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Abstract 
This dissertation is an extensive study of the rise of urban private enterprises in post - 
1949 China. It focuses upon the changing relationship between the state and the private 
sector. As a backdrop to my argumentation, it traces the historical background of the 
Chinese private economy back through the whole era of the Communist rule and 
discusses the politico- economic logic of the revival of a private economy after the 
Mao's era. Based upon my case studies of the private information technology sector in 
Beijing and Guangzhou, I argue that the theory of "embeddedness" in the literature of 
economic sociology fails to grasp the dynamics of development of the private 
enterprises. Instead, I argue that a process of "disembeddedness" is under way in the 
evolution of the private sector, driven by the impact of overwhelming market forces. I 
suggest that private enterprises in China have become an autonomous economic force, 
not at the mercy of the state bureaucracy as previous accounts depicted. 
I also argue that the Chinese state can be likened to an "intermediate state" in 
accordance with the state theory put forward by Peter Evans, because it lacks a 
consistent performance in economic transformation. It has not yet become a 
"developmental state" due to a lack of ability to collaborate with the private sector to 
pursue national development goals. Despite the vast contribution of the private sector to 
post -Mao economic development, the state and the private entrepreneurs are alienated 
from each other. I suggest that this has become an obstacle to the subsequent 
development of the private economy. 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
This is a study of the political economy of development in a transitional socialist 
country, China. The study focuses upon the most burgeoning economic sector, 
indigenous urban private enterprise with a particular focus upon the information 
technology (IT) industry. The dissertation is framed by corresponding studies from 
economic sociology, which has produced a considerable number of scholarly works on 
the Chinese economy. 
The revival of a de novo private economic sector is one of the hallmarks of 
reform among the former socialist countries in Eastern Europe and the socialist 
countries in Asia, namely China and Vietnam. While many foreign observers and 
scholars were probing into the Chinese reform of a state -dominated ownership system, a 
quiet revolution involving the resurrection of private ownership exerted a neglected 
influence upon the economic reform. Since the 1990s, the private sector has gradually 
grown into a significant powerhouse of Chinese economic growth. According to a 
recently released report by the World Bank, the private economic sector, which the 
report refers to as shareholding, foreign and indigenous private firms, including private 
enterprises falsely registered as collectives, accounted for 33% of GDP in 1998, of 
which the indigenous private sector already constituted 24 %, whereas the state sector 
was reduced to 37 per cent. 
A Technical- Report: China Private Enterprise Study, prepared for the International Finance Corporation 
(IFC), the World Bank and The State Economic and Trade Commission (SETC), the PRC, by the Asia 
Pacific School of Economics and Management at the Australian National University with the assistance 
of the China Centre for Economic Research, Peking University. Canberra, January 2000. 
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The indigenous private firms are officially divided into two types of economic 
entities: self -employed household firms, the so- called getihu, and private enterprises, 
the so- called siying qiye. The former refers to a tiny individual firm that is supposed to 
employ less than eight persons, while the latter refers to a private firm employing more 
than seven persons, according to the Provisional Regulations on Private Enterprises 
promulgated in 1988.2 By the end of 1999, there were 31 million getihu, which 
employed a total of 60 million persons, and 1.5 million private enterprises, which 
covered 20 million employees.3 The private enterprises are the subject of this study, and 
more specifically the high -tech "knowledge" side of it - the private sector of the IT 
industry. 
Why the IT Industry? 
The IT industry is becoming the rocket of a new phase of global economic 
development, the so- called "New Economy." India is unleashing its long- shackled 
economy, with the IT sector as the spearhead of growth. This industry just re- 
engineered the revival of the South Korean economy, after a two -year trauma caused by 
the Asian financial crisis,4 and the growth of the industry Korean government support is 
playing an indispensable part. This recent boom of the IT industry seems to attest to the 
prediction by Peter Evans that the sector is most likely to be the leading business sector 
The distinction of these two types of firms by this definition is not very true in practice now. I will 
discuss this issue in Chapters 3 and 5. 
3 China Daily, 28 August 2000 (Internet edition: www.chinadaily.com.cn). 
Brian Bremner & Moon Ihlwan, "Korea's Digital Quest," Business Week (Asian edition), 25 September 
2000: 20 -5. 
2 
in the 21st century with substantial state involvement in shaping the path of industrial 
transformation.5 
In China, the IT industry provides a focal point by which not only to examine 
the changing state- business interplay but also to grasp the trend of development of the 
private economic sector in this socialist country. The IT industry is a sunrise industry 
that is relatively free of the old planning system, so that the private sector was better 
able to burgeon in this industry and to create a larger niche than the overall private 
sector. Moreover, since the Chinese state realises that technological innovation will 
serve as a key to sustaining current economic growth, the state's industrial policy is 
becoming high -tech oriented, with the IT sector at the vanguard of all high -tech sectors 
and as the focus of the state's support. As the state began boosting the development of 
private enterprises, it put a higher premium on the high -tech private sector. The recently 
adopted Tenth Five -Year Economic Plan directs that the government "should create a 
fair competition environment for all types of enterprises, and support, encourage and 
guide private and individual firms, especially technology -based medium- and small - 
sized ones, to develop in a healthy direction. (emphasis added) "6 It is clear, in short, that 
the private IT/high -tech enterprises enjoy higher status among all types of private firms. 
The IT industry is cultivating a new generation of entrepreneurs, some of whom 
are already millionaires today.? They are of the type whose success promotes the 
legitimacy of private ownership among the communist government and a people 
5 Peter Evans, Embedded Autonomy: State and Industrial Transformation (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 1995), 11. 
6 See the full text of the Plan from Renmin ribao [People's Daily], 19 October 2000: 1. 
7 According to a recently released list of the 50 richest entrepreneurs in China, the core businesses of nine 
of these entrepreneurs lie in the IT industry. The richest among them is Song Chaodi, ranked as tenth, 
who is one of the cases in my sample. See Forbes Global 3, 24(25 November 2000): 150 -9. 
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imbued with decades of socialist indoctrination. The image of legitimacy held by these 
entrepreneurs may help to create more room for the rest of private enterprises in other 
industries. In short, the IT sector becomes an excellent testing ground for us to 
scrutinise to what extent, at its best, the interaction between the state and the private 
enterprises is shaping the Chinese economic configuration in the new century. 
Methodology 
The research was carried out mainly through on -site in -depth interviews with private 
entrepreneurs. I selected two cities as my field sites: Beijing and Guangzhou. My 
fieldwork was conducted from May to December 1999. Interviewees were contacted 
through four sources. The first is through the Internet. Many enterprises in China, 
especially the IT firms, now have their own websites and I was able to tap these to 
contact their management for interviews. The second source was through personal 
connections - accessing interviewees through my friends' acquaintances in Beijing 
and Guangzhou. Third were institutional referrals, by way of intermediary 
organisations, especially the administrations of the Tianhe Scientech Park and the 
Guangzhou Economic and Technology Development Zone in Guangzhou. The fourth 
source was direct personal approaches to several renowned private enterprises. Among 
the four methods, enterprises accessed via website searching constitute 80% of the cases 
in this study. 
I completed 50 case studies of enterprises, all of which included interviewing: 
26 from Beijing and 24 from Guangzhou. I also chatted with a few businesspeople who 
refused to be formally intery iewed. Among the 50 cases, not all of the interviewees 
4 
were the chief executive. Sometimes, I interviewed senior managers instead, especially 
in the cases of large -scale enterprises. But I tried to collect material about the chief 
executive from the interviewees and other overt sources. (The heads of the large -scale 
enterprises were often celebrities whom newspapers and magazines had written about 
extensively.) Notably, too, the interviewed top executives were not necessarily the 
owners of the companies. An entrepreneur whose company was funded by foreign 
venture investment was such a case. Another case was an enterprise founded by an 
interviewed entrepreneur but fully funded by another private capitalist. Among my 50 
cases, 42 come from the IT industry and 8 cases come from other industries and provide 
comparisons and a control in this study. 
Most of the interviews were conducted using a tape recorder to enable me to 
carry out the interviews smoothly. Most businesspeople did not mind speaking into a 
tape recorder and even took the government to task on tape. The interviewees were 
questioned along the lines of a semi -structured questionnaire (See Appendix II). I also 
asked them extra follow -up questions. Most interviews were conducted at the 
entrepreneurs' offices. Each interview lasted from 45 minutes to 1% hours. The duration 
depended upon whether the interviewees were talkative and whether I could explore 
some extra topics based on what they said. However, sometimes the interviewees were 
very busy, and so I had to cut the interviews short. Usually, the businesspeople would 
reject being interviewed if I insisted upon a one -hour interview beforehand. However, 
when the interviewees found me familiar with their businesses, they often forgot to 
watch the time, and the interviews could be prolonged. Hence, I tried to familiarise 
myself with and keep abreast of their part of the IT industry before interviews. 
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Besides the interviewing, I also have amassed a variety of documentary 
materials about the private economy, IT industry and related information in China. The 
data of the 50 cases are not only drawn from the interviews but also from other media, 
including newspapers, magazines and the Internet. After interviews, I kept abreast of the 
news of the enterprises and entrepreneurs I studied. Alongside the development of the 
Internet, T kept observing the up -to -date situation of my cases through visiting their 
companies' websites and on -line news coverage. This after -fieldwork information has 
been incorporated into the dissertation. 
Concepts, Terminology and the Scope of the Study 
According to my original research plan, I only expected to study officially registered 
indigenous private enterprises, excluding "fake" collectives and foreign -funded private 
enterprises. However, during my fieldtrip, I found it difficult, without case referrals by 
the Bureau of Industry and Commerce Management (Gongshang xingzheng guanliju), 
to judge initially whether a firm was a private enterprise. At the beginning of my 
fieldtrip, whenever I contacted a firm for an interview, I tried to make sure that it was a 
"private" firm. However, I failed. When I contacted companies for interviews, I noted 
that my research focused upon "private" enterprises, but I found that the staff was 
sometimes ignorant of the real registration of their companies. Even when I could talk 
directly with the owners, the owners sometimes seemed only to hold an ambiguous 
sense of the nature of their own firms. As a result, I interviewed a number of 
entrepreneurs whose enterprises were not formally registered as private firms. 
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The key to this misunderstanding should be attributed to the expressions 
"siying" and " minying." Both terms are usually translated as "privately owned." But 
whereas there is a strict official classification of private enterprises, the businesspeople 
did not adhere to this. The indigenous privately -owned enterprises should be called 
"siying" according to the official norms. However, more businesspeople now would like 
to adopt " minying" as a label for their enterprises, including the private entrepreneurs 
who register their firms as collective enterprises: that is, the firms that "put on a red hat" 
(dai hong maozi). This is because min could be associated with renmin (people). 
Minying can be understood as "people- managed," which sounds better socialIy and 
politically in China than "privately- managed" (siying). Si is associated with zisi 
(selfishness) and collides both with the notion of socialism and with Chinese culture.$ 
However, we should dissociate siying from minying, albeit the latter 
encompasses the former. Minying is a term now employed to label all enterprises except 
for the traditional state -run and foreign enterprises. Some minying enterprises lie within 
the category of state ownership. Precisely speaking, the source of their funding is not 
from individuals but from some non -profit state or semi -state organisations or from 
other state -owned enterprises. In the case of the IT industry, many of these are "spin- 
offs" from universities and research institutes. 
Unlike the traditional state -mn sector, these companies are registered as 
independent legal entities and are not funded through the state budget. They do not 
operate under the direction of any economic ministry. They bear the responsibility for 
their own profits and losses, facing a harder budget constraint than the traditional state 
8 Philip Huang provided the same account of this cultural distinctiveness in Chinese. See his 
`Biculturality in Modem China and in Chinese Studies," Modern China 26, I (January, 2000): 4 -5. 
enterprises. They are basically self -financed and rely upon their retained profit for 
reinvestment. Some of them are in a mixed ownership involving with private capital 
investment, so it is now difficult to classify the nature of such enterprises simply by 
ownership. Minying becomes a generic term for the people on the mainland to 
encapsulate these enterprises. 
In addition, due to the inferior status of the indigenous private sector vis -à -vis 
the public and foreign sectors, while some indigenous private enterprises try to register 
themselves as collective enterprises, some others try to register themselves as foreign - 
funded enterprises, the so- called "putting- on -of -a- foreign -hat" (dai yang maozi). These 
enterprises are usually nominally established by overseas Chinese who are acquainted 
with the real business founders. Starting in the 1980s, many mainland Chinese went 
overseas to study; and some acquired residency /citizenship abroad. They helped their 
kith and kin at home to organise de jure "foreign- funded" firms. In the 1990s, some of 
these students started to return to China to seek out business opportunities. Taking 
advantage of their new identity, their firms could be registered as foreign- funded 
enterprises and granted preferential treatment. Especially important to them would have 
been the independent right to export and import. 
Besides the problem of phoney public and foreign firms, it should be realised 
that, as noted above, the capital structure of the indigenous private enterprises has 
become increasingly complicated. Apart from the state -private mixed ownership, the 
rapid growth of the indigenous private economy in the 1990s lures foreign companies to 
seek partnerships not only with the public sector, hut also with some outstanding private 
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firms. Some foreign capital has also been injected into the indigenous private sector in 
the form of venture capital instead of forming joint ventures. 
Owing to the above reasons, in the midst of my fieldtrip I decided to open the 
boundaries of my case selection and to restructure my conception of the parameters of 
indigenous private enterprises in China today. My belief is that the enterprise cases 
presented in this dissertation project a relatively accurate image of indigenous private 
enterprises in China 
To avoid any conceptual and terminological confusion, let me clarify here some 
terms that have specific definitions in this dissertation. 
Enterprise known as "qiye" in Chinese, refers to all types of business firms, 
except for the self -employed households (getihu). 
Company - known as "gongsi" in Chinese, only refers to a limited liability 
company if it is a privately owned enterprise. In other words, an unincorporated 
private firm cannot be considered a "company." 
State Enterprise - this generally refers to an enterprise that is owned by the state. 
In this dissertation, it narrowly refers to a state -owned enterprise that is funded by 
the state budget and subject to the administrative control of state ministries. 
Public and Non -public Enterprise - the public enterprise category encompasses the 
state -owned enterprises, the collective enterprises, and shareholding enterprises. The 
non -public (feigong) enterprise is a popular term on the mainland to refer to both 
officially registered indigenous private firms and foreign funded companies. 
Non -state /Minying Enterprise - this category of enterprises consists of the 
collective, cooperative, shareholding, individual and private, and state -owned 
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people- managed enterprises.9 It solely excludes the state -owned state -run 
enterprises that are funded by the state budget and subject to the administrative 
control of state ministries. This term originated in the high- tech -IT industry.10 In 
order to highlight the distinct feature of this category, I prefer in this dissertation to 
use minying to label the non -state IT /high -tech enterprises. For instance, among my 
cases in Guangzhou, one is a state -owned spin -off, which can be considered a 
minying enterprise. 
Thus, this study of indigenous private enterprises covers the scope of minying, beyond 
the boundary of the "orthodox" private enterprises. Nowadays, many private 
entrepreneurs in China do not manage an "orthodox" private enterprise. For example, 
the renowned Harbin -based Orient Group (Dongfang Jituan), one of the biggest non - 
state conglomerates, developed from a village collective construction team in 1978 - 
now a shareholding company - and is popularly considered a private enterprise. Its 
president, Zhang Hongwei, is one of the richest entrepreneurs in China. The top IT 
company, Legend (Lianxiang), a spin -off from the Chinese Academy of Sciences 
(CAS), only having received a loan of 200,000 yuan from the CAS since its founding, 
claimed itself a state -owned people- managed enterprise before its shareholding 
° In Corinna- Barbara Francis's study of high -tech industry in China, she referred to all state -owned spin- 
offs as non -state enterprises. See her "Reproduction of Danwei Institutional Feature in the Context of 
China's Market Economy: The Case of Haidian District's High -Tech Sector," The China Quarterly, 147 
(September, 1996): 839 -59. 
1° This definition is derived from a policy document promulgated in 1993 that aimed to encourage the 
development of minying technology -based enterprises. See Xinhua yuebao [New China Monthly], 584 
(June, 1993): 42. 
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transformation in 1999.11 Its president, Liu Chuanzhi, is also considered a private 
entrepreneur, and he holds stock in Legend worth many millions of yuan. 
The above two cases raise a question. What is a private enterprise and private 
entrepreneur in the context of China nowadays? In this dissertation, I define a private 
enterprise as a business venture managed by individual persons who are not subject to 
any state hierarchical control in their business operations and who assume the role of 
residual claimants, for a venture that is not funded by the state budget. But a private 
entrepreneur may not be the owner of an enterprise, albeit s/he is a risk -taker and risk - 
bearer. Here the private enterprise and the private entrepreneur are two discrete entities. 
First of all, in a real situation, no matter whether in China or other market economies, 
ownership and control over operations are often separated in an enterprise. An 
entrepreneur is not necessarily an investor or an owner of an enterprise. The state can 
provide some of the capital to support private businesses, like Legend. In this sense, in a 
state -owned enterprise there may exist a private entrepreneur who assumes the right of 
operation of the enterprise. Many leased or contracted -out state enterprises are run by 
such private entrepreneurs. The shareholding state -owned companies are operated by 
private entrepreneurs who are stockholders of the companies. Different from the factory 
directors (changzhang) of traditional state -run enterprises, these managers need to take 
business risks and are residual claimants to the enterprises. 
It is notable that the private enterprises are not necessarily purely privately - 
funded enterprises. The initial capital of many private enterprises was drawn from loans 
n For the development history of Legend, see Qiwen Lu, China's Leap into the Information Age: 
Innovation and Organization in the Computer Industry (New York: Oxford University Press, 2000), 63- 
103. 
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provided by various state institutions. They might secure, in varying degrees, other 
state -controlled resources granted by local governments, like collective assets, land and 
production plants. Only by employing the above definition, can we elicit the dynamics 
of the private economic growth. 
Prelude 
This dissertation will argue that the private sector in China has become increasingly 
autonomous from the mercy of the state bureaucracy. The evolution of the sector is 
overwhelmingly determined by market forces. The state, social and cultural institutions 
only modulate the angle of the development path, and do not play the key role. 
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Chapter 2: Alternative Approaches to the Growth of the Private 
Sector: A Critical Review and Framing of Research 
Three Explanatory Approaches 
The development of private business in post -Mao China did not catch much scholarly 
attention until the end of the 1980s. The surge of interest at that time could be attributed 
to the political role of private businesspeople in the Tiananmen Incident in 1989. The 
economic role of businesspeople remained insignificant compared with the enormous 
size of the state -owned sector. However, they were a relatively independent group under 
a Communist regime and academics looked to see whether private business could be 
one of the ingredients of a hoped -for democracy. Though almost all of the researchers 
put a "not yet" answer to this question, the issue promoted a wider interest in the private 
sector's development. Paradoxically, the crisis of 1989 also became a driving force 
within China in the proliferation of the private sector. It seems that the government 
attempted to unleash the engine of private economic growth to distract popular attention 
from political issues and to boost economic development so as to legitimise Communist 
rule. 
There are three broad analytical approaches to the growth of private business in 
China. These are the central -state approach, the market -transition approach and the 
clientelist approach. The central -state approach focuses on the role of central policy - 
making and macro -politics in directing the ebb and flow of the private sector.' In this 
Dorothy J. Solinger, Three Visions of Chinese Socialism (Boulder: Westview Press, 1984); Thomas B. 
Gold, "Urban Private Business in China," Studies in Comparative Communism 22, 2 &3 (Sum. /Aut., 
I989): 187 -201; Kristen Parris, "The Rise of Private Business," in Merle Goldman & Roderick 
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perspective, the growth of the private economy is at the mercy of state reformers who 
take a liberal approach to its development. However, the uncertainty of the state's 
policy as well as local bureaucratic predation is counter -effective to further prosperity.' 
From the perspective of institutional economics, Ding Lu stresses that the suppressed 
market institutions in Deng Xiaoping's China to a certain extent channelled the 
entrepreneurial resources into capturing artificially advantageous positions under an 
officially enforced monopoly.3 
While the central -state approach examines the influence of conscious state 
actions, the market- transition approach underscores the unintended effects of market 
reforms. Put forward by Victor Nee, the approach holds to the premise that the adoption 
of market- oriented reforms creates a favourable environment for the growth of private 
businesses by reducing the redistributive role of the state. The growth of the private 
sector in turn facilitates the transition to a full market system by fostering a more 
competitive environment. The interaction between both sides snowballs into an out -of- 
plan growth of private business.4 Despite his emphasis on the significance of the state - 
imposed market institutions, Lu indicates that the activities of private entrepreneurs in 
China are incessantly correcting the distorted market and pushing policymakers towards 
more market -oriented reforms.5 Akin to the market -transition approach, Richard Smith 
MacFarquhar (eds.), The Paradox of China's Post Mao Reform (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 
1999). 
Rashid Malik, Chinese Entrepreneurs in the Economic Development of China (Westport: Praeger, 
1997). 
Ding Lu, Entrepreneurship in Suppressed Markets: Private- Sector Experience in China (New York: 
Garland, 1994). 
° See Victor Nee & Rebecca Matthews, "Market Transition and Societal Transformation in Reforming 
State Socialism," Annual Review of Sociology 22 (1996): 425 -26. 
'Ding Lu, op. cit., 107 -127. 
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argues that it is the inexorable failure of market reform within the state sector that 
enables the private sector to thrive.6 
Arguing against the decline of bureaucratic power during marketisation, the 
clientelist approach contends, in scrutinising the frontline relations between street -level 
bureaucrats and private businesses, that bureaucratic power has not been curtailed by 
the market- oriented reform. The proliferation of the private sector involves a nexus of 
political manoeuvres in which the local bureaucracy significantly shapes the process.' 
Along the lines of Andrew Walder, who argues for the prevailing and enduring strength 
of state/bureaucratic power under the market reforms,8 the clientelist argument posits 
that the distributive function of bureaucracy has not ceased, albeit it is declining. The 
decline in this kind of power does not mean that the bureaucrats have lost all sources of 
power. They can even make use of decentralisation to exploit other sources of power 
and advantages. With respect to private economic growth, bureaucracies provide 
shelters to private businesses, especially under unfavourable political/policy conditions, 
and commodity the resources they hold in exchange for the latter's tribute to local 
government coffers. The growth of the private sector arises partly out of an exchange 
process between favour- seeking businesspeople and benefit- seeking bureaucrats in what 
6 Richard Smith, "The Chinese Road to Capitalism," New Left Review, 199 (May -June, 1993): 55 -99. 
7 Ole Braun, Business and Bureaucracy in a Chinese City: An Ethnography of Private Business 
Households in Contemporary China (Berkeley: Institute of East Asian Studies, University of California, 
1993). 
s Andrew Welder, "Market and Inequality in Transitional Economies: Towards Testable Theories," 
American Journal of Sociology 101, 4 (January, 1996): 1060 -1073. 
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become patron -client relationships. This is not ideal -typical market development that 
the market -transition arguments would suggest.9 
The above three approaches are ideal- types, and each focuses on a single theme. 
While the central -state approach aptly highlights the significance of state policies as a 
driving force in the ups and downs of the private sector, it cannot explain the 
spontaneous growth of the private sector, whose development outpaced the limitations 
placed upon it by central policies from the outset. The market -transition approach is 
better able to explain the unintended proliferation of the sector, but it portrays a zero - 
sum game of the market displacing the state, ignoring the significant function of local 
bureaucratic sponsorship suggested by the clientelist approach. On the other hand, the 
clientelist approach fails to explain the non -particularistic aspects of private- sector 
development by ignoring market forces. 
Although none of the research publications in the 1990s adopt an ideal -type 
approach, all of them lean towards one of the three approaches. Willy Kraus leaned 
towards the central -state approach by scrutinising the changing central policies towards 
the private economy even while he also drew attention to local spontaneous 
development.10 Despite her attention to the informal ties between local bureaucracy and . 
private business in her case studies of Sichuan, Susan Young highlighted the 
decentralisation policy of the government as the dynamic of private economic growth 
9 David Wank, "Bureaucratic Patronage and Private Business: Changing Network of Power in Urban 
China," in Andrew G. Walder (ed.), The Waning of the Communist State: Economic Origins of 
Political Decline in China and Hungary (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1995) and David 
Wank, Commodífying Communism: Business, Trust, and Politics in a Chinese City (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1999). 
1° Willy Kraus, Private Business in China: Revival between Ideology and Pragmatism (Honolulu: 
University of Hawaii Press, 1991). 
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and emphasised the confrontation between business and bureaucracy» More remote 
from the central -state approach, some recent studies, usually in sociology, examine the 
local dynamics of private economic growth and the "bottom -up" pattern of the policy 
making From the clientelist perspective, David Wank argues that the "bottom -up" 
pattern does not necessarily imply market growth at the expense of the state hierarchy. 
Nor is the relationship between businesspeople and bureaucracy necessarily one of 
confrontation. Instead his case studies of private trading businesses in the city of 
Xiamen in Fujian Province unveiled many cases of mutual accommodation and 
reciprocity through the formation of patron- client ties. Wank further asserts that these 
ties do not simply fade away with the expansion of market forces.12 
Likewise, against the Wank's studies conducted at the end of the 1980s, a 
political scientist, Andrea Roberts, refutes the notion that personal ties with bureaucracy 
become less useful in the competitive environment of the 1990s. She argues that the 
accumulated power of the private economy has already formed a force facilitating 
market -transition, driving the government ultimately to accede to market forces. A 
non -Western sociologist, Chen Chieh -hsüan, in his recent studies in several prosperous 
counties in Guangdong Province, holds to the same argument and contends that 
economic development and marketisation induces a division of labour between the 
government and business firms. And both the local government and the business 
u Susan Young, "Private Entrepreneurs and Evolutionary Change in China," in David S. G. Goodman & 
Beverley Hooper (eds.), China's Quiet Revolution: New Interactions between State and Society 
(Melbourne: Longman Cheshire, 1994) & Private Business and Economic Reform in China (Armonk: 
M.E. Sharpe, 1995). 
I2 David Wank, "Bureaucratic Patronage and Private Business: Changing Network of Power in Urban 
China," op. cit. 
13 Andrea Lynne Robert, The Political Impact of China's New Private Entrepreneurs, PhD Dissertation 
(University of California, Berkeley, 1997). 
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community have to zero in on their own specialities so as to be able to hasten local 
economic development hand -in -hand. In this regard, the ties between the government 
and business firms are based upon a "professional" trust. They should not be confused 
with "particularistic" personal ties.14 
The market -transition and the clientelist accounts constitute the two contending 
models to explain the growth of the private sector in China. Despite debates between the 
two sides, sometimes each account represents one side of a coin. Wank and Roberts in 
reality recognised the significance of both personal ties and marketisation. By 
elaborating on Solinger's argument of the transition from dependent to symbiotic 
clientelism15 and by arguing for market -clientelism, Wank recognised that clientelism 
and marketisation went hand in hand, but he disagreed with the argument of complete 
erosion of the patron -client relationship due to the growth of the market.' 
Paradoxically, he suggested that the bigger a private enterprise became, the more 
important bureaucratic support became to it." Thus Wank linked marketisation to 
clientelism by subsuming the former under the latter. In contrast, Roberts modifies the 
market -transition account, or what can be labelled a political economy account,'$ by 
14 Chen Chíeh- hsüan, Taiwan chanye de shehuixue yanjiu [Studies of Taiwan's Industrial Sociology] 
(Taipei: Lianjing, 1998). 
15 See Dorothy I. Solinger, "Urban Entrepreneurs and the State: The Merger of State and Society," in 
Arthur Lewis Rosenbaum (ed.), State and Society in China: The Consequences of Reform (Boulder: 
Westview Press, 1992). In dependent clientelism, private businesspeople as clients depend more upon 
the support of their patron, the bureaucracy, and the tie is more stable. However, in symbiotic 
clientelism, both sides are mutually dependent, possibly the patron depends more upon the client in 
material resources. The tie is more opportunistic. See David Wank, "Bureaucratic Patronage and 
Private Business: Changing Network of Power in Urban China," op. cit. 
'6 See David Wank, "The Institutional Process of Market Clientelism: Guanxi and Private Business in a 
South China City," The China Quarterly, 147 (September, 1996): 836. 
'7 See David Wank, "Bureaucratic Patronage and Private Business: Changing Network of Power in Urban 
China," op. cit., 181. 
is David Wank refers a similar argument to "political economy" account. See Commodifying 
Communism, op. cit., 26 -8. 
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absorbing personal ties into the operations of market transition. She asserts that the 
aggregate effect of the common practice of seeking bureaucratic favours is to break the 
hierarchical bureaucratic control over resource allocation - or in economic terms 
"market distortions." The informal and even illegal practices generated by personal ties 
correct this distortion, which is in line with Lu's "distortion- correcting" argument.19 In 
fact, the arguments between Wank and Roberts were to a large extent mutually 
compatible. The difference between both lay in their recognition of the role of personal 
ties in the market. The market clientelism school perceived it as the embeddedness of 
clientelism in the market. Clientelism was part of marketisation, so it did not fade away 
with marketisation.20 The political economy school perceives it as a generator of the 
market. It argues that personal ties help generate markets in different fields previously 
dominated by the administrative hierarchy, but that these ties erode after having broken 
up the hierarchical allocation system. 
However, David Wank in his latest account slightly revises his frame by 
replacing the word "market" with the word "commercial. "21 "Commercial Clientelism" 
seems to deny the market reform in China is a true marketisation. It is rather a 
"commodification" of state resources. Different from marketisation, in commodification 
the resources are only exchanged dyadically between bureaucrats and entrepreneurs in 
closed commercial terms. The bureaucratic monopoly over resources thus is not 
curtailed, in contrast to the marketisation. Wank further suggests that the more 
19 Ding Lu, op. cit. 
20 David Wank, "The Institutional Process of Market CIientelism," op. cit., 836. 
21 David Wank, "Political Sociology and Contemporary China: State -society Images in American China 
Studies," Journal of Contemporary China 7, 18 (July, 1998): 205 -227 & Commodifying Communism, 
op. cit. 
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economically developed an area, the more the large private businesses need to gain 
access to state resources.22 He thus argues that economic prosperity brings the 
bureaucracies and entrepreneurs closer together. Wank now keeps his account distinct 
from the market-transition/political economy accounts. 
At the opposite end of the spectrum, Chen argues for the view that entrepreneurs 
are becoming more autonomous as the more developed the Chinese economy becomes. 
Although Chen subscribes to that government and entrepreneurs are mutually 
dependent, the entrepreneurs are no longer subject to the government control. 
Furthermore, the local government has to adjust itself to accommodate to the demand of 
entrepreneurs. The bargaining power of entrepreneurs is sharply enhanced.23 
The Three Approaches in Changing Contexts 
The various arguments to a large extent represent the different dynamics of 
development in different times and places. Chronologically, the private sector was in a 
germinal stage until around 1988. Until then a petty private economy of individual 
producers and vendors constituted the bulk of private activities, which had developed in 
an unfriendly environment. As a result of its weakness as well as the legacy of 
ideological discrimination, the private sector was very vulnerable to shifts in state 
policy. However, the relative success of rural economic reforms and liberalisation 
fostered strong private businesses in rural areas. Correspondingly, the first wave of 
foreign writings, which highly depended upon the documents released by the news 
22 David Wank, "Political Sociology and Contemporary China: State -society Images in American China 
Studies," op. cit., 222. 
23 Chen Chieh- hsüan, op. cit., 357 -66. 
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media, was sensitive to the state's policy debates and the suppressive aspects of policy 
implementation, and so leaned towards the central -state approach.24 
The possibility of fieldwork since the end of the 1980s and vigorous private 
economic development in the rural areas have turned the academic focus towards the 
rural private sector. This second wave of work increasingly has focused on the local 
bureaucracy- business interactions rather than state policy.25 The take -off of the private 
sector in urban areas since the 1984 urban reform also drew the attention of a few 
academics who were conducting field research in Chinese cities.26 But observers of the 
urban scene more often have put their efforts into scrutinising the political role of 
entrepreneurs and of the intermediary organisations that stood between them and the 
24 Dorothy J. Solinger, Three Visions of Chinese Socialism (Boulder: Westview Press, 1984); Linda 
Hershkovitz, "The Fruits of Ambivalence: China's Urban Individual Economy," Pacific Affairs 58, 3 
(Fall, 1985): 427 -450; Thomas B. Gold, "Urban Private Business in China," op. cit.; Susan Young, 
"Policy, Practice and the Private Sector in China," The Australian Journal of Chinese Affairs, 2I 
(January, 1989): 57 -80; Susan Young, "Wealth but Not Security: Attitude towards Private Business in 
China in the 1980s," The Australian Journal of Chinese Affairs, 25 (January, 1991): 115 -137; Willy 
Kraus, op. cit. 
25 Ole Odgaard, Private Enterprises in Rural China: Impact on Agriculture and Social Stratification. 
(Aldershot, Hants: Avebury, 1992); Yia -ling Liu, "Reform from Below: The Private Economy and 
Local Politics in the Rural Industrialization of Wenzhou," The China Quarterly, 130 (June, 1992): 293- 
316; Susan Young, "Private Entrepreneurs and Evolutionary Change in China," op. cit. & Private 
Business and Economic Reform in China, op. cit. 
26 Thomas B. Gold, "China's Private Entrepreneurs: Small -scale Private Business Prospers under 
Socialism," The China Business Review 12, 6 (Nov.-Dec., 1985): 46 -50; "Urban Private Business in 
China," op. cit.; "Guerrilla Interviewing among the Getihu," in Perry link, Richard Madsen & Paul G. 
Pickowicz (eds.), Unofficial China: Popular Culture and Thought in the People's Republic (Boulder: 
Westview Press, 1989); '`Urban Private Business and China's Reforms," in Richard Baum (ed.), 
Reform and Reaction in Post -Mao China: The Road to Tiananmen (London: Routledge, 1991); Ole 
Bruun, Business and Bureaucracy in a Chinese City, op. cit.; "Political Hierarchy and Private 
Entrepreneurship in a Chinese Neighborhood," in Andrew G. Walder (ed.), The Waning of the 
Communist State (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1995); David L. Wank, "Private Business, 
Bureaucracy, and Political Alliance in a Chinese City," Australian Journal of Chinese Affairs, 33 
(January, I995): 55 -71; "Bureaucratic Patronage and Private Business: Changing Network of Power in 
Urban China," op. cit.; "The Institutional Process of Market CIientelism: Guanxi and Private Business 
in a South China City," op. cit.; "Political Sociology and Contemporary China: State -society Images in 
American China Studies," op. cit.; Commodifying Communism: Business, Trust, and Politics in a 
Chinese City, op. cit.; "Producing Property Rights: Strategies, Networks and Efficiency in Urban 
China's Nonstate Firms," in Andrew G. Walder & Jean C. Oi (eds.), Property Rights and Economic 
Reform in China (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1999). 
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state.27 Despite the variations in their research agendas, one common point that both 
rural and urban studies caught was the significance of informal vertical ties between 
bureaucrats and private businesspeople. This helped to explain (1) why the private 
sector could grow beyond the limits drawn by central state policy; (2) why the sector 
could carry on through the crisis of 1989; and (3) the operating logic of the private 
sector in a period of uncertainty. 
With the passage of time, difficulties faced by the state sector, and the further 
legalisation of the private economy, more resources are being left to private control. Its 
rapid development since 1992 made Victor Nee's market- transition account, which was 
proposed in 1989, regain momentum, despite a shift in the new arguments.28 Andrea 
Roberts' recent PhD research substantiated that personal ties not only were compatible 
with the market transition but also facilitated the development of market institutions.29 
She explained that the personal exchanges outside the purview of legal institutions were 
endeavours to enforce market exchanges that were forbidden by the state's 
discriminatory institutions and policies. The growing predominance of these illegal 
practices forced the surrender and endorsement of the state to market exchanges. It 
should be recognised that the private sector nowadays has passed the stage of a struggle 
for survival. Businesspeople are possibly hesitant to invest but apparently seldom for 
27 Christopher Earle Nevitt, "Private Business Associations in China: Evidence of Civil Society or Local 
State Power," The China Journal, 36 (July, 1996): 24 -43; Kristen Parris, "Private Entrepreneur as 
Citizen: From Leninism to Corporatism," China Information 10, 3/4 (Winter /Spring, 1996): 1 -28; 
Jonathan Unger, " `Bridges': Private Business, the Chinese Government and the Rise of New 
Associations," The China Quarterly, 147 (September, 1996): 795 -819; Margaret Pearson, China's New 
Business Elite: The Political Consequences of Economic Reform (Berkeley: University of California 
Press, 1997). 
28 See Victor Nee, "A Theory of Market Transition: From Redistribution to Markets in State Socialism," 
American Sociological Review 54, 5 (October, 1989): 663 -81. 
29 Andrea Lynne Robert, op. cit. 
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political reasons. They are no longer so evidently at the mercy of bureaucracy. They 
now hold less the image of victims and instead an image of being the greatest 
beneficiaries of the reform. If anything possibly imperils them, it is the 
underdevelopment of the formal institutions that would ensure a stable and predictable 
business environment for the private entrepreneurs. 
Despite the newly gained momentum of the market- transition approach, the 
recent attempts tended to incorporate the clientelist arguments into the market- transition 
account.30 Now the debate is not whether informal linkages function during the period 
of marketisation, but rather a question of the nature and functions of the informal 
linkages. Yet the attempt at a synthesis weakens rather than strengthens the market - 
transition argument, as the incorporation of informal linkages is regarded as antithetical 
to the core ideas of the market -transition account.31 It should be noted that the earliest 
market -transition hypotheses too optimistically predicted the rapid transformation of the 
socialist economy into a system imitating the western market. But Chen asserts that 
while marketisation is indeed significantly transforming the pre -reform socio- economic 
relationships, sociologists usually disregard the impact of it. The existence of informal 
linkages should not be considered antithetical to the market, because the Iinkages are 
business -oriented as such.32 
3° Victor Nee & Sijin Su, "Institutions, Social Ties, and Commitment in China's Corporatist 
Transformation," in John McMillan & Barry Naughton (eds.), Reforming Asian Socialism: The Growth 
of Market Institutions (Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press, 1996); Yimin Lin, The 
Competitive Advantage of Firms after Communism: State and Market in Post -Mao China, Manuscript 
(1998). 
31 Xueguang Zhou, "Reply: Beyond the Debate and toward Substantive Institutional Analysis," American 
Journal of Sociology 105, 4 (January 2000): 1175 -89. 
32 Chen Chíeh- hsüan, op. cit., 348, 357. 
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The argumentation of the market -transition/political economy account should 
look more promising due to the state's milestone step of marketisation since the early 
1990s. Even the stalwarts of the clientelist account or state -centred approach have 
recently found the significant dispersal of resources to the private sector by state - 
sponsored privatisation and the vigorous growth of the private business since the early 
1990s.33 The latest works of Wank still fail to entertain the consequences of the reform 
after the 1990s.34 But the clientelist /state- centred viewpoint still enjoys currency among 
Western academics. 
This dissertation constitutes another attempt to examine the relationship between 
marketisation and informal linkages, and between the state and business at the close of 
the 1990s. Rather than examine the dyadic state -business linkage, my research goes 
further to encompass the multiple linkages among businesses (including SOEs and state 
business agencies) and between businesses and various state administrative agencies. 
When there is uneven access to resources in the market, does this imply the 
functioning of a patron -client relationship or alternatively other business linkages? 
What networking strategies do entrepreneurs adopt to maximise their edge over their 
competitors and to minimise the risk/uncertainty of the politico- economic environment? 
Do the networks and relationships with the state agencies become more formalised and 
de- personalised? The fundamental question is whether private entrepreneurs manipulate 
these linkages or are subject to manipulation by these linkages. An answer to such a 
33 For example, see Jean C. Oi, "The Evolution of Local State Corporatism," in Andrew G. Walder (ed.), 
Zouping in Transition: The Process of Reform in Rural North China (Cambridge: Harvard University 
Press, 1998); Oi, Rural China Takes Off. Institutional Foundation of Economic Reform (Berkeley: 
University of Califomia Press, 1999). 
34 David Wank, Commodifying Communism, op. cit. & "Producing Property Rights: Strategies, Networks 
and Efficiency in Urban China's Nonstate Firms," op. cit. 
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question would suggest whether the private sector is liberated from politico- economic 
control. 
Reframing the Research 
To answer the above questions, I suggest that we should first reframe the contexts: (1) 
differentiation among private businesses should be taken into account in further 
research; (2) the clientelist approach should be sub -categorised; (3) the central -state 
approach should be reincorporated into the analysis. 
Differentiation among Private Businesses 
Certainly, after two decades of development, the private sector no longer is a 
homogeneous group that can be understood by a specific case study. It is now 
segmented by different sets of conditions, varying according to industry, scale and 
geography. First, certain industries have been dominated by the private sector, while 
others are still dominated by the state sector. For example, the service sector is now 
mostly in private hands,35 and the competition in it is especially fierce, as entry into the 
sector is relatively easy and private investment inclines towards this sector.36 The 
situation in the manufacturing sectors may not be the same, as the private sector may 
still be facing unfair competition from the state sector and more regulatory institutions 
than the service sector. Another source of competition comes from the foreign -invested 
sector, which dominates the markets of certain industries. Under these circumstances, 
35 Fang Li, The Social Organization of Entrepreneurship: The Rise of Private Firms in China, PhD 
Dissertation (University of Chicago, 1997), 31. 
3e Xia Xíaolin & Li Lulu, "Zhongguo siying gongye qiye: beijing, xianzhuang yu qiantu (shang)" 
[China's Private Industrial Enterprises: Background, Current Situation and Future (1)), Gaige 
(Reform], 91 (20 July 1998): 116 -125. 
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the private sector may challenge or alternatively accommodate itself to either the ailing 
old institutions or new institutions. In addition, some industries, like the IT sector 
studied in this dissertation, have higher barriers to entry in terms of technological or 
capital requirements. The market uncertainty there is very high. The private businesses 
in the sector may enjoy specific advantages of flexibility compared to the state sector, 
but at the same time the private sector may suffer from capital deficiency. The above 
variations may have different impacts upon the patterns of business /official linkages. 
Wank's case studies, which only concentrated upon the trading business sector, might 
only present a small part of the story. 
The scale of business is another point of reference. For big businesses, according 
to Wank's suggestion,37 government support may become more critical. Despite the fact 
that most raw materials are available in the market now, supplies of capital, 
infrastructure, land and other restricted and scarce resources are still highly dependent 
upon government allocations. By contrast, Ole Bruun perceives that small businesses 
which do not pursue ambitious growth may be independent of government domination 
and even resist state predation.38 Wank has suggested that these small businesses tend to 
minimise their contact with the bureaucracy and could avoid dependent patron -client 
ties without switching to symbiotic ones.39 To what extent are these arguments valid? 
Do the linkages of the private sector simply follow the logic of Bruun and Wank? Is 
37 David Wank, "Private Business, Bureaucracy, and Political Alliance in a Chinese City," op. cit., 67 -8. 
3301e Bruun, "Political Hierarchy and Private Entrepreneurship in a Chinese Neighborhood," op. cit. 
39 David Wank, "Private Business, Bureaucracy, and Political Alliance in a Chinese City," op. cit., 67 -8; 
"Bureaucratic Patronage and Private Business: Changing Network of Power in Urban China," op. cit., 
180 -1. 
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there any clear distinction between the networking strategies of big and small 
businesses? 
Geographical elements are significant in three dimensions. Due to different 
physical, cultural and historical backgrounds, different places have different economic 
development patterns. The distinction between coastal and interior regions is one point 
of reference; between the north and the south is another. The third dimension is the 
rural -urban distinction. In terms of private economic development, the coastal and 
southern regions are well ahead of the interior and northern regions. The rural -urban 
distinction can be divided into two contrasting aspects. First, it was in the rural areas 
that the private sector developed the earliest. But the urban areas emulated the rural 
areas in private economic development during the 1990s. This can be elaborated by way 
of the spatial mobility of the private sector. Fang Li's research suggests that many of the 
rural areas come under the tight control of local governments, and that in such districts 
good personal ties with village or township officials remain crucial.40 Susan Young 
observes that the private businesses in rural Sichuan have to assume considerable extra - 
business social responsibilities.41 
Despite the persistence of advantageous personal ties, there are alternatives for 
those having no close personal ties with officials in villages - moving to places 
favourable to them. As a result, places with more open business opportunities may be 
able to attract more outside investment. These places are usually urbanised towns and 
4o Fang Li, op. cit., 212. 
41 Susan Young, "Ownership and Community Interests in China's Rural Enterprises," in Kjeld Erik 
Bredsgaard & David Strand (eds.), Reconstructuring Twentieth- century China (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1998). 
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cities.42 This has resulted in a more vigorous development of the urban private sector. In 
a word, it is relevant to ask whether different economic contexts lead to different 
configurations in the strategies of private businesses. For entrepreneurs emigrating from 
rural or other urban areas, is it possible for them to survive without firm, longstanding 
personal linkages? Do the native entrepreneurs gain a greater edge over non -native ones 
in business competition? 
A main point here is that we have to first differentiate among private businesses 
before we go on to analyse their behaviour. I will focus upon two particular urban areas 
- Beijing and Guangzhou - where multiple factors have been juxtaposed in terms of 
the private economy. Although they both belong among the primary cities of China, 
they lie respectively in northern and southern China. 
Guanxi, Clientelism and Networks 
In this study, I deny the assumption of neo- classical economics that portrays 
markets as loci for randomly distributed buyers and sellers. In fact, there is no perfect 
business competition in which all entrepreneurs enjoy equal access to information and 
resources. Those who hold monopoly profits do not voluntarily yield their own profits 
to other entrepreneurs without a quid pro quo. Uneven access to resources is usually the 
case in a real market situation. The imperfect competition per se reflects other 
mechanisms operating within market institutions. 
In China, guanxi (personal connections), as a generic concept, is always 
encapsulated as an informal mechanism of this kind. In Western societies, a similar 
°2 Fang Li, op. cit., 212; Wang Xiaoyi & Zhu Chengbao, Zhongguo xiangcun de minying qiye yu jiazu 
jingji [Private Enterprises and Family Economy in Chinese Countryside] (Taiyuan: Shanxi jingji 
chubanshe, 1996). 
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mechanism is called "networks." It includes interpersonal and social relations and 
habitual connections. The distinction between these two mechanisms is not so clear 
when they are scrutinised. 
However, it is generally assumed that guanxi includes some illegitimate or 
particularistic practices bypassing formal institutions, while "networking" is legitimate 
albeit informal. Furthermore, guanxi is sometimes considered a specific cultural 
phenomenon in the Chinese community. However, two economists argue that guanxi is 
not a cultural phenomenon in China. Reliance on guanxi is because of a lack of a 
reliable legal recourse. If formal institutions are well established and efficient, a rule - 
based business governance would replace a relation -based governance.43 Douglas 
Guthrie argues by his recent studies of Chinese urban business that guanxi should be 
distinguished from "guanxi practice." Guanxi only refers to "establishing good business 
relations" that are universally necessary in the business world. It should not be confused 
with "guanxi practice" that refers to the corrupt practice of "going around the law." He 
finds that the latter is increasingly taboo for business firms in urban China now.44 Chen 
Chieh -hsüan has a similar view. He finds two types of informal business ties: personal 
and professional. The latter is based upon professional knowledge and past performance 
in business transactions. He argues that the professional ties will be more prevailing 
than the personal ties when the economy of a territory is maturing. The former is only 
significant outside the economic life.45 It is arguable that guanxi may not be 
43 Shuhe Li & Shaomin Li, "The Economics of Guanxi," (12 July 2000) China Online 
(www. china onlin e. c om) . 
44 Douglas Guthrie, "The Declining Significance of Guanxi in China's Economic Transition," The China 
Quarterly, 154 (June, 1998): 254 -82. 
45 Chen Chieh -hsüan, op. cit., 347 -8. 
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distinguishable from "networks." Hence, we had better diversify our understanding of 
guanxi, incorporating it into the analysis of networks and networking. 
The network analysis of an economy is greatly influenced by the theory of 
"social embeddedness of economic behaviour" put forward by Mark Granovetter, who 
argued that economic modernisation has not created a separate distinguishable 
economic life as was expected. Economic behaviour remains substantially embedded in 
the social relationships of the pre- market society.46 Applied to marketising China, the 
notion of social embeddedness usually refers to the economic life embedded in pre - 
reform institutions, like danwei, household registration and other hierarchical 
institutions that facilitate the formation of patron- client ties,47 and embedded in long 
lasting social and cultural institutions like kinship and guanxi. 
In terms of the private economy, David Wank emphasises the persistence of a 
high degree of embeddedness of private businesses in their clientelist ties with 
bureaucrats. According to Carl Landé, a patron -client relationship is a vertical dyadic 
alliance between two persons of unequal status, power or resources that exists for the 
purpose of exchanging favours and providing mutual assurances of aid between the 
superior member (patron) and the inferior member (client).48 In terms of the exchange 
between a government official and a businessperson, it is taken for granted that the 
46 Mark Granovetter, "Economic Action and Social Structure: The Problem of Embeddedness," American 
Journal of Sociology 91, 3 (November, 1985);481 -510. 
47 For example, Corinna- Barbara Francis observed that danwei system was reproduced among the 
evolving high-tech enterprises in Beijing. See her "Reproduction of Danwei Institutional Features in 
the Context of China's Market Economy: The Case of Haidian District's High -tech Sector," The China 
Quarterly, 147 (September, 1996): 839 -59. 
48 Carl H. Landé, "The Dyadic Basis of Clientelism," in Steffen W. Schmide, Laura Guastic, Carl H. 
Landé & James C. Scott, Friends, Followers, and Factions: A Reader in Political Clientelism 
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 1977), XX. 
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former is supposed to be a patron which possesses monopolised resources that the 
businessperson cannot obtain by himself. 
According to this definition, the patron -client relationship covers all reciprocal 
relationships between persons of unequal status, power and resources. This exchange 
relation happens everywhere in the world, no matter how a society is transformed. 
Hence, this definition is too broad to discern the difference between a pre- market and a 
marketised society if changes really happen. Any bureaucrat -business exchange can be 
reduced to a patron -client relationship. Therefore, I would add that the existence of 
patron -client relations between bureaucrats and businesspeople should be so restraining 
that clients cannot easily get rid of it or seek alternative links. The clients cannot draw 
key benefits outside their link with patrons, as the clients lack legitimacy out of the link. 
Fred Riggs terms the businesspeople who live on this relationship as "pariah 
entrepreneurs. "49 Theoretically, entrepreneurs should tend to want to both reduce 
dependence and exploit their advantage in retaining important personal ties,50 unless the 
economic institution is what Riggs terms a tributary canteen where "pariah 
entrepreneurs" are restrained from making deals outside of the ties.51 
Transformed from dependent clientelism, Wank's symbiotic clientelism seems 
to no longer produce a power relationship between patron and client according to my 
modified definition. We cannot simply say the bureaucrat plays the role of patron due to 
increasing bureaucrat- business mutual dependence. Victor Nee and Sijin Su also 
49 Fred W. Riggs, Administration in Developing Countries: The Theory of Prismatic Society (Boston: 
Houghton Miffin Company, 1964). 
5° Wayne E. Baker, "Market Networks and Corporate Behavior," American Journal of Sociology 96, 3 
(November, 1990): 589 -625. 
51 Fred W. Riggs, op. cit., 109. 
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observed a similar bureaucrat- business relationship in their account, but they just point 
up the presence of the guanxi tie, not the patron -client tie. It is only a horizontal 
network tie.5z 
Wank also argues that the private sector in China does not become more 
autonomous from the state sector because of the lack of a clear public- private 
distinction. I do not think this is an appropriate yardstick by which to measure the 
degree of autonomy of the private sector. Socialist China was originally a state -owned 
economic system. How can one expect that a private sector would fully develop from a 
private sphere which was almost absent in the pre -reform period? Moreover, without 
mass privatisation as in the East European and former Soviet countries, the state -owned 
economy continues to prevail in the national economy. Hence, it is inevitable for there 
to he interplay between the private and public sectors. What we should ask is how the 
interplay operates. Does it operate according to formal institutions? Can private 
entrepreneurs make decisions independently, free from political intervention? Is the 
private sector offered alternatives, not controlled by a specific state business partner? If 
all of the answers are affirmative, we can conclude that the private sector is gaining an 
autonomous status from the state, even though various public- private ties are formed. 
We should bear in mind that the validity of Wank's thesis of commercial 
clientelism is based upon the premise that there has been no genuine marketisation in 
China. If this premise is incorrect, his argument becomes problematic. Some espousers 
of "social embeddedness" assert that if only a partial marketisation has occurred then 
32 Victor Nee & Sijin Su, "Institutions, Social Ties, and Commitment in China's Corporatist 
Transformation," in John McMillan & Barry Naughton (eds.), Reforming Asian Socialism: The Growth 
of Market Institutions (Ann Arbor The University of Michigan Press, 1996), 123. 
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the economic behaviour remains highly embedded in the original social and political 
institutions.53 In this regard, what we should ask is whether the disembeddedness is in 
progress or the marketisation is being recaptured by the original institutions, when we 
now see the economy is partially marketised. 
To be sure, it is self -evident that the original institutions would not simply 
vanish or be incorporated into the evolution of the market. But what we should focus 
upon is whether economic behaviour is being increasingly swayed by rational economic 
logic. Refuting Mark Granovetter's "social embeddedness of economic behaviour," 
Chen Chieh -hsüan employs the Weberian conceptual division between "economic 
action" and "economically oriented action.i54 Chen argues that the economic action is 
going to dominate economic life inasmuch as economic life is increasingly independent 
of other domains. Chen challenges Polanyi's division into "substantive" and "formal" 
economic activities, among which he upheld the prevalence and magnitude of the 
former against the latter, as failing to catch the real development trend of modern 
economic life.55 
The school of "social embeddedness" has never entertained the social 
implications of marketisation, as the attention of the school is fully caught by the 
enduring features of pre -modern/pre- reform society. To ask how marketisation changes 
social relationships is more important than to ask what original institutions persist. 
53 For example, see Yanjie Bian and John Logan, "Market Transition and Persistence of Power," 
American Sociological Review vol. 61 (October, 1996): 739 -58. 
54 Economically oriented action refers to all types of action influenced by economic considerations, but it 
includes primarily non -economic action such as political action and all non -peaceful action such as 
warfare. In the case of China, for example, guanxí practice can be considered non -economic action. See 
Max Weber, Economy and Society (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1978), 64 -5. 
ss Chen Chieh- hsüan, op. cit., 9. 
33 
Without probing this dimension, it is difficult to interpret the dynamics of change. This 
is the missing link of the "network" approach in the China field. 
In Western society, a corresponding debate is framed by asking whether the 
laissez-faire market is regulated by the interventionist state in the post -war period. In 
his term "embedded liberalism," John Gerard Ruggie argued that the emergence of a 
hegemonic "liberal" international economic order has been checked by political 
authorities, which constantly serves social purposes.56 But Hannes Lacher recently 
rejoined that the so- called regulated market has not given rise to "embedded liberalism" 
as it has not rooted out the foundation of the market: the commodification of land, 
labour and money. Under the logic of the market, he pointed out, "the livelihood of 
people became dependent on market income, forcing them to behave according to the 
rationality of the market. The economy became `disembedded' from the organic whole 
of pre -capitalist societies.i57 The same process of commodification is happening in 
China, too. How far does marketisation make the Chinese economic life disembedded 
from the pre -reform institutions? 
Disembeddedness does not refer to a homogenous globalisation of economic 
institutions. Political and social institutions do play a significant role in coping with the 
pressures of marketisation. Neil Fligstein suggested that market participants tend to 
adopt strategies to pursue a more stable and predictable market institution rather than to 
pursue free competition.58 On this point, what I stress is that institutional responses to 
56 John Gerard Ruggie, "International Regimes, Transaction, and Change: Embedded Liberalism in the 
Postwar Economic Order," International Organization 36, 2 (Spring, 1982): 379 -415. 
5' Hannes Lacher, "Embedded Liberalism, Disembedded Markets: Reconceptualising the Pax 
Americana," New Political Economy 4, 3 (November, 1999): 345. 
58 Neil Fligstein, "Markets as Politics: A Political -Cultural Approach to Market Institutions," American 
Sociological Review 61, 4 (August, 1996): 656 -73. 
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marketisation do not necessarily stem from the pre -set social relations. The responses 
can be a creative action of entrepreneurs. And business networking is not necessarily 
equivalent to creating particularistic or patron- client ties. 
In addition, in the changing context of recent years, socio- economic relations in 
China are undergoing a significant transformation. On the one hand, the market - 
transition approach suggests that businesspeople can get resources from multiple 
channels of contacts other than the state. Hence, relying upon a strong tie with the 
government may not guarantee an edge over competitors. On the other hand, the 
clientelist approach argues that the active involvement of government in promoting the 
private economy enhances the significance of official ties. But this analysis poses a 
simple dichotomy between official and non -official ties, and should be subject to 
debate. First, the bureaucratic system of China has become increasingly fragmented,59 
and so the official ties become more diversified and divergent. The nature and the 
degree of significance of different government agencies need to be considered. Some 
government agencies are more concerned with economic development; others more 
concerned with regulation. Some have nothing to do with business issues; others are 
very critical for business. Some are concerned with financial extraction; others are not. 
Second, the non -official ties cannot simply be categorised as one group. Some 
non -official organisations have semi -official status, like banks, SOEs, regulatory state 
corporations, intermediate associations for organising private businesspeople, and 
labour unions. Some of them are highly concerned with business per se. The 
59Kenneth G. Lieberthal & David M. Lampton (eds.), Bureaucracy, Politics, and Decision -making in 
Post -Mao China (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1992). 
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relationship between private enterprises and these organs is fundamentally business - 
oriented but not absolutely. Furthermore, they have more leverage than average 
enterprises and sometimes exercise semi -official power. On the other hand, the business 
linkages with them may be somewhat different than those with state administrative 
agencies. How we consider their role and nature is also a question subject to research. 
Should they be regarded as official links or as business links or as hybrid links? How do 
we account for relationships with these organisations if they are closely related to the 
growth of a private enterprise? 
In any links connected with the above agents or enterprises, some "connections" 
may he for survival, others for business development. The growth of a private firm may 
not be concerned with the official /semi -official agencies if the latter are not related to 
critical allocations of economic resources. The fall of a business may not be attributed 
to the absence or failure of the official /semi -official connection but the absence or 
failure of other linkages. Even though the official /semi -official connection is concerned 
with access to critical resources or the entrepreneur may be well connected with a top 
leader of the government, a state agency may well be unable to manipulate all variables 
of business activities. For example, the Ministry of Foreign Trade and Economic 
Cooperation can control the allocation of permits to export and import, but a connection 
with it cannot guarantee the sales of a product overseas and minimise other costs of 
business. In this regard, it should be observed that Wank's analysis and other traditional 
network analyses are only concerned with a "supply side," neglecting a "demand side" 
analysis. The "supply side" refers to networking for the access to resource suppliers. 
The "demand side" refers to networking for product and service delivery. The latter is 
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more important for the survival and success of a business, while the accessibility to 
production inputs only is pre -requisite to the establishment of the business. No 
customers or purchasers would care how you gain the production inputs, but they all 
care whether they buy a good service or product from you. 
All in all, the networking is more complicated and multi -dimensional than is 
usually suggested. Previous studies appear to have simplified or muddled up ill- defined 
linkages. We are unable to simply account for the success or failure of a business by 
virtue of only a single official link, even though we can see the existence and 
significance of the link. Other issues also come to mind in relation to networking. Are 
the private businesspeople still "pariah entrepreneurs "? Can the official linkages be 
simply encapsulated as patron -client relationships? Is an official linkage now on 
average less personalised and more formalised? How should we consider the linkages 
with semi -official agencies? What networking strategies do private entrepreneurs tend 
to adopt? What are the most significant linkages of the private sector in their business 
development? Does the private sector need to secure any other linkages to guarantee the 
security of their businesses? 
Bringing the State Back In 
The foregoing sub -section focused upon the informal ties between the 
bureaucracy and private business. It overlooked impersonal state -business interactions. 
It should be noted that the institutional adjustments to the building of a "socialist market 
economy" since 1992 mark a milestone, and state actors have to begin to conform to the 
rule of a market economy and to build up a favourable legal framework for its 
operation. In line with this, the Chinese government has avowedly switched from a 
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reluctant encouragement to active promotion of the private economy. Many local 
governments have formulated policies to promote the private economy and have sought 
"private" partners in the SOEs' reform. It seems that some regional and local 
governments are attempting to assume the role of "picking a winner "60 and to direct 
private investment,61 which had previously left them in the lurch. It implies that the 
state's role in private economic development should be incorporated into the analysis, 
whereas most previous studies in the market -transition mould and of the clientelist 
approach simply suppose the state operates as a rent -creator, playing a negative, 
suppressive but diminishing function or as a personalised body of bureaucracies. 
The notion of a beneficial role for the state in economic development is a 
controversial issue. The paradigm of neo- classical economics plays down the role of the 
state, while the developmental -state model asserts the state's significant contribution to 
modernisation, particularly reflected in the countries of East Asia.62 No matter which 
argument is more convincing, history shows us that, as Karl Polanyi indicated very 
early, the state has never been absent from shaping economic activities.63 The problem 
is what role the state is playing. 
65 For example in Zhejiang province, the Bureau of Industry and Commerce Management plans to foster 
20 private enterprises to be conglomerates, to foster 20 famous brands of privately- produced 
commodities, to foster 20 enterprises as big exporters, and to help develop 20 focal private economic 
zones. See Dagongbao [Takungpao] (Hong Kong), 12 November 1998 (Internet edition: 
www.takungpao.com). 
51 For example, in the name of the Glorious Project, the private entrepreneurs are channelled to invest in 
poverty- stricken central and western regions. See China Daily, 28 November 1998 (Internet edition: 
www chinadaily.comcn). 
62 See Gordon White & Robert Wade, "Developmental States and Markets in East Asia: An 
Introduction," in Gordon White (ed.), Developmental States in East Asia (Houndmills, Basingstoke, 
Hampshire: Macmillan Press in association with the Institute of Development Studies, University of 
Sussex, 1988). 
aá Karl Polanyi, The Great Transformation: The Political and Economic Origins of Our Time (Boston: 
Beacon Press, [1944] 1957). 
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The post -Mao economic development without "explicit" privatisation seems a 
miracle to many foreign observers. Compared with the unexpected collapse of the 
former Soviet Union and with the excruciating misery brought by the post- Soviet 
marketisation and privatisation programmes that were advised by Western economic 
experts, the model of China seems to give an alternative and more feasible path of 
economic transformation for post -communist countries. But some scholars attribute the 
difference to the "weak" state of Russia and the "strong" state of China.64 However, the 
so- called "strong" Chinese state is only referred to the local states of China. Jean 01's 
"local state corporatism" and Marc Blecher's and Jane Duckett's "entrepreneurial state" 
emphasise positive functions of direct economic participation of local governments.65 
Different from the "developmental state" model applied to the East Asian countries, 
where there is a clear functional distinction between the state and business sectors in a 
capitalist system, albeit both are closely linked up for pursuing economic 
development,66 the local state corporatismientrepreneurial state is a merger of state and 
economy in which local government officials engage in entrepreneurial business 
management (hereafter I use "entrepreneurial state" to encapsulate Oi's "local state 
corporatism "). 
However, the "entrepreneurial state" concept has limitations when interpreting 
the state -society relationship in economic development. First of all, it is not a coherent 
64See a literature review from Shu -yun Ma, "Comparing the Russian State and the Chinese State: A 
Literature Review," Problems of Post- Communism 47, 2 (March -April, 2000): 3 -12. 
65 See Jean Oi, Rural China Takes Of, op. cit.; Marc Blecher, "Development State, Entrepreneurial State: 
The Political Economy of Socialist Reform in Xinju Municipality and Guanghan Country," in Gordon 
White (ed.), The Chinese State in the Era of Economic Reform: The Road to Crisis (Armonk: M.E. 
Sharpe, 1991); Jane Duckett, The Entrepreneurial State in China: Real Estate and Commerce 
Departments in Reform Era Tianjin (New York: Routledge, 1998). 
66 See Chalmers Johnson, MITI and the Japanese Miracle: the Growth of Industrial Policy, 1925 -1975 
(Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1982). 
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institution prevailing across the country. Its existence depends upon at least two 
variables that need to be present simultaneously -a weak local society, and competent 
and aggressive leaders who are set to assume the entrepreneurial role. A weak society 
means that the economic components within the society lack an ability to organise and 
coordinate themselves to achieve the common goal of economic development. Hence it 
needs a leader as an organiser and coordinator. And this leader is usually the political 
leader of the society. However, cases were also found that if a society is strong enough 
to organise economic activities, the entrepreneurial state may not necessarily be the 
case, like Wenzhou in Zhejiang Province where the indigenous private sector dominates 
the local economy. In southeast coastal areas, the strong economic linkages with 
overseas Chinese in society minimise state participation. However, in remote inland 
villages where the weakness of leadership and society is prevalent, the economic 
development tends to be inactive.67 
Second, in light of the state -society dichotomy, the state and society under the 
entrepreneurial state model highly overlap. Village governments are usually ruled under 
a one -man leadership, and the leader acts both as the representative of the state and of 
the social communities.68 The indistinct boundary between the state and society makes 
the analysis problematic and irrelevant. 
In addition, the entrepreneurial state maybe a transitional phase of development. 
The entrepreneurial state could help the local economy to take off during the infant 
stage of development, as it is too risky and costly for societal actors to organise and 
« These villages are labelled as "paralysed villages" by Kevin O'Brien; see "Implementing Political 
Reform in China's Villages," The Australian Journal of Chinese Affairs, 32 (July, 1994): 51 -3. 
65 Xiaolin Pei, "Township- Village Enterprises, Local Governments and Rural Communities: the Chinese 
Village as a Finn during Economic Transition," Economics of Transition 4, 1 (1996): 52. 
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coordinate the scattered resources. However, it becomes an obstacle to the later stages 
of development due to the indeterminate property rights system. Hence, it is found that 
the trend of privatisation has already grown strong enough in rural China to break 
through the bottleneck.69 Chen Chieh Hsüan's study substantiates that the separation of 
government from business is a remarkable trend of economic development in China in 
which the local economy has passed through the take -off period.76 
Lastly, Duckett's entrepreneurial state in the urban setting is further detrimental 
to social interests, as entrepreneurial bureaucracies are simply pure profiteers that are 
insulated from society, and take advantage of their special positions to pursue 
personal /departmental interests and to erect barriers of entry to private entrepreneurs. 
This actually works against the overall interest of national economy.71 The 
entrepreneurial state in this sense is only a replication of the bureaucratic- capitalism that 
had existed under the Kuomintang's rule. 
The growth of the private economy gives a better interface for the study of state - 
society relationship because of the more distinguishable roles between the state and the 
business sector. Some recent studies have noted that some rural governments switch to 
playing a "developmental" role in facilitating the growth of the private sector.72 But it 
should be noted that the capacity of these lowest -level states to steer development is 
69 See Jean Oi op. cit., 80 -94. 
70 Chen Chieh- hsüan, op. cit. 
7' See a review of Duckett's book from Jean -François Huchet, China Perspectives, 24 (July -August, 
1999): 86 -8. 
72 In Marc Blecher's & Vivienne Shue's case studies of Shulu County in Hebei Province, the county 
government was portrayed as well establishing regulatory institutions for private commercial trade. See 
Tethered Deer: Government and Economy in a Chinese County (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 
1996), 135 -47. In the latest studies of Xiqiao Township in Guangdong Province done by Jonathan 
Unger and Anita Chan, it is also found that the local government seeks to nurture private industry_ See 
their "Inheritors of the Boom: Private Enterprise and the Role of Local Government in a Rural South 
China Township," The China Journal, 42 (July, 1999): 45 -74. 
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limited because of deficient expertise and resources. What is more, the authority 
exercised by the local states was strictly bounded by their feeble administrative power. 
Only the authority of higher -level government organs can play a linchpin role in 
readjusting the state -business relationship. The urban setting of this study will provide a 
better backdrop to examine this issue. 
After two decades of reforms, China has entered a post- state -socialist stage in 
which the market system assumes the dominant role in economic development, albeit 
with state macro -economic control over the market. China is now more comparable to 
the newly- industrialised East Asian countries in which the state's participation in the 
market economy is conspicuous.73 However, scholarly findings tend to point out that the 
strength of the Chinese state is declining. Wang Shaoguang and Hu Angang, for 
instance, argue that the "state capacity" of China has been declining since the reforms.74 
Somewhat along the same line, Shaun Breslin argues that the miracle of Chinese 
economic development has occurred despite a lack of a systematic formulation of a 
coherent and effective national economic development strategy. It is a "dysfunctional 
development. "75 To be sure, the "state" in their definition should be an autonomous 
entity insulated from society. This stems from a "statist" conception in which a "strong 
state" refers to the state's ability to devise and implement policies even against the will 
of major societal actors. 
T The involvement of state in the market is usually termed "state intervention." But it is a biased term 
employed by economists. Hence, I rephrase the term by "state participation." 
74 The "state capacity" they refer to consists of extractive capacity, steering capacity, legitimative 
capacity and coercive capacity. See Wang Shaoguang & Hu Angang, Zhongguo guojia nengli baogao 
[Report on the China's State Capacity] (Shenyang: Liaoning renmin chubanshe, 1993). 
75 Shaun G. Breslin, "China: Developmental State or Dysfunctional Development," Third World 
Quarterly 17, 4 (December, 1996): 689 -706. 
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Many of the recent writings in development studies pinpoint that a "strong state" 
in terms of economic development does not lie in the high degree of autonomy of the 
state. An institutional linkage between the state and society is ultimately necessary. 
According to the "neo- statism" presented by Linda Weiss and John Hobson, a strong 
state is a state that can strengthen society and mobilise elite social collaboration in 
pursuit of development goals.76 Similarly, Peter Evans contends that the developmental 
state should not be insulated from society but be embedded in a concrete set of social 
ties, while it is capable of transcending private interests - i.e. embedded autonomy.77 
Conversely, a "weak" state is so autonomous that it is only able to use its despotic 
power to extract resources from society but lacks powers to penetrate and centrally 
coordinate the activities of civil society through its own infrastructure. For the case of 
East Asian countries, Cal Clark and K. C. Roy conclude that strong states and strong 
societies both are equally important to the success of their development.78 In short, 
successful development rests on the state and society collaborating well with each other 
in pursuing the goals of economic development. If so, how should we account for the 
growth of the Chinese private economy? Is China an exceptional case in this 
perspective? Does "neo- statism" shed light on our understanding of this issue? 
The development of the private sector originated from a paradox in which there 
was both consistency and inconsistency between the state and society. Both sides shared 
the same goal, that economic modernisation should be given first priority after the 
76 Linda Weiss & John M. Hobson, State and Economic Development: A Comparative Historical Analysis 
(Cambridge: Polity Press, 1995). 
77 Peter Evans, Embedded Autonomy: State and Industrial Transformation (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 1995). 
78 Cal Clark & K.C. Roy, Comparing Development Patterns in Asia (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 1997). 
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failures of Maoist radicalism. That was the aspect of consistency. However, there was 
no consensus between them on the means to achieve the goal. The state, in terms of 
policymaking and corresponding institutions, was not attempting to forge an economic 
collaboration with the private business. The extraordinary growth of the private sector 
was indeed a "dysfunctional development" that was not an intention of the state. From 
the society- centred perspective, as Minxin Pei suggests, the private economic 
development is a "societal takeover. "79 
With the full legitimatisation of the private sector at the end of the 1990s, the 
state no longer stands aloof from promoting the private economy. However, is the 
Chinese state "weak" or "strong" with respect to the development of the private 
economy? Is the state now building up effective institutional linkages with the business 
sector? Or does the nature of the state remain predatory and despotic? And if so, can the 
growth of the private economy maintain in the context of a "weak state and strong 
society "? 
In short, this study is framed to probe the dynamics of private economic 
development at the end of the 20th century and the start of the 21st through the lens of 
informal and formal interactions between the state and the private business. What is the 
nature of evolving state -business linkages now? Do they facilitate or retard a healthy 
development of the private economy? 
Minxin Pei, From Reform to Revolution: The Demise of Communism in China and the Soviet Union 
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1994). 
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Chapter 3: Policymaking towards the Private Economy 
My fieldwork was conducted in 1999 when the private sector had already developed for 
two decades. A review of this past development can help us to understand the current 
situation. This chapter attempts to reconstruct the history of state policy towards the 
private sector from 1949 to the present time. My key point is that except for the radical 
period of the Cultural Revolution decade, the Party line towards the private sector has 
been ambiguous. This ambivalence was a mixed blessing to the private economy, 
whereas more recently the policy has turned in favour of the private sector due to the 
adoption of a market economy. 
The Private Economy in the Pre -Reform Eral 
When the Party came to power in 1949, except for the bureaucratic -capitalists closely 
associated with the Kuomintang regime whose properties were immediately 
confiscated, the 7.24 million independent private craftsmen, merchants and 
industrialists in cities and towns retained their businesses.2 Statistical data about the 
rural areas is lacking, but it has been estimated that there were 30 -40 million people 
engaged in private business in the entire country.3 These businesspeople were classified 
as the national bourgeoisie or petty bourgeoisie, an intermediate force with whom the 
Party could form a united front to help develop the Chinese economy, based upon the 
The argument about the Chinese private economy from 1949 to 1956 is mainly drawn from my Master's 
thesis. See my, Elites, Bureaucracy, and the Policy Process in China: A study of the Socialist 
Transformation of Capitalist Industry and Commerce, 1949 -56, MPhil. Thesis (Hong Kong: University 
of Hong Kong, 1996). 
2 Beijing Review 27, 33 (13 August 1984): 26. 
3 Beijing Review 31, 7 & 8 (15 -28 February 1988): 15. 
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moderate line of New Democracy. In accordance with this line, husinesspeople were 
guaranteed that the capitalist economy would be retained, as long as this activity was in 
accord with state regulations. The private sector was forbidden to engage in businesses 
concerned with the people's livelihood and key sectors, like banking and heavy 
industries. There was a consensus among the Party leaders that this "New Democratic" 
era would last around 10 to 15 years.4 During the period from 1949 to 1953, private 
industry witnessed a certain degree of growth under this non -socialist policy. The 
number of industrial plants increased from approximately 120,000 in 1949 to over 
150,000 and employed 2.2 million workers in 1952.5 
However, in the second half of 1952 Mao Zedong suddenly claimed that China 
should enter the socialist stage. The socialist policies adopted from 1953 onward 
included a gradual changeover of the ownership of private enterprises into joint public - 
private enterprises. There were two reasons for this drastic change. The first was Mao's 
optimism regarding the capability of the Communist government to run the economy. It 
was the intrinsic conviction of the Party leaders that the public sector was more 
advanced than the private sector. The division of opinion lay over when it would be ripe 
for the former to take over the latter. With the unanticipated early victory of the civil 
war and the completion of the Land Reform Campaign in 1952, Mao judged that 
socialism should "become a reality" earlier than the Party leadership previously 
expected. 
Bo Yibo, Ruogan zhongda juece yu shijian huigu [Reflection on Certain Major policy Decisions and 
Events], vol. I (Beijing: Zhonggong zhongyang dangshi chubanshe, 1991), 212-4. 
Wang Haibo, XinZhongguo gongye jingjishi [History of Industry of New China] (Beijing: Jingji guanli 
chubanshe, 1994), 207. 
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The second reason why Mao acted was the incompatibility between planning 
and the market, and between the state sector and the private sector. Despite its leniency 
towards the existence of a private economy, the new government was abolishing some 
of the marketing institutions in order to implement Soviet -like economic planning and 
was trying to turn the private sector into a subsidiary of the state economy. Even before 
the change of policy line, private industry was being subjected to indirect control by the 
state. Private industrial firms increasingly depended upon the state's processing orders. 
In 1952, 56% of the private industrial output was produced for state contracts.6 Since 
the private sector was now serving the state rather than the market, entrepreneurs tended 
to pursue corrupt "rent- seeking" activities that to a large extent led to the outburst of an 
anti -corruption campaign in early 1952, namely the Five -Anti Campaign. However, the 
origin of the corruption was officially attributed to the "evil" attributes of capitalists 
attempting to attack the proletariat. Mao thus judged in June 1952 that the contradiction 
between the working class and the national bourgeoisie had become the "principal" 
contradiction.8 The campaign more or less swayed the judgement of Mao over the 
schedule of nationalisation. 
In the commercial field, officials from the state trading agencies accused 
merchants of engaging in speculation and challenging the leadership of the state by 
competing against the state sector. The merchants usually found themselves without any 
6 See Zhonghua renmin gongheguo jingji dang'an zíliao xuanbian [Selected Economic Archives of the 
PRC], Industry and Commerce Section: 1949 -52 (Beijing: Zhongguo shehui kexue chubanshe, 1993), 
739. 
The campaign aimed to fight against five '`poisons" of the bourgeoisie: bribery, tax evasion, theft of 
government property, incorrect fulfilment of government jobs and the employment of economic data 
for private benefit. For the viewpoint about the economic cause of the campaign, see Ding Lu, 
Entrepreneurship in Suppressed Markets.- Private- Sector Experience in China (New York: Garland, 
1994). 
8 Selected Works of Mao Tsetung, vol. 5 (Peking: Foreign Language Press, 1977), 77. 
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niche to adapt to the new regime, for no matter what business strategy they adopted they 
came under the suspicion of officials. The state started to replace some of the private 
commercial sector with state agencies even before 1953, as private commerce was 
regarded as the most exploitative and "non- productive" sector by the Communists. This 
early take -over went hand in hand with the implementation of unified purchases of 
some key materials from 1951 onward. However, due to the incompetence of the state 
sector to satisfy the daily needs of a scattered, huge population and the difficulty to 
settle the job placements of enormous numbers of merchants and their employees, the 
nationalisation and collectivisation of private commerce made no significant progress. 
The number of commercial firms was only slightly reduced from 4.5 million in 1951 to 
4.1 million in 1953.9 It is interesting to note that the Communist government was never 
able to fully expunge the commercial and service sector, albeit it was the first sector to 
be transformed. After the adoption of the reform policy in 1978, the private commercial 
and service industry was also the first to revive. 
Nationalisation and collectivisation - the so- called "socialist transformation" 
- was swiftly completed under the state's mobilisation. However, when the Party 
proclaimed that at the Eighth National Congress in 1956, the socialist transformation 
had been basically completed, a considerable number of private firms remained in 
place, especially in the commercial sector - respectively 870 industrial and 432,000 
commercial concerns.1° Many "transformed" small shops and traders basically sustained 
their operations as before without being collectivised or merged into the state sector, 
Zhongguo gongshang xingzheng guanli tongji sishinian [Forty Years of the Industrial and Commercial 
Administration of China] (Beijing: Zhongguo tongji chubanshe, 1992), 130. 
1° See Zhongguo zihenzhuyi gongshangye de shehuizhuyi gaizao [Socialist Transformation of Chinese 
Capitalist Industry and Commerce] (Beijing: Renmin chubanshe, 1978), 228 -9. 
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albeit they were relabelled as a joint public -private operation. In fact, not only the 
sweeping campaign of nationalisation had not thoroughly extinguished the private 
economy, but also many new private handicraft workshops and small traders revived 
right after 1956, with around 1.4 million people engaged in the businesses then.'1 In 
fact, the Party leaders were aware that a wholesale nationalisation and collectivisation 
only led to excessive amalgamation; therefore, the government switched to loosening 
controls over the development of small businesses in 1957. 
After the disaster of the Great Leap Forward and rural communisation in 1958, 
moderate policies initiated by Liu Shaoqi and Deng Xiaoping gained the upper hand 
over Maoist radicalism and allowed the revival of private farming plots, rural free 
market trade and other peripheral private industries like poultry farming. This policy of 
"adjustment" from 1961 -64 proved to be effective to rehabilitate the economy but was 
later denounced as a capitalist line and "revisionism" during the Cultural Revolution. 
While the private sector rapidly dwindled after 1953, the years from 1957 to the 
eve of the Cultural Revolution experienced a slight growth of individual businesses. 
According to the official figures, the number of urban individual business units 
expanded from 1.06 million in 1958 to 2.27 million in 1964 (See Figure 3.1). However, 
with the outburst of the Cultural Revolution in 1966 Maoist radicalism dominated the 
policy line again. In order to cut off "the tails of capitalism" (i.e. remnants of 
capitalism), almost all markets and private economic practices were prohibited. The size 
of the individual economy plummeted. On the eve of the reform era, there were 
approximately only 150,000 individual business units left in urban areas (See Figure 
Wang Binglin (ed.), Zhongguo gongchandang yu siren zibenzhuyi [the CCP and the Private Capitalism] 
(Beijing: Beijing shifandaxue chubanshe, 1995), 384 -5. 
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3.1). Nevertheless, it is noteworthy that after the completion of the socialist 
transformation, the private sector in the form of individual business, later called getihu, 
and even an occasional "underground" enterprise had existed in China. 
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Sources: compiled from Zhang Houyi & Ming Zhili (eds.), Zhongguo siying giye fazhan 
baogao (1987 -1998) [Report on the Development of China Private Economies 
(1987- 1998)] (Beijing: Shehui kexue wenxian chubanshe, 1999), 92. 
The foregoing paragraphs do not aim to review how the private economy waned 
during the pre -reform era. What I want to emphasise was the inability of the Party to 
replace the private sector completely with a "bureaucratic economic organisation." To 
be sure, the level of nationalisation and collectivisation of socialist China was lower 
than that of the Soviet Union in the sense that most of the labour force in the latter 
worked in a fully protected state sector, including collective farms, that provided 
income security, medical care, and other benefits, whereas about 80% of the labour 
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force in China, mainly peasants, received no such benefits from the state.12 More 
importantly, the hierarchical control of economic planning in China was never attained 
to the same extent as in the former Soviet Union, so that out -of -plan economic 
development triggered by political decentralisation could be rolled out easier in China.13 
By contrast, the decentralisation measures under perestroika encountered resistance 
from local bureaucracies and peasants because the reform infringed upon their vested 
interests. 
The less complete state plan in China might attest to the relative weakness of the 
Chinese state in the "statist" sense; on the other hand, the spirit of entrepreneurship was 
not thoroughly extinguished. This "state failure" sowed the seeds for the spontaneous 
growth of the private sector soon after the end of Mao's rule. At the same time, the 
Party leaders, especially the liberal wing, were not stalwarts of the Soviet model. They 
believed that the backwardness of the Chinese economy justified the limited use of 
markets and material incentives to boost economic development before the completion 
of economic modernisation. The effectiveness of the policy of "adjustment" in the early 
1960s provided Deng Xiaoping with a reasonable basis to employ a similar policy when 
he came to power in 1978. This liberal tendency of pro -reform leaders facilitated the re- 
legitimisation of the private sector in the post -Mao era. However, the Party and 
businesspeople confronted each other again concerning compatibility between the 
market economy and the planned economy, the same issue that they had failed to settle 
Z Minxin Pei, From Reform to Revolution: The Demise of Communism in China and the Soviet Union 
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1994), 136. 
13 See the comparison of the initial reform economic institutions between China and the Soviet Union 
from Yingyi Qian and Chenggang Xu, "Why China's Economic Reforms Differ: the M -form Hierarchy 
and Entry/Expansion of the Non -state Sector," Economics of Transition 1, 2 (1993): 135 -170. 
"Minxin Pei, op. cit., 126 -7. 
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during the New Democracy era of the early 1950s. The adoption of reforms in 1978 to a 
certain extent took China back to the historical scenario of New Democracy or the early 
1960s. 
Policies in the Post -Mao Era: Crossing the River by Groping for Stones 
The development of Party policies towards the private economy during the post -Mao 
era can he divided into four stages. The period from 1978 to 1987 was one of 
"toleration," which was simply a continuation of the tolerant policy implemented during 
the New Democracy era, though the implications were somewhat different. During the 
years from 1988 to 1991, the policy came across as a "mixed interim." On the one hand, 
the private economy was formally legalised as an economic component in socialist 
China. On the other hand, its development suffered due to the 1989 political turmoil. 
The southern tour of Deng Xiaoping in 1992 resolved the impasse of the ambivalent 
official attitude towards the private economy and proved a milestone for the subsequent 
period of rapid growth of the private sector. The years from 1992 to 1997 marked a 
period of "active promotion." The central and local governments started to hasten the 
development of the private economy. The reform measures towards SOEs indirectly 
helped the growth of the private sector. Despite this, it still lacked an equal status with 
other types of ownership in terms of accessibility to resources and legal protection. But 
from 1997 onwards, the policy entered into a period of "public- private convergence." 
At the end of the 1990s, there existed two tendencies in economic policymaking. First, 
Party policy started to blur the distinction between the public and the private sectors. As 
the traditional SOEs have obviously lost their competitive edge under the market 
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reform, the private economy is now deemed indispensable to economic development. 
And the private sector is being merged with state capital, as the state now encourages 
the development of various types of mixed ownership. Second, economic policies no 
longer sharply make distinctions according to ownership. Policy is being re- oriented in 
terms of distinctions by scale of enterprises and types of industries. 
Policymaking towards the private economy has been based upon the general 
reform strategy of "crossing the river by groping for stones" (mozhe shitou guohe). It 
connotes that the reformers did not know which point of the opposite bank they would 
reach eventually (i.e. the ultimate goal of the reforms), but they knew that they had to 
"cross the river" (i.e. needed to carry out reforms). Although the ultimate goal was not 
clear to the reformers at the beginning, the "stones" positioned before them in fact 
pointed in a definite direction. The closer they approached to the opposite bank, the 
clearer the goal would be. Under this strategy, policymaking was relatively passive at 
the beginning and once the goals were made clear, policymaking became more active. 
Policies towards the private economy followed this line of development from toleration 
to active promotion. 
The Period of Toleration (1978 -1987) 
Although the Third Plenum of the CCP's Eleventh Central Committee in 
December 1978 officially marks the beginning of economic reforms,15 the Plenum made 
no specific policy concerning the private economy. It only allowed some sideline 
15 But in Lynn T. White's recent work, he substantiates that the economic reform started socially from the 
early 1970s. See his Unstately Power Vol. 1: Local Causes of China's Economic Reforms (Armonk: 
M.E. Sharpe, 1998). 
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private endeavours within the rural communes and revived rural markets. However, the 
redirection of the policy line against egalitarianism and towards emphasis upon material 
incentives and allowing a certain degree of inequality gave impetus to the revival of 
private business. 
To be sure, individual businesses were legitimised as early as 1975 when the 
Party called for carrying out the Four Modernisation programme.16 The legal position 
of individual business was written into the 1975 Constitution where Article 5 read: 
"The state may allow non -agricultural individual 
labourers to engage in individual labour involving no 
exploitation of others, within the limits permitted by law 
and under unified arrangement by neighbourhood 
organisations in cities and towns or by production teams 
in rural people's communes. At the same time, these 
individual labourers should be guided onto the road of 
socialist collectivisation step by step (emphasis 
added). "t7 
This Article was retained basically intact in the 1978 Constitution. But even 
though individual business was allowed, it had to involve "no exploitation of others." 
This implied that the hiring of labour might be problematic. More significantly, the 
direction of individual business still pointed towards "socialist collectivisation." Hence, 
it was hard to say there was any policy breakthrough at that time. 
It was not until 1981 that the government clarified the policy towards individual 
business. The "Policy Regulations on Urban Non -Agricultural Individual Business" 
issued by the State Council on July 17, 1981, stipulated that the state protected 
individual businesses from infringement. In addition, the individual business owner was 
16 The four aspects of modern isation consisted of agriculture, industry, national defence, and science and 
technology. 
" Quoted from Joseph En -pao Wang, Selected Legal Documents of the People's Republic of China Vol. 1 
(Arlington, Virginia: University Publications of America, 1976), 72 -3. 
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allowed to employ one to two helpers and not more than five apprentices with the 
approval of corresponding state agencies of industrial and commercial administration.lg 
It was later stipulated that individual businesses (getihu) were those employing fewer 
than eight persons, whereas those employing more than seven were private enterprises 
(siying giye).19 The 1982 Constitution then further stipulated that "the individual 
economy of urban and rural working people ... [was] a supplement to the socialist 
public economy" (Article I I). More importantly, collectivisation was no longer a goal 
of government and the individual business development. The individual business sector 
was deemed a long -term economic sector. 
The thrust of policies during the early 1980s mainly aimed at solving 
unemployment problems, especially among the "returned youth" who had been sent to 
rural areas during the Cultural Revolution as well as filling the economic gaps left by 
the state sector. From 1978 to 1982, 1,471,000 jobless people were absorbed into the 
individual business 20 Cadres and state employees were not qualified to embark upon 
individual businesses. The phrase "supplement to the socialist public economy" implied 
no significant role for the private sector in economic modernisation. However, the 
policy imposed no real regulations upon the private sector. 
Private businesses in certain areas went beyond the limit of "seven employees" 
from their inception. Facing the spontaneous growth of the private sector, the Party 
I8 Geti siying jingji zhengce fagui xuanbian [Selected Laws and Regulations on Individual and Private 
Economies] (Beijing: Qiye guanli chubanshe, 1996), 62 -5. 
19 According to another source, quoted from the work of Karl Marx that reads that those businesspeople 
employing more than seven persons became capitalists, the line of demarcation between getihu and 
private enterprise was drawn accordingly. See X. L. Ding, "The Disparity between Idealistic and 
Instrumental Chinese Reformers," Asian Survey 28, 11 (November, 1988): 1129 -30. 
20 Feng Chen, Economic Transition and Political Legitimacy in Post -Mao China: Ideology and Reform 
(New York: State University of New York Press, 1995), 130. 
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adopted a wait -and -see approach. Not only did the private sector face uncertainty, so, 
too, did the Party. Nevertheless Party's leaders believed that the private sector remained 
too weak to challenge Party leadership. If any "negative" elements appeared, it would 
not be difficult to crack down on them. Hence, in 1983 the Party only responded with an 
indeterminate "three do -nots" policy to the emergence of private enterprises (sìying 
qiye) - i.e. do not encourage them, do not publicly promote them, and do not ban 
them.21 This ambivalent attitude gave much leeway to local officials to suppress 
"capitalist resurrections," and many businesspeople suffered setbacks during the early 
1980s. 
The Party passed a resolution on the economic reform at the Third Plenum of the 
CCP's Twelfth Central Committee in October 1984.22 If the Third Plenum of the 
previous Central Committee was historically significant in "correcting the `leftist' line 
of the Cultural Revolution," this later Third Plenum was significant in setting the goal 
for subsequent economic developments. To pursue a divergent path from the Soviet 
system, it was decided to build up "socialism with Chinese characteristics," in which, 
instead of fully depending upon planning, the Chinese socialist economy was to become 
a "planned commodity economy" in which the market, as a supplementary but 
indispensable force, was to remedy the shortcomings of mandatory planning. By the 
same token, instead of purely public ownership, diversified types of ownership were 
allowed, including not just individual businesses but also Sino- foreign joint ventures 
under the dominance of public ownership. The individual economy was recognised as 
having "an irreplaceable role in expanding production, meeting the people's daily needs 
2' Meng Jie & Jiang Shaomin, Zaizao hunpo [Remaking Soul] (Shenyang: Shenyang chubanshe, 1998). 
22 See the full text of the resolution from Beijing Review 27, 44 (October, 1984): III -XVI. 
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and providing employment. It is a necessary and valuable adjunct to the socialist 
economy and subordinate to it." And for the first time, the Party in the resolution 
allowed the leasing or contacting -out of small state -owned enterprises to collectives or 
individuals. This should be considered the first symptom of privatisation in post -Mao 
China. 
After the six initial years of successful experiments with decentralisation 
reforms in rural areas, the Party felt confident enough to launch an all- around reform 
and try to separate government from urban SOEs (zheng qi fenkai). Despite the 
conservative Party leaders' complaints about "spiritual poIIution" during the early 
1980s, which was supposed to be caused by the resurrection of capitalist elements, the 
reformers in power believed that the private economy caused more benefit than harm. 
To be sure, the policy towards the private economy still lagged behind the real 
situation of the private sector. The Party could not keep a wait- and -see attitude any 
longer, as the uncertainty had been engendering rows over whether capitalism was 
being regenerated in China. If it had been justifiable to allow individual businesses on 
the grounds that the owners of tiny concerns themselves were the labour who exploited 
nobody, how were the private enterprises which employed many wage labourers to be 
justified in socialist China? At the Party Thirteenth National Congress in October 1987, 
the Party formally endorsed the existence of private enterprises. Based on the resolution 
adopted by the 1984 Third Plenum, the Party theorised that China remained in the 
"primary stage of socialism. "23 At that stage, the principal contradiction lay in between 
the growing material and cultural needs of the people and backward production. Based 
23 See the full text of the Zhao's report from Being Review 30, 45 (9 -15 November 1987): I- XXVII. 
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on the premise, the private sector should be allowed as "practice proved that a certain 
degree of development of the private sector promoted production." The toleration of it 
implicitly subscribed to and re- employed the notion "merit of exploitation" put forward 
by Liu Shaoqi in Tianjin in 1949.24 At the Plenum, Zhao Ziyang, who just assumed the 
position of Party General Secretary, justified the existence of the private sector on the 
grounds that it would not threat socialism in China - because "the private sector is 
bound up with the public sector, which remains predominant. "25 
In spite of the Party's endorsement, the uncertainty about the Party line did not 
immediately fade away. The campaign against Bourgeois Liberalisation had just been 
launched, leading to the purge of flu Yaobang. The justification for the existence of the 
private sector was not particularly sound from the perspective of orthodox Marxism, 
and the Party did not deny the problem of "exploitation" caused by the private 
economy. If the private sector was growing at the expense of the public sector, would 
the public sector remain dominant in the national economy, and thus was the toleration 
justifiable? 
To be sure, in terms of the overall national economy, the private economy 
remained very weak. It only constituted 3% of the gross national industrial output in 
1987.26 But in some regions, the private economy had already taken on a significant 
role. For example, in Wenzhou Prefecture in Zhejiang Province, a significant cradle of 
the private economy in the post -Mao era, the private sector accounted for 34.4% of the 
74 The notion was drawn from his speech to the cadres in Tianjin delivered right after the liberation. By 
the speech, Liu intended to correct the "leftist" practice of the cadres who suppressed the private 
business in Tianjin. Liu exhorted them not to impose radical measures upon the private business and 
suggested that the exploitation of capitalism was not a sin at that time but made contribution. See the 
text from Dang de wenxian [Document of the Party], 5 (1993): 4 -9. 
25 Ruing Review 30, 45 (9 -15 November 1987): XIV, 
26 China Statistical Yearbook 1989 (New York: Praeger, 1990), 224. 
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gross industrial output in 1986. That did not include the contribution of private 
enterprises that were registered as collectives.27 
A Mixed Interim (1988 -1991) 
The years from 1988 to 1991 experienced the most politically and economically 
unstable time in the Deng era. From the mid- 1980s, the Party switched to tackling the 
crux of the reforms - urban economic reforms - but that proved to be more difficult 
and complicated than the rural reforms and ultimately induced a political crisis at the 
close of the 1980s. In this period, the private enterprise was for the first time after the 
socialist transformation Iegalised in 1987. And in 1988 a provision was added to Article 
11 of the constitution: 
"The state permits the private economy to exist and to 
develop within the limits prescribed by law. The private 
economy is a supplement to the socialist public 
economy. The state protects the lawful rights and 
interests of the private economy and provides guidance, 
supervision and control. "28 
On 25 June 1988, the State Council promulgated "Provisional Regulations on 
Private Enterprises. "29 This was the first set of comprehensive regulations on private 
enterprises since the Party proclaimed that China had entered the socialist stage. It 
defined all private economic organisations that had eight or more employees as 
belonging to the category of a "private enterprise" (siying qiye). Cadres and state 
employees were allowed to open their own enterprises after resigning from their posts. 
27 Zhongguo de siying jingji - xianzhuang, wenti, gianjing [Chinese Private Economy: Current Situation, 
Problems and Prospect] (Beijing: Shehuí kexue chubanshe, 1989), 137. 
28 Quoted from Jianfu Chen, "The Revision of the Constitution in the PRC," China Perspectives, 24 
(July -August, 1999): 78. 
29 See the Regulations from Beijing Review 32, 10 (6 -12 March 1989): IX -XIV. 
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The private enterprises were divided into three types: wholly individually -owned 
enterprises, partnership enterprises and limited liability companies. Wholly 
individually -owned enterprises (duzi give) referred to enterprises invested in and 
operated by one person who bore unlimited liability for the enterprise's debts. 
Partnership enterprises (hehuo qiye) referred to enterprises jointly invested in and 
operated by two or more persons in accordance with an agreement concluded by them. 
The enterprises also bore unlimited liability. Limited liability companies referred to 
enterprises invested in by at least two but generally not more than 30 persons who bore 
liability according to the amount of their investment. These enterprises needed to carry 
the word "limited liability company" (youxian zeren gongsi) or "limited company" 
(youxian gongsi) in the concerns' name. In addition, the "company" possessed a 
separate "legal person" status. 
It should be explained that in China, the term company ( gongsi) with regard to 
the private economy only refers to a limited company with a legal person status. Other 
types of private enterprises cannot carry the word "company" - gongsi in their 
name and usually possess no legal person status, though collective and state enterprises 
can be named "gongsi," and possibly possess no legal person status. In many other 
countries, unlimited companies with legal person status are allowed legally, and one - 
man owned enterprises can he called a "company" and registered as a limited company. 
Although the status of private enterprises was legalised, their operations were 
circumscribed by the Regulations. According to the Provisional Regulations, for 
example, the salary of a director or manager had to he limited to less than 10 times the 
average salary of the workers. No less than 50% of the after -tax profit had to be 
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reinvested in the enterprise; otherwise, permission needed to be sought from the tax 
authorities. In addition, the private sector was still prohibited from engaging in 
financial, railway, munitions and many other industries that were monopolised by state 
enterprises. 
The promulgation of the new regulations did not spur any great enthusiasm to 
re- register enterprises. It was officially estimated that there should have been 225,000 
enterprises eligible to be private enterprises in 1988, including respectively 50,000 and 
60,000 units that were registered as collective and co- operative firms. But about 40,000 
firms were registered as private enterprises by the end of 1988.30 Private entrepreneurs 
seemed to be taking a wait - and -see attitude. Even though the private economy was 
recognised as a positive contributor to the overall economic development in China, 
private entrepreneurs were at the same time deemed "capitalists" (zibenjia) in the sense 
that they were exploiting workers under the definition laid down by Karl Marx. The 
political instability of 1988 -9 further discouraged them from taking a bold step. 
After the Tiananmen protests of 1989 were crushed, the "evil" capitalist nature 
of the private economy was canvassed and castigated. In the Party Central Document 
No. 9 issued in August 1989, the relationship between private enterprise owners and 
their employees was formally defined as one of exploiters and exploited.31 Private 
businesspeople were denounced for evading taxes, for competing with state enterprises 
for scarce resources, for disturbing the state's central planning, and for injuring the 
interests of the state and the people simply for profit's sake. These accusations seemed 
3Ó See Beijing Review 32, 3 (16 -22 January 1989): 30 -1 & Zhu Fangmin et al., Siyou jingji zaí Zhongguo 
[Privately -owned Economy in China] (Beijing: Zhongguo chengshi chubanshe, 1998), 78. 
31 Li Zhenjie, Siying qiye taoshi [Perspective on Private Enterprises] (Beijing: Jingji guanli chubanshe, 
1999), 40. 
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to take businesspeople back to the nightmare of the 1952 Five -Anti Campaign. The 
Party conservatives instigated waves of propaganda against Bourgeois Liberalisation 
from 1990 to 1991 in which they reached a conclusion that the private economy was the 
economic root of Bourgeois Liberalisation and the development of it was leading to the 
privatisation of the national economy.32 
Meanwhile, a policy of "economic rectification" was adopted at the Fifth 
Plenum of the Thirteenth Party Central Committee in November 1989. The 
"rectification" was aimed to control inflation and restore economic order over the next 
three years. Despite claiming that the government was persisting in the line of "reform," 
the concrete policies adopted by the then premier Li Peng retreated from the Thirteenth 
National Party Congress by carrying out economic austerity. The domino effect of the 
collapse of the Eastern European Communist Bloc since 1990 further spurred the Party 
to take a defensive strategy lest China might "peacefully evolve" (heping yanbian) into 
capitalism. The conservative faction queried in various mass media the political nature 
of various reform measures - as to whether they were surnamed "socialism" or 
"capitalism." 
Alongside this political adversity, various heavy fees were levied on private 
businesses. Some of the firms were thus forced to close down. As a result, the number 
of small individual businesses decreased by 14% in 1989.33 And private enterprises 
were sharply reduced by about 14,000 right after the June 4 Incident.34 Wenzhou, long 
32 Ma Licheng & Ling Zhijun, Jiaofeng [Crossing Swords] (Beijing: Jinni chubanshe, 1998), 93. 
33 Zhang Houyi & Ming Zhili (eds.), Zhongguo siying Tye fazhan baogao (1987 -1998) [Report on the 
Development of China Private Economies (1987 -1998)] (Beijing: Shehui kexue wenxian chubanshe, 
1999), 93. 
34 Zhongguo gongshang [China Industry and Commerce], 125 (May, 1996): 13. 
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regarded as the "hotbed" of capitalism in China, could not avoid attacks. In response to 
various "disclosures" of Wenzhou's capitalist development, the State Council 
dispatched four investigation teams to Wenzhou between 1989 and 1991 to look into 
whether Wenzhou was fostering capitalism. Fortunately, Qiao Shi and Li Ruihuan, 
known as leaders of the liberal faction, respectively paid visits to Wenzhou and 
endorsed its contribution to Chinese economic development.35 
Although radical measures were imposed upon private businesses locally, the 
central policy towards the private economy was not basically revised. While Deng was 
upholding "combat against Bourgeoisie Liberalisation," he tried to confine it to non- 
economic aspects. One of the then largest private enterprises (registered as a collective 
enterprise), Stone Group, was implicated in the sponsorship of the students' protest and 
the president of the company, Wan Runnan, fled to France after the government 
crackdown, but the corporation kept operating after a government -led reshuffle and 
today remains one of the biggest private business groups.36 Right after the Tiananmen 
crackdown, Deng reiterated that the policy line adopted by the Thirteenth National Party 
Congress would not be altered, remarking: "Whoever alters it must step down. "37 After 
the political turmoil, Deng firmly believed that political stability could only be 
guaranteed by efficacious economic reforms. The existence of the private economy was 
part of this. The Party also intended to distract the popular attention from political 
issues by channelling energy into business. 
35 Ling Zhíjun, Chen Fu [Sinking and Floating] (Shanghai: Dongfang chuban zhongxin, 1998),151 -7. 
36 For the history of the Group, see Scott Kennedy, "The Stone Group: State Client or Market 
Pathbreaker ?" The China Quarterly, 152 (December, 1997): 746 -777. 
37 Deng Xiaoping wenxuan [Selected Works of Deng Xiaoping], vol. 3 (Tianjin: Tianjin renmin 
chubanshe, 1993), 324. 
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The first decade of the reforms resembled the economic situation of the first 
years of the PRC in the sense that there existed a dual -track system: co- existence of 
planning and the market. Although the market was to play a "supplementary role" in 
policy, like Chen Yun portrayed the system as a "birdcage" economy in which the bird 
(the market) could not flee from the cage (plan). But the fact was that the market was 
shaking the foundation of the planning system. This was in part reflected by speculative 
activities and rampant corruption, which spread throughout the 1980s and drew 
increasing attention from the conservative Party leaders, who held reservations about 
the market reforms and attributed the political and economic crises at that time to these 
reforms. However, whereas the Party had opted for nationalisation and abolition of the 
market in the 1950s, the Party leaders now could not take the old road again because it 
had not worked. If planning and the market were incompatible, it was imperative to pick 
one of them. They faced a Hobson's choice. 
The Period of Active Promotion (1992 -1997) 
The standstill in economic reforms and the measures of austerity resulted in an 
economic recession. This concerned Deng, and in order to get the reforms moving 
forward again, in early 1992 Deng, at the age of 88, embarked upon a southern tour to 
the prosperous Pearl River Delta, including Shenzhen and Zhuhai, where there was a. 
concentration of beneficiaries and supporters of the reforms. 
During the southern tour, Deng called for the prolonged debate about the 
reforms to cease and urged bolder measures to implement the economic reforms. He 
declared that the criteria by which to judge whether the reforms were socialist consisted 
of whether they advanced the development of the productive forces, advanced the 
64 
enhancement of the overall capacity of the country and advanced the improvement of 
people's living standards - the so- called "three advances" (sange youliyu). In short, 
any measures that helped to develop the economy were not antithetical to socialism. 
Deng was indicating that a planned economy was not synonymous with a socialist 
economy. Planning and market regulation could not be used to draw distinctions 
between socialism and capitalism. Both were only means of controlling economic 
activities that could be employed by both capitalist and socialist countries. Deng further 
urged people to take bolder steps to introduce the advanced business and management 
systems of capitalism.38 
Deng's speeches during the southern tour were later adopted by the Fourteenth 
National Party Congress in October 1992 as the Party's policy guideline, by way of a 
report calling for the establishment of a "socialist market economy" in place of the 
"planned commodity economy." AIthough the report kept to the framework that the 
private sector was a supplement to the public sector, which includes enterprises owned 
by the state or collectives, it opened the door to "allow diverse sectors of the economy 
to develop side by side" and to encourage different sectors to jointly operate firms on a 
voluntary basis.39 The importance to the private economy of the new policy did not lie 
in the concrete policy statements towards the private sector, but in the general policy 
line requiring the Party to embark on various attempts and experiments to establish the 
socialist market economy. Starting in 1992, various local governments issued their own 
regulations and policies to relax controls and to encourage the development of the 
38 See Deng's speeches in the southern tour from Deng Xiaoping wenxuan, op.cit., 370 -383. 
39 See the full text of the report from Beijing Review 35, 43 (26 October - 1 November 1992): 9 -32. 
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private sector, and local initiatives started to play a bigger role. For instance, as early as 
August 1992 the Jilin provincial government promulgated trial regulations to (1) allow 
the forming of consortia and joint ventures between private enterprises, collectives and 
SOEs, which could he formed in terms of limited companies or shareholding 
companies; (2) to allow contracting out, leasing out and selling off of SOEs to the 
private sector; and (3) to allow private enterprises with two or more investors and with 
more than 30,000 yuan of registered capital to possess a legal person status.40 The first 
two measures were confirmed at the Third Plenum of the Party Central Committee in 
November 1993. The third measure went beyond the limits of the 1988 Provisional 
Regulations on Private Enterprises, which only allowed limited companies to possess a 
legal person status. The years from 1992 to 1994 experienced a take -off in the growth of 
private enterprises. In 1994, it reached an annual growth rate of 81.7% (See Table 3.1). 
The Third Plenum of the Fourteenth Party Central Committee put forward a plan 
to crystallise the establishment of the socialist market economy. The policy was based 
upon a new notion that the market was to play the fundamental role in resource 
allocation, with only macroeconomic controls by the state. The property rights of the 
enterprises were clearly defined by means of establishing a "modern enterprise system" 
in which the ownership and the rights of the enterprise were to be separated by turning 
the enterprise into an independent legal entity. And ownership of the enterprise would 
become scattered. This was a new attempt to separate government from enterprises.41 
4° Geti siyingjingji zhengce fagui xuanbian, op.cit., 602 -3. 
41 The idea of establishing "modem enterprise system" was inspired by the development of business 
enterprises in the United States and was influenced by the work of Alfred D. Chandler: The Visible 
Hand: The Managerial Revolution in American Business (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1977). 
I am indebted to Edward Xin Gu for this point. 
66 
Although the reform aimed primarily at restructuring the state sector, this 
structural reform had a profound impact upon the entire economic system. First of all, 
the property rights reform was for the first time set as a major goal, though it had been 
experimented with since the late 1980s. The clarity of property rights was important not 
only to the state sector but also to all other sectors. This marked the beginning of the 
state's show of official respect towards private property. Second, to establish a market 
economy meant the abolition of a dual -track economic system, which helped to put the 
different sectors on an equal footing. Third, establishing a "modem enterprise system" 
implied that the enterprises, as independent legal entities, were not to be classified 
according to types of ownership but rather means of investment and responsibility. The 
sources of investment could become more diversified, which helped the entrance of the 
private sector into different industries and sectors. The concept of "legal entity" was 
applied to economic organisations from the late I980s and private limited companies 
were granted a legal person status as noted above. However, this had not been put in full 
play until this reform. Last but not least, under the modem enterprise system, 
entrepreneurs in the sense of risk -takers and innovators, instead of economic 
bureaucracies or factory directors (changzhang), assumed the management of 
enterprises. Entrepreneurs (qiyejia), as "economically competent" (jingji nengren), were 
considered a key to the generation of wealth for enterprises. 
This shift was very important to the legitimacy of private businesspeople. On the 
one hand, the entrepreneurs, no matter whether associated with state or private 
enterprises, started to be regarded as a resource to promote the welfare of the country. 
And private businesspeople were no longer simply considered "capitalists" but 
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entrepreneurs. On the other hand, in order to transform those managers /entrepreneurs of 
SOEs into risk- takers and innovators, they started to be formally granted residual claims 
to the SOEs, including in the form of stocks. This was fostered another source of private 
entrepreneurs (I will further elaborate on this point in the next chapter). 
In accordance with the new policy line, various reforms were launched from 
1994 onward, including a tax reform and unification of currency exchange rates. The 
implementation of the Company Law as of July 1994 was very significant, in that its 
promulgation marked a key attempt by the Party to establish a corporate law regime in 
line with international standards. The primary aim of the law was to address the need 
for establishing the "modem company system," especially for the ailing SOEs. The 
Party also wanted to facilitate various forms of inter -sectoral business co- operations that 
included participation of the private sector,42 Hence, unlike the preceding adopted laws 
governing economic entities, the theme of the law does not cover one specific type of 
ownership or source of investment in enterprises. It is applicable to almost all types of 
ownership, including state -owned, township- village, private, and foreign- funded 
enterprises, provided that they fulfil the conditions stipulated by the law which only 
governs two types of legal entities limited company and shareholding company 
(gufen youxian gongsi). Of these two types, the limited company is more relevant to the 
growth of the private economy at the current stage. 
The conditions for establishing limited companies in accordance with both the 
Provisional Regulations on Private Enterprises (hereafter, the Regulations) and the law 
42 
"Interpretation of PRC Company Law (draft) "(15 February 1993) from Wang Baoshu & Cui Qinzhí, 
Zhongguo gongshifa yuanli [Principles of China's Company Law] (Beijing: Shehui kexue wanxian 
chubanshe, 1998), 420. 
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are similar. Both require at least two shareholders in a limited company. But the 
shareholders under the Regulations only refer to natural persons, while they can be 
either natural or legal persons under the law. SOEs and foreign -funded enterprises are 
granted preferential treatment by allowing their limited companies to be invested in by 
one legal entity and one natural person respectively. Different from the Regulations, the 
law stipulates no minimum number of employees for forming a company. Hence, from 
the jurisprudential point of view, business firms employing less than eight persons 
could be registered as a private company.43 
However, the law stipulates a minimum amount of registered capital for 
establishing a limited company. Although the Regulations did not, there were 
corresponding regulations issued in 1988 stipulating the minimum registered capital for 
"legal person" enterprises, and this also applied to the registration of private limited 
companies.44 The conditions required by the law and the Regulations are almost the 
same. Both stipulate that the minimum registered capital for establishing limited 
companies ranges from 100,000 to 500,000 yuan, depending upon which industry a 
company embarks upon. But the law requires that companies in manufacturing have to 
have at least 500,000 yuan of capital, whereas only 300,000 yuan is required by the 
regulations. For other industries, both stipulate the same requirements. The stipulations 
regarding minimum registered capital and a minimum shareholders compare to those for 
establishing public companies under the English Company Law, which similarly 
43 To my knowledge, the state administration in many places, like Beijing, has allowed private Iimited 
companies that employ less than 8 persons since the promulgation of the Company Law. 
44 See "Implementation Codes for Regulations on Legal- Person Enterprise Management (1988)" from 
Gao Qiao (ed.), Zuixin giye jingying falü fagui shiwu zhinan [Directory of New Laws and Regulations 
on Enterprise Operation] (Beijing: Qiye guanli chubanshe, 1994), 153. 
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requires at least two members to form a public company and £50,000 as minimum 
capital, whereas private companies may have one member with £1 as capita1.45 Of 
course, the limited companies in China are not public companies in the sense that they 
cannot issue stock, while only shareholding companies can do so. Obviously, the 
Chinese Company Law was enacted not to boost sole proprietorships, while larger 
private companies formed by share capital and partnership, like public companies in 
other market economies, were allowed. In this sense, private companies should not 
thrive in the subsequent years, but a surprise ensued. 
In 1992 and 1993, the annual growth rate of private limited companies was 
remarkable - 164.7% and 274.9% respectively (See Table 3.1). While the years 
between 1992 and 1994 (before the promulgation of the Company Law) experienced the 
highest growth rate, it only marked a take -off. In terms of absolute value as an indicator, 
the figures look quite different. The annual additional number of all types of private 
enterprises and limited companies reached a peak in 1995 (after the promulgation of the 
Company Law) - respectively 232,090 and 109,478. While the overall growth trend 
plunged between 1996 and 1997, the limited companies sustained the momentum and 
rose again from 1997, chalking up another peak in 1998 (See Figure 3.2). The growth of 
private enterprises was mainly led by both wholly individually -owned enterprises and 
limited companies before 1995. It was the latter which accounted for the majority of the 
growth after 1995 (See Figure 3.2). 
45 Stephen W. Mayson, Derek French & Christopher L. Ryan, Company Law (London: Blackstone Press, 
1993), 34. 
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Table 3.1: Official Statistics on the Growth of Private Enterprises (1989 -1998) 


























Rate ( %) 
1989 90581 48172(53 %) 38573(43 %) 3836(4 %) 
1990 98141 8.4% 53491(55 %) 11.0% 40303(41 %) 4.5% 4347(4 %) 13.3% 
1991 107843 9.9% 60613(56 %) 13.3% 40552(38 %) 0.6% 6678(6 %) 53.6% 
1992 139633 29.5% 77268(55 %) 27.5% 44692(32 %) 10.2% 17673(13 %) 164.7% 
1993 237919 70.4% 124944(48 %) 48.8% 56722(24 %) 26.9% 66253(28 %) 274.9% 
1994 432240 81.7% 209852(49 %) 82 -6% 86594(20 %) 52.7% 135794(31 %) 105.0% 
1995 664330* 53.7% 301153(45 %) 43.5% 118354(18 %) 36.7% 245272(37 %)* 80.6% 
1996 840612* 25.5% 358453(43 %) 19.0% 127763(15 %) 8.0% 353242(42 %)* 44.0% 
1997 994647* 18.3% 387534(39 %) 8.1% 130668(13 %) 2.3% 478396(48 %)* 35.4% 




36.0% 29.8% 16.4% 90.3% 
Sources: Zhongguo gongshang tongji ziliao [Statistical Materials of China Industry and Commerce] (State 
Administration of Industry and Commerce, 1989 -1) & Zhongguo gongshang xingzheng guanli 
nianjian [Yearbook of the Industrial and Commercial Administration of China] (Beijing: Gongshang 
chubanshe, 1993 -9). * The original aggregate national data do not contain the private limited liability 
companies which are registered in accordance with the Company Law in Beijing. The data from 
1995 -8 shown in this table has been revised by adding the private limited liability companies in 
Beijing. 
In short, the limited companies played the most significant role in private 
economic development. The absence of laws governing partnership and sole 
proprietorship before 1997 maybe a minor factor leading to this result. But it is more 
relevant that the scale and the sphere of private business was expanding to the extent 
that the private enterprises were entering into contracts that needed the enterprises to 
possess the capacity of legal persons. Furthermore, as early as 1992, a trial version of 
the Company Law came into effect to help establish the "modern company system." 
Any enterprises registered as limited companies and shareholding companies started to 
be regulated by corresponding administrative rules issued by the State Commission on 
Economic System Reform that had already provided a prototype,46 while the 
40 See State Commission on Economic System Reform Document (1992) no. 31. 
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promulgation of the Company Law in 1993 further emboldened the growth of the 
private limited companies. In 1994, there were 135,794 private limited companies, 
while there were 245,272 in 1995, a net increase of over 100,000. In 1995, 134,723 
were registered in accordance with the newly adopted Company Law.47 Of these 
companies, if all of the newly registered limited companies were supposed to he subject 
to the regulation of the Company Law, most of the rest, about 25,000 firms, were 
undoubtedly the old limited companies that switched to the new system. The share of 
the limited companies subject to the new system increased from 52.5% in 1995 to 
81.7% in 1997.48 
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Sources: comp led from Table 3.1. 
47 Zhongguo gongshang xingzheng guanli nianjian (1996), op. cit., 146, 416. 















Figure 3.3: Registered Capital of Private Enterprises (1989 -1998) 
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Sources: Zhongguo gongshang tongji ziliao (1989-1), op. cit. & Zhongguo gongshang 
zingzhengguanli nianjian (1993-9), op. cit. 
In terms of registered capital, the figure is more astonishing. In 1993, the 
registered capital of limited companies had already constituted 64.06% of the total 
registered capital of all private enterprises.49 In 1998, this rose to 80.41% of the capital 
(See Figure 3.3).5Ó To be sure, the figure concerning registered capital should be 
qualified. Different from many other countries such as Britain, which set no minimum 
capital requirement for setting up limited companies, China's Company law stipulates a 
minimum level of registered capital, an amount that is very high in terms of the income 
level of the populace. Hence, the more limited companies that are established, the more 
the amount of registered capital of the limited companies overshadows two other types 
of enterprises - wholly individually -owned and partnership enterprises. In fact, the 
owners of limited companies may not really have sufficient initial capital. They often 
49 Ibid. (1994), Chapter 7: 25. 
s° Ibid. (1999), 432 -3. 
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overstate the capital during the initial registrations' This reflects the fact that private 
businesspeople prefer to register their enterprises in accordance with the Company Law, 
as it is a non -discriminatory law that sets all types of ownership on an equal footing. 
The business licence of the company registered in accordance with the law no longer 
shows the "ownership nature." More importantly, only "companies" can bear limited 
liability in China. Despite the permission to form limited companies under the 
Regulations, the 1988 Regulations are only a set of administrative rules with a label of 
"private" that cannot be comparable to a universally applied law. 
By and large, private entrepreneurs took advantage of the SOE's reform measures 
to seek a new niche and utilised it better than the state sector. In Beijing, for instance, 
among 63,606 limited companies in Beijing in 1998, 59,690 (94 %) were privately 
owned. The ratio of incorporation of private enterprises is much higher than that of 
SOEs.52 
Besides the unintended proliferation of private companies, other SOE reform 
measures indirectly boosted the private economy. The encouragement of developing 
public -private consortia or joint ventures, the permission to sell small SOEs, the 
shareholding system reform (gufenhua gaige) and the establishment of stock markets 
were measures aimed primarily to save ailing SOEs. But the consequence was to 
encourage the development of the private sector in the form of privatisation. A typical 
example is the biggest private conglomerate, Hope Group. Since 1992, this Sichuan- 
based conglomerate has formed joint ventures with or bought off over thirty SOEs in 
51 Further elaboration on this observation will be seen in Chapter 5. 
sz Zhongguo gnngshongxingzhengg anli nianjian (1999) op. cit., 147 -8. 
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various provinces in the name of participating in the SOE reform.53 In 1996, one of its 
founders, Liu Yonghao, selected in 2000 as one of 50 stars of Asia by a magazine,54 
split it up by forming the New Hope Group. This was one of the major shareholders of 
the sole non -state bank, Minsheng Bank. This so- called non -state bank does not mean a 
"private" bank, as it was initiated and established in the name of the All China 
Federation of Industry and Commerce in 1996 with various sources of investment 
including both state and private capital and in the form of a shareholding company. The 
government prohibits the private sector from establishing their own banks. However, as 
long as an enterprise is not purely established and owned by natural persons, it is not 
officially regarded as a "private" enterprise. Interestingly, the New Hope Group as well 
as another private conglomerate, Orient Group, is now holding majority shares in the 
bank by purchasing the shares held by other private and state legal entities.55 The 
shareholding system reform along with the establishment of stock markets in Shanghai 
and Shenzhen underscored the "implicit" legitimatisation of privatisation. Even though 
it was supposed that the state should have held the majority of the shares of most listed 
SOEs, which were prohibited from selling off state and corporate shares, many of these 
shares were sold off without regard to the rule from the very beginning.56 
3 Shichangbao [Market Daily], 13 March 1999: 5. 
54 "The Stars of Asia: 50 Leaders at the Forefront of Change," Business Week (Asian edition), 3 July 
2000: 36A2 -3. 
55 Zhonghua gongshang shibao [China Business Times], 14 March 2000 (Internet edition: 
www.cbt.com.cn). 
56 See Shu -yun Ma, "Shareholding System Reform: The Chinese Way of Privatization," Communist 
Economies & Economic Transformation 7, 2 (1995): 159 -174. It is reported that the Chinese 
government is planning to sell off the state share in order to fund the social security system. See 
Business Weekly, 18 June 2000: 4. 
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The New Hope Group is not an isolated case. In Hunan Province, for instance, 
1,463 SOEs had been taken over by private enterprises by the end of 1997.57 In some 
localities like Shunde in Guangdong Province and Chucheng in Shandong Province, the 
local governments launched a large -scale privatisation programme by selling off their 
SOEs to the private sector or by shareholding reforms, including restructuring 
enterprises into employee -owned firms. 
To be sure, the development of the private economy had been solidly guaranteed 
by state policy since 1992, but the corresponding institutional and legal frameworks 
remained at the starting point. The infringement of private property remained common 
due to the legacy of indeterminate property rights of old private enterprises and the lack 
of other legal reforms that ought to have been adjusted to suit an economy with 
diversified types of ownership. The private sector's access to resources was still 
restricted by the old institutions. For instance, most private enterprises still found it 
difficult to have access to bank loans, which were almost monopolised by the state 
banks and were mostly allocated to the SOEs. The private enterprises still enjoyed no 
independent rights to export and import and thus had to attach themselves to the state 
foreign trade enterprises.S5 
On the other hand, the integration of private and state capital since the early 1990s 
started blurring the boundary between the state sector and the private sector. The trend 
of privatisation again engendered a crisis of legitimacy of the reforms, which continued 
57 Zhonghua gongshang shibao [China Business Timesl, 3 April 1999: 3. 
58 But the Special Economic Zones started granting the rights of export and import to individual private 
enterprises under their jurisdiction. 
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to stress the dominant status of the public sector in a socialist market economy. The 
Fifteenth National Party Congress in September 1997 tackled this issue. 
The Convergence of Public and Private (1997 to the Present) 
The year 1997 was a significant watershed. Deng Xiaoping, the helmsman of the 
post -Mao reform, passed away in February. The sovereignty of Hong Kong reverted to 
China in July. Two months later, the Party held its Fifteenth National Congress. Soon 
after, the East Asian financial crisis erupted. These latter two issues had a profound 
impact upon the private economy's development. The 1997 Party Congress further 
enhanced the status of the private economy, while the East Asian financial crisis 
demonstrated to the Chinese government that the state's protection of the SOEs might 
lead to disastrous consequences. As a result, not only the boundary between the public 
and the private sector but also that in economic policymaking started to be blurred. 
After the southern tour of Deng, as noted above, the private economy has 
boomed to the extent that it is not simply a supplement to the public economy. The 
shareholding reform revitalised the local economies in experiments in Shunde, 
Chucheng and elsewhere. However, this engendered debates over whether the 
shareholding system should be considered "public" or "private." After the death of 
Deng, Deng's line was deemed irreversible, and the Fifteenth Party Congress provided 
Jiang Zemin with a platform to give it his own "brand name." In his report to the 
Congress, Jiang pointed out that the public sector consisted of state -owned and 
collective enterprises, and the state -owned and collective stakes in the enterprises of 
mixed ownership. Jiang stressed that the forms of public ownership could be realised in 
diverse patterns. The shareholding system should be one of the patterns to realise public 
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ownership as long as the state or collective bodies controlled a majority stake in the 
enterprises. Sticking to the previous line, Jiang kept to the frame that the state -owned 
economy should play the "leading" role of the national economy. However, it was not 
realised in terms of the share of the state sector in the national economy but in terms of 
the degree of state control. In this sense, only key sectors of the national economic 
backbone should be dominated by the state sector, whereas the overall economic share 
of the state sector might adequately decrease. It should be strengthened in terms of 
quality not quantity.59 
Even though Jiang's argument for quality against quantity might make sense 
from the viewpoint of economics, the Party yielded to the fait accompli that the state 
retreated from the sphere it had previously controlled. The share of the state -owned 
economy had already plummeted since the beginning of the reforms. In 1980, the state 
sector accounted for 76% of gross industrial output; whereas this had been reduced to 
31% in 1997.60 Conversely, the non -public industrial sector, composed of indigenous 
and foreign private industries, rose from 0.48% in 1980 to 36% in 1997.61 Hence, the 
Party Congress could not help but endorse the non -public economy as an "important 
component" of the socialist market economy. The new phrase - important component 
- was written into the constitution amended at the 1999 National People's Congress. 
This endorsement hastened the private sector boom from 1997 onward, forming 
a second wave of growth (See Figure 3.2). In 1998, the number of registered private 
enterprises reached above 1,200,000 (See Table 3.1). In this second wave, the new 
59 See the full text of the report from Beijing Review 40, 40 (6 -12 October 1997): 10 -33. 




private enterprises were composed of many enterprises that originally were registered as 
collective, whose owners were emboldened by the new line to re- register their 
enterprises as private enterprises in a so- called "taking off of red hats" (zai hong maozi), 
albeit a few cases had already occurred around the mid- 1990s. 
In 1995, the Party had confirmed the line of the SOEs' reform as "grasp the 
large, let the small go" (zhuada fangxiao). That meant the state only put resources into 
the 1,000 or so largest SOEs by reorganising them into conglomerates, like the zaibatsu 
or chaebol in Japan and South Korea. The debt -ridden and inefficient small -sized SOEs 
would be sold off, Ieased out or allowed to go bankrupt. The 1997 Party Congress kept 
to this line and determined to sort out the SOEs' difficulties within three years. The 
SOEs' reform from within has been among the least successful of the reforms, and the 
East Asian financial crisis gave China a lesson that if the Chinese SOEs' reform pointed 
in the direction of the Japanese and Korean model, a similar financial disaster might 
occur in China. The extraordinary concessions made to the United States in the 
negotiations on entry into the World Trade Organisation in 1999 marked the Chinese 
government's determination to expose the Chinese firms to markets rather than to 
protect them from the foreign competition.62 The basic line of economic policy now 
implicitly but significantly deviates from what the Party claimed to defend: socialist 
public ownership. As Edward Steinfeld argues, "instead of using market forces to save 
state socialism, state socialism itself would have to be sacrificed to preserve the market 
62 The concessions included lifting the barrier on imported agricultural products, opening its lucrative 
telecommunications market and allowing American insurance companies sell policies throughout the 
country. 
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economy. "63 Although the state economic sector would not simply vanish, only those 
firms that adapted themselves to fierce competition would survive in future. 
At sub -national levels, the private sector is now regarded as an indispensable 
force for boosting economic growth, whereas the exclusively state -owned enterprises 
are deemed economically inefficient. This notion is especially pronounced in the poor 
interior provinces whose governments attribute their slower pace of economic progress 
in part to the less developed private sector under their jurisdiction.ó4 Hence, their 
economic plans now embrace the growth of the private economy. In Shaanxi Province, 
one of the interior provinces, for instance, the government required all county -level 
governments to stop establishing new SOEs and to switch to developing shareholding 
co- operatives and other types of non -public enterprises.G5 In Qingdao City in Shandong 
Province, the establishment of exclusively state -owned enterprises is now not easy to 
win approval. Only state enterprises with various sources of investment can obtain the 
city government's nod.66 
The encouragement of mixed ownership leads to a blurring of the traditional 
boundary between public and private enterprises. The emergence of shareholding 
companies and shareholding co- operatives has the same effect even though this is 
regarded as a means to realise socialist public ownership. On the trend of developing 
mixed ownership, David Wank considers it a waning of the conscious distinction 
63 Edward S. Steinfeld, `Beyond the Transition: China's Economy at Century's End," Current History 98, 
629 (September, 1999): 272. 
64 In 1998, the number of private enterprises and their investors and employees, and the amount of their 
registered capital in both western and central provinces only accounted for 35.5 %, 39.4 %, 37.8% and 
49.3% of the national total figures. See Zhang Houyi & Ming Zhili (eds.), Zhongguo siying qiye fazhan 
baogao (1999) [Report on the Development of China Private Economies (1999)] (Beijing: Shehui 
kexue wenxian chubanshe, 2000), 45. 
65 Zhonghua gongshang shibao [China Business Times], 7 March 1997: 1. 
66 Dagongbao [Takungpao] (Hong Kong), 28 March 2000 (Internet edition: www.takungpao.com). 
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between legal public and private property rights.ó7 It should be clarified that the mixed 
ownership does not necessarily induce a blurred property rights structure, as long as the 
distribution of company shares between the public and the private shareholders is 
clearly stipulated in accordance with the Company Law, like other types of partnership. 
Notably, the public -private joint ownership, as exists in China, is not unique in the 
world. The Commonwealth Bank and Qantas Airlines in Australia present two 
examples among many. 
Needless to say, in China, this merging does not represent a re- nationalisation of 
private enterprises or bureaucratisation of economic organisations, which was the case 
in the 1950s.68 Instead, the rhetorical legitimacy of socialism seems to be justified by 
the new ownership definition. Non -state and non -collective ownership is not necessarily 
identical to private ownership (siren suoyouzhi); and the shareholding transformation is 
not identical to privatisation in the sense of siyouhua. In Chinese, privatisation can be 
translated as either minyinghua or siyouhua. Minyinghua literally means that a state -run 
enterprise is transformed into an enterprise that is not operated by the state bureaucratic 
system. It can alternatively be understood as de- nationalisation. This is not taboo in the 
official discourse now. But siyouhua continues to be repudiated as a term. Although 
minyinghua is sometimes employed as a euphemism for siyouhua, the meaning of 
67 David L. Wank, Commodifying Communism: Business, Trust, and Politics in a Chinese City 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), 207. 
68 X. L. Ding in his recent research substantiates that the public -private joint venture is significantly 
employed to drain away state assets. Here I agree that Ding's account is part of the story. See his "The 
Illicit Asset Stripping of Chinese State Firms," The China Journal, 43 (January, 2000): 1 -28. 
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siyouhua is essentially different from that of minyinghua. Siyou, always translated as 
"privately- owned," should be understood as something owned by one person or family, 
or a couple of individuals. Siyouhua strictly refers to the takeover of a public enterprise 
by one or at almost a few natural persons.69 When we discuss privatisation in socialist 
or former socialist countries, usually we refer not only to siyouhua but also to 
shareholding transformation and takeovers by private legal entities. However, the CCP 
discourse seems to refer only to the former now. And this type of privatisation is not the 
most prevalent in practice. 
The enterprises formed by institutional investment and share capital, as a 
counterpart of public companies in other market- economy countries, are now put into 
the category of socialist public ownership, like Minsheng Bank noted above. These 
enterprises stem not only from collectives and SOEs but also from private enterprises, 
whose scale expands to become shareholding companies, which sometimes go public. 
In other words, some of the expanded private enterprises, which absorb multiple sources 
of investment, will fall into the category of socialist public ownership in the official 
discourse. Tian Jiyun, the Deputy Chairman of the National People's Congress (NPC), 
suggested in his address to the Second Plenum of the Ninth NPC in March 1999 that the 
development of the private economy would attain the stage where it takes the road of a 
fiB A senior Chinese economist, Yu Guangvuan, quoted from a work of Frederick Engels to clarify what 
private production is in Marxism. Engels said, "What is capitalist private production? Production by 
separate entrepreneurs, which is increasingly becoming an exception. Capitalist production by joint - 
stock companies is no longer private production but production on behalf of many associated people ... 
this put an end not only to private production ..." (here quoted from Karx Marx & Frederick Engels, 
Karl Marx, Frederick Engels: Collected Works, vol. 27 (London: Lawrence & Wishart, 1990), 224. 
Emphasis is original). In this sense, any production in association with the properties of more than one 
person is not "private" production. See his "Lishi shang he dangqian Zhongguo de sìyou he gongyou" 
[Privately -owned and Publicly -owned in the Historical and the Current China], Zhongguo siying jingji 
nianjian [Yearbook of Chinese Private Economy] (1978 -1993) (Hong Kong: Xianggang daobaoshe, 
1994), 47. 
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shareholding transformation or shareholding co- operativisation; and this meets the 
needs of "socialised" (shehuihua) large -scale production.70 In other words, any 
economic entity that contains "collaborative" elements can be defined as "socialistic." 
In addition, economic policymaking is ever more industry- oriented rather than 
ownership- oriented. No matter the type of ownership, only enterprises in certain 
government- promoted industries can obtain preferential government treatment. In other 
fields, both the state and private enterprises would gradually be placed on an equal 
footing in policy treatment.71 Furthermore, the scale of enterprises becomes a line of 
division in policymaking. Under the 1998 reform of China's administrative structure, a 
new Medium and Small -sized Enterprises Bureau was set up under the State Trade and 
Economic Commission to take charge of policies towards such enterprises, which 
include most of the private enterprises. 
Two further sets of laws concerning the private enterprises were also adopted. 
These were the Partnership Enterprises Law and the Wholly Individually -owned 
Enterprises Law, which were adopted in 1997 and 1999 respectively. Along with the 
1993 Company Law, thus, a complete set of laws concerning private enterprises has 
been built up. It should be noted that these laws were enacted not along the line of 
ownership but rather in terms of modes of investment and responsibility. This is an 
attempt not only to keep in line with international standards but also to de- emphasise 
the enterprise distinction by ownership. 
7° Liaowang [Outlook], 791 (March, 1999): 4. 
71 For example, Shanghai in 1998 granted "national treatment" to the private sector. That means the 
government no longer discriminates against the private sector in economic policy, which can enjoy the 
same treatment as other sectors. See Zhonghua gongshang shibao [Chinese Business Times], 10 April 
1998: 2. 
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It is premature to say that all private enterprises can now enjoy equal treatment 
with other sectors, because the close connections between the state sector and the 
government and the distortion and variations of policy implementation remain. 
However, the government increasingly relies upon the private sector for both economic 
development and revenue generation. What is more, the private enterprises have helped 
to absorb millions of laid -off workers from the SOEs. The decline of non -state 
investment in 1997 and 1998 aroused a great deal of concern by the state and, in 
response, independent rights to import and export goods were granted to the private 
sector in 1999 to stimulate private investment. Private enterprises are now deemed a 
means to bolster the foreign trade of China.72 
In a word, current national economic policymaking erodes the distinction 
between public and private ownership, which is increasingly de- emphasised in the 
classification of enterprises. 
Concluding Remarks 
The development of policymaking towards the private economy has reflected a passive 
approach by the Party as it adopted a strategy of "crossing the river by groping for 
stones." Deng's pragmatism weakened state control over the development of the private 
sector. But this is not to argue that the extraordinary growth of the private sector was 
inevitable. The legacy of orthodox Marxism and Maoism has been a stumbling block to 
72 By the end of 1999, 438 private enterprises had been granted the right of import and export goods by 
the Ministry of Foreign Trade and Economic Co- operation. The total value of exports accomplished by 
the private sector was 130 million US dollars in that year. See Zhonghua gongshang shibao [Chinese 
Business Times], 17 February 2000 (Internet edition: www.cht.com.cn). 
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such development. The setbacks suffered during the "mixed interim" period 
demonstrated the state's coercive power. On the other hand, whenever a step toward 
liberalisation was taken, it triggered a leap in growth. The key decision to replace 
planning with the market cleared up the uncertainty of the policy and accelerated the 
decline of the state sector. Minxin Pei's "societal takeover" has not taken account of the 
function of the market -facilitating state. Of course, the demonstration of the 
competitiveness of the private sector in economic development helped establish its 
legitimacy. That in turn pushed the government to guarantee the security of the property 
of private entrepreneurs and to adopt an accommodating approach to them. Now the 
"river -crossing" reformers are approaching the "opposite bank." 
Still, state policymaking could not account well for the growth of the private 
sector. In particular, it could not make sense of how various resources of the private 
sector could derive from a state- dominated planning system. Moreover, the private 
economy grew in opposition to the state's initial goals for economic development. The 
scope of analysis needs to be enlarged beyond a focus on the top -down policy process. 
In the following chapter, I will reconstruct the trajectory of the development in a 
bottom -up approach, illustrated in terms of the urban private economy and IT industry. 
85 
Chapter 4: The Rise of the Urban Private Economy and of an 
Information Technology Industry 
In Western political economy, the distinction between the public and private sectors and 
the implications for the polity and the economy are principal foci when examining 
mechanisms of allocation, the extent of redistribution and the ownership structures of a 
society.' By the same token, before his fieldwork studies David Wank presumed that the 
new private business community would generate its own resources and could be 
independent of the state apparatus. But he found that it was not empirically easy during 
his fieldwork to distinguish so clearly between public and private.2 This situation led 
him to articulate his commercial clientelism thesis, in which the growth of private 
business was based upon dependent ties with the local government. 
This cognition was to a certain extent misguided by his presumption that the 
private sector should not be intertwined with the state apparatus in an ideal typical 
model. This perception has two problems when applied to China. First, in socialist 
China, especially in the pre -reform and early years of the post -Mao era, state institutions 
were ubiquitous in the form of danwei, rural communes and many so- called social 
organisations which could be regarded as extensions of the state. How can one expect 
that a private sphere can suddenly and rapidly develop from scratch? 
However, the "nominal" state institutions were not homogeneous. They 
contained informal aspects that were dysfunctional to the state. The growth of the 
Jan -Erik Lane & Svante Frsson, Comparative Political Economy: A Developmental Approach, 2nd ed. 
(London: Pinterm, 1997), 109. 
2 David Wank, Commodifying Communism: Business, Trust, and Politics in a Chinese City (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1999), 3. 
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private economy reflected these aspects. While Wank perceives that the local state took 
advantage of its autonomy to exercise discretion in patronising the private sector, this 
phenomenon could also be perceived as private businesspeople taking advantage of 
local bureaucratic discretion to seek their own benefits and to siphon off resources from 
the state. 
While Wank's perception is not groundless, it lacks a broader historical 
perspective that would enable us to delineate a chain of development. During the 
gradual transformation of the state- dominated economy, a certain degree of public - 
private conjunction was indispensable to the rapid growth of the private sector, as the 
public sector had manipulated key resources at the outset. Hence, the autonomy of the 
private sector was not significant at the outset, but has been strengthened alongside the 
development of a division of labour between the government and the business sector.3 
While China has not adopted a mass privatisation programme to achieve private 
ownership, a gradual transfer of public resources to private hands provided an 
alternative means. This transfer did not entail zero -sum redistribution. The private 
sector activated and added value to the state /public resources. A liberal Chinese 
economist, Fan Gang, has suggested that the economic reform in China worked along 
the Iines of "incrementalism" in the sense that substantial development relied upon the 
growth of the non -state sectors, the institutions outside traditional state planning.' But I 
3 See Chen Chíeh- hsüan's study of Mainland Chinese economic development in Taiwan chanye de 
shehuixue yanjiu [Studies of Taiwan's [ndusuial Sociology] (Taipei: Lianjing, 1998), 345 -77. 
° See Fan Gang, "Teshu de fangshi yu teshu de wenti - Zhongguo gaige de ruogan tezheng de lilun 
fenxi" [Special Approaches to Special Problems: A Theoretical Analysis of Some Characteristics in 
China's Reform], Zhongguo yanjiu [China Studies], 1 (Autumn, 1995): 37. 
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would like to add that these "exogenous" sectors were not isolated from the "old" 
institutions but made use of their resources. 
The rise of the urban private economy, especially the private IT industry, can 
illustrate this point. This chapter examines the trajectory of private economic growth in 
urban China. It briefly reviews the growth of the urban private sector in the first section. 
The chapter then surveys the background to the growth of the information technology 
(IT) industry, which was to a large extent shaped by the urban private sector. Lastly we 
will examine private economic development in the two urban field sites of this study - 
Beijing and Guangzhou where the private IT sector is thriving. 
Origins and Development of the Urban Private Economy 
An urban private sector began to emerge in the early 1980s, but it was far less 
developed than its rural counterpart throughout the decade. Most people with urban 
residency were assigned to work in danwei where they could obtain a basic security of 
livelihood. Yet a considerable number of urban inhabitants worked for poorly equipped 
urban collectives or engaged in self -employed business for a living. 
After the turmoil of the Cultural Revolution (1966 -68), a great many urban 
youths were sent down to the countryside and mountainous areas. From the early 1970s, 
they started to return to the cities without state approval. By the latter part of the 1970s, 
the local governments could not help but allow the returnees to engage in individual 
businesses (getihu) or set up urban collectives. Another major source of early private 
urban businesspeople was retired workers. Some of them might be skilled craftsmen in 
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a particular trade like traditional arts and crafts. They maintained their skills and passed 
these on to younger workers, often their children. 
The getihu businesspeople of the early 1980s mainly embarked upon repairs, 
carpentry, photography, eateries, catering, and transport - the economic gap left by the 
state sector. The urban private businesses concentrated upon the commercial and service 
sector while more rural private firms were in the industrial sector. Unlike their rural 
counterparts, the urban cadres during the first half of the 1980s were not engaged in 
private business due to state prohibitions, while cadres played more an entrepreneurial 
role in rural areas.5 By the same token, the social status of urban getihu businesspeople 
was very low during the initial revival of private business. Only those who lacked a 
social network and could not find other employment were forced to do individual 
business. Most young people who were doing private business waited for opportunities 
to enter the state sector for a lifetime job. Cases were found by the mid -1980s of some 
state employees who quit their state jobs to go into business in order to rid themselves 
of humdrum routines or personnel disputes in the state sector,6 but they were isolated 
cases. 
The low self -esteem of getihu businesspeople changed starting from the mid - 
1980s. Their higher income made their career choice more desirable. State control over 
them was also loosening.' Despite their higher income, the businesspeople usually put 
most of their income into consumption, seldom into re- investment, because of their 
5 Minxin Pei, From Reform to Revolution: The Demise of Communism in China and the Soviet Union 
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1994), 110 -1. 
6 See a case from Beijing Review 30, 49 (7 -13 December 1987): 7. 
7 Thomas B. Gold, "China's Private Entrepreneurs: Small -scale Private Business Prospers under 
Socialism," The China Business Review 12, 6 (Nov. -Dec., 1985): 50. 
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distrust regarding the longevity of the "tolerant" policy.8 Moreover, state policy did not 
encourage their expansion beyond the scope of an "individual" business; hence, there 
were no other outlets for their accumulated profits. Facing obstacles from the state 
institutions in cities, the urban private sector could not boom in parallel with the rural 
areas, where some local cadres disregarded central state policies. Accordingly, the rural 
private sector accounted for 90% of the gross private industrial output in 1987.9 
Nevertheless, the urban getihu did open a niche for the accumulation of private wealth 
and tempted people from other backgrounds into private business. By the end of 1985, 
11,710,000 licensed getihu businesspeople possessed 16.4 billion yuan in funds, 
averaging 1,402 yuan per person.10 
Privileged urban social groups started to go into business from the mid- 1980s. 
They did not launch their businesses as getihu, but leased small SOEs or - pertinent to 
this study - started technology -based enterprises. As stated in the last chapter, since 
1984 the state has leased or contracted out small state -owned firms to collectives, or to 
individuals who to a large extent came from the ranks of former state employees. By 
1987, some 60% of all small state -owned firms had been leased out. ll These firms were 
concentrated in the service sector, including retail outlets and food shops. Although the 
state ownership of these enterprises was kept intact, this fostered ranks of urban private 
entrepreneurs who were making use of state resources to earn seed capital and who later 
8 Thomas B. Gold, "Guerrilla Interviewing among the Getihu," in Perry link, Richard Madsen & Paul G. 
Pickowicz (eds.), Unofficial China: Popular Culture and Thought in the People's Republic (Boulder: 
Westview Press, 1989), 186. 
9 China Statistical Yearbook 1989 (New York: Praeger, 1990), 137. 
0 Feng Chen, Economic Transition and Political Legitimacy in Post -Mao China: Ideology and Reform 
(New York: State University of New York Press, 1995), 131. 
" Willy Kraus, Private Business in China: Revival between Ideology and Pragmatism (Honolulu: 
University of Hawaii Press, 1991), 110. 
90 
launched their own businesses. Among my interviewees, two had the experience of 
running contracted -out state food shops in the 1980s, 
To encourage modernisation of science and technology, universities, research 
institutes and individuals were allowed to establish profit- seeking research and technical 
service institutes from 1985. Many distinguished technology -based companies founded 
in the mid -1980s were initiated by scientific personnel from the state research institutes 
or universities, but these spin -off enterprises were usually registered as collectives or 
SOEs at that time and received a certain amount of state sponsorship. Some of these 
enterprises became private or semi -private firms by means of incorporation or 
shareholding transformation in the 1990s. These managers of public enterprises thus 
became private entrepreneurs. 
The majority of the first generation of getihu businesspeople did not evolve into 
the backbone of the private economy in the later stages of development. According to 
two recent surveys conducted by a Chinese government agency and an academic 
institute, the current entrepreneurs of private enterprises mostly came from the ranks of 
cadres and professional technicians. The survey, conducted in Zhejiang, Henan and 
Gansu Provinces, by the State Council's System Reform Office, found that former 
cadres from state agencies and former professional technicians accounted for 54.7% of 
the entrepreneurs. Those that developed from getihu only constituted 18.6% of the 
sample.12 
12 For the survey done by Chinese Academy of Social Sciences. See Dagongbao [Takungpao] (Hong 
Kong), 2 February 1999 (Internet edition: www.takungpao.com). For the survey done by System 
Reform Office, see Beijing kejibao [Beijing Science and Technology News], 22 February 1999, quoted 
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The urban private sector started to catch up with the rural sector from the early 
1990s. The number of urban private enterprises overtook those in the rural sector in 
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1993 (See Figure 4.1), and by 1998, the number of urban private enterprises accounted 
for 62.9% of total private enterprises.13 In 1994, the employees in urban private 
enterprises reached half of the total employees in all private enterprises and the urban 
employees constituted 55.1% in 1998 (See Figure 4.2).14 The registered capital of urban 
private enterprise outstripped that of its rural counterpart as early as 1991. In 1998, the 
registered capital of urban enterprises almost tripled that of the rural sector, soaring to 
533.4 billion yuan, while the latter only reached 186.2 billion yuan (See Figure 4,3),15 
In this regard, it should be qualified that the dominance of registered capital in urban 
private enterprises was due to the prevalence of limited companies among the urban 
private enterprises. As noted in the last chapter, it required a much higher minimum 
registered capital to set up a limited company in China. In 1990, the limited companies 
accounted for only 9% of urban private enterprises compared with 1.5% of rural private 
enterprises.16 In 1994, the share of urban limited companies rose to 43 %, while their 
rural counterparts only reached 17 %.17 The incorporation of urban "fake" collectives 
should account for a considerable proportion of them. By 1998, 366,000 urban 
collective enterprises with supervising units (guakao danwei) have been singled out 
nationwide to have their property rights clearly defined.18 Incorporation is one of the 
means to clarify the property rights. 
13 Zhongguo gongshang xingzheng guanli nianjian [Yearbook of the Industrial and Commercial 
Administration of China] (Beijing: Gongshang chubanshe, 1999), 432. 
14 Ibid. 
s Ibìd (1992), 55 & (1999), 432. 
16 Zhongguo gongshang tongji ziliao [Statistical Materials of China Industry and Commerce] (State 
Administration of Industry and Commerce, 1991), 51. 
Zhongguo gongshang xingzheng guanli nianjian (1995), op. cit., 412 -3. 













Rgure 4.3: Registered Capital of Rural and Urban Private 
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Sources: The same as Figure 4.1 
The upsurge of the urban private sector in the 1990s did not emerge from 
scratch. The reform of the state sector from the 1980s laid a significant foundation for 
the boom in the 1990s. Furthermore, it is significant to note that the growth of the urban 
private economy mainly occurred by unleashing state -controlled resources, especially 
human resources. State employees, especially cadres, have a better education, better 
personal networks, better access to information and a richer management experience 
than the vast majority of getihu businesspeople, leaving aside their better ability to 
corruptly siphon off state resources. Hence, they enjoyed an advantage in organising 
larger business firms. The scientific personnel and the advanced techniques they could 
apply gained the edge in market competition in the cutting -edge sectors. Forfeiting state 
jobs to go into business (xiahai) proliferated from the early 1990s, especially after 
Deng's southern tour. The gloomy career prospects of a state job vis -à -vis the growing 
business opportunities reduced the opportunity cost of forgoing the state job. 
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Background and Development of the IT Industry 
Within the urban economy, the IT industry is a sunrise sector. As early as 1958, the first 
vacuum tube computer was produced in China, with the assistance of the Soviet Union, 
but the computer industry first arose not for commercial but for military purposes. After 
ties with the Soviet Union were severed, the development of computer technology 
became self -reliant from the mid -1960s to the 1970s. Although a partial shift from 
military to civilian applications occurred after the Cultural Revolution, the production 
was small in scale and the application was not for non -commercial purposes, mainly to 
aid scientific research and the management of various government agencies.19 
With the advent of microcomputers in the 1980s, a commodification of the 
industry burgeoned at the same time. Taking advantage of China's opening up, the state 
sector started to import production lines from abroad with foreign currency quotas 
offered by the state to assemble computers domestically. However, this import- 
substitution strategy did not help to upgrade the local technological level. The imported 
technology was poor in handling Chinese fonts, and very little application software in 
Chinese was available. It is noteworthy that at that time the industry had not tapped the 
capability in computer technologies held by local research institutions 26 
To integrate scientific research into industrialisation, the Party launched reform 
of the science and technology management system in 1985.2' This was the Party's first 
19 Otto W. Witzell & J. K. Lee Smith, Closing the Gap: Computer Development in the People's Republic 
of China (Boulder: Westview Press, 1989). 
25 Qiwen Lu, China's Leap into the Information Age: Innovation and Organization in the Computer 
Industry (New York: Oxford University Press, 2000), 9 -10. 
21 See the policy from the "Party Centre's Decision on Reform of the Science and Technology 
Management System," Xinhua yuebao [New China Monthly], 485 (March, 1985): 104 -8. 
95 
endeavour to link up scientific research with industrial production by creating a 
"technology market" and allowing research institutes and their personnel to set up 
profit -seeking organisations. From the mid -1980s onward, various spin -off enterprises, 
which were initiated by either individuals or institutions, burgeoned around the hubs of 
research institutes and institutes of higher education. These spin -offs were considered 
non -state enterprises in the sense that they received no state budgetary funding and 
operated in an independent manner, although they gained varying degrees of support 
from local authorities and many of them had even registered themselves as state -owned 
enterprises due to their status as subsidiaries of state research institutes or universities. 
To be sure, even though these parent institutes claim to have provided seed capital to set 
up the firms, the amount is usually small, and sometimes in the form of loans.22 
Many of these spin -offs were computer businesses. In the 1980s, the four best - 
known spin -off enterprises, namely the Two Tongs and Two Hais Sitong (i.e. Stone), 
Xintong, Kehai and Jinghai - all focused upon computer technology. Many of these 
spin -offs, generically called minying enterprises, now have been reorganised into 
private or semi -private enterprises by means of incorporation or a shareholding 
transformation. 
The growth of the computer industry in the 1980s was mainly driven by the 
importation of foreign -made computers. The indigenous enterprises made use of the 
opening up to absorb foreign technologies and to accumulate capital by embarking upon 
sales of imported computers and components. For instance, the current top IT 
conglomerate, the Legend Group, a spin -off from the institute of Computer Technology 
of the Chinese Academy of Sciences, started with sales and after -sales service of 
'2 See such cases in Qiwen Lu, op. cit. 
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imported personal computers (PCs) in the 1980s. At that time, the users of computers 
were mainly composed of personnel in state agencies and research institutes. The 
marketplace remained very small. 
It was not until the early 1990s that PCs started to be used within the urban 
populace. Despite the market dominance of the foreign brand names, like IBM, Compaq 
and AST, indigenous companies did not surrender the whole market to the foreign 
sector. The indigenous sector has been increasingly catching a larger market share 
through competitive pricing and by taking advantage of their familiarity with the 
domestic market. Starting at the end of the 1980s, many small private firms had already 
embarked upon producing IBM clones (without a brand name) by integrating imported 
components, known as "screwdriver assembly." Besides the larger indigenous computer 
companies, which put their brand -name PCs into the market, some domestic large -scale 
manufacturers of home electrical appliances, like Changhong, Haier and TCL, crammed 
themselves into this very competitive market at the end of the 1990s. After several 
years of competition, the two top PC vendors in the domestic market are no longer 
foreign but indigenous non -state brands: Legend and Founder (Fangzheng) a spin -off 
from Peking University.23 It should be noted that the indigenous sector does not grow at 
the expense of the foreign sector. It rather is fostering the popularity of computers and 
thereafter helps the development of derivative businesses, including software and the 
Internet. Without the indigenous sector, it is hard to envision the upsurge of annual PC 
market sales from hundreds of thousands during the early 1990s to several millions 
now. 
23 See China Daily, 1 December 1999 (Internet edition: www.chinadaily.com.cn). 
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To be sure, the "core" computer technologies are still dominated by foreign 
companies, mainly from the United States, Japan and Taiwan. Most computer chips, 
including the central processing unit (CPU) and the dynamic random access memory 
(DRAM), are not developed in China, though domestic firms are already starting to 
design and produce integrated circuit chips.24 Chinese companies mainly participate in 
the later stages of the production chain and in the manufacturing of some peripheral 
accessories, like keyboards, power supplies and mice. This is partly a function of the 
international division of labour in which much of the local production is for foreign 
firms in accordance with the specifications designed by the foreign firms, and the 
products are abroad under the brand names of these foreign firms, i.e. original 
equipment manufacturing (OEM) arrangements. The production processes in China are 
mostly composed of labour- intensive assembly operations and are not technically 
demanding.25 Despite this, this assembly work contributed to the remarkable growth of 
the computer industry in China. While the output value of the computer industry was 
only 5.2 billion yuan in 1991, it increased by 16.5 times, reaching 86 billion yuan, in 
1998.26 In 1999, China was the fifth biggest hardware exporter and is forecast to rank 
the third in 2000 as ever more Taiwan's computer manufacturers move their production 
into the mainland 27 
24 The sales of China -made integrated circuit chips accounted for only 1% of total global sales. See China 
IT & Telecom Report, (Interfax Information Services, http:// www. interfax .ru/english/china_it.htm, 
September 1, 2000), 1. 
25 Barry Naughton & Donald Clarke, Intellectual Property Rights in China: Evolving Business and Legal 
Frameworks (Seattle, WA: National Bureau of Asian Research, 1999), 23. 
Zhongguo dianzí gongye nianjian [China Electronics Industry Yearbook] (Beijing: Dianzi gongye 
chubanshe, 1998), 10 & Zhongguo dianzi gongye nianjian [China Electronics Industry Yearbook] 
(Beijing: Dianzi gongye chubanshe, 1999), 97. 
27 Beijing wanbao [Beijing Evening News], 28 October 2000 (Internet edition: www.jb.com.cn) & South 
China Morning Post, 30 October 2000 (Internet edition: www.scmp.com). 
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The more competitive edge in technology for the indigenous sector lies in the 
software rather than the hardware sector of the industry. A separate software industry in 
China did not emerge until the early 1990s, however, because the value of software was 
not widely recognised by computer users or vendors in the 1980s and most software 
products were sold together with hardware. Entering the 1990s, the software was 
increasingly separated from hardware, and the rise of a software market ensued.28 
Unlike another rising power in software production, India, where the industry focuses 
upon software exports or providing offshore services to American and European 
companies, the Chinese software industry focus upon the domestic and overseas 
Chinese market. Even though Microsoft still dominates the operating system software, a 
lot of application software, which require tailor -made designs, cannot use imported 
software packages. Given this, the foreign software companies tend to employ 
indigenous companies to undertake "localisation" of their products. The cooperation 
with foreign companies is a significant part of the industry. The indigenous firms also 
tend to be able to establish an independent market for local software. 
Software manufacturing is neither labour -intensive nor capital -intensive. It is a 
knowledge- intensive industry in which the high calibre of human resources is the key to 
development and success.29 As a result, it is easier for individuals to enter into business 
provided that they can well master the technique of software engineering, programming 
and/or have such human resources linkages. Several large -scale software companies 
2x Jeff X. Zhang & Yan Wang, The Emergence Market of 'f China's Computer Industry (Westport: Quorum 
Books, 1995), 43. 
29 In accordance with the conventional wisdom, here the labour- intensive only refers to the high intensity 
of manual labour input; the capital -intensive only refers to capital and producer goods input. Actually 
the knowledge- intensive can be both labour- and capital- intensive in the sense that the labour input is in 
form of intellect and the human resources are per se treated as capital. The labour and the capital are 
the same thing. 
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nowadays are founded by individuals without any institutional background in China. 
Some of them are even the bellwethers in their own software specialities. Some small 
firms which had only been engaged in the hardware business also have switched to or 
expanded in the software sphere, in part because marginal profits in hardware sales are 
dwindling almost to nothing under cut -throat competition. 
The emergence of the Internet since the mid -1990s has further boosted the 
computer industry, alongside a simultaneously developing telecommunications sector. 
The earliest application of the Internet in China can be traced back to 1986. At that time 
only some scientific institutions used long- distance dialling to retrieve information from 
European on -line databases. The milestone in development was the establishment of the 
Computer Network Information Centre in 1994. Under the support of the State 
Economic Planning Commission and World Bank loans, a super- computing centre was 
set up in Beijing. It linked 30 -plus sites at the Chinese Academy of Sciences and at 
Peking and Tsinghua universities with the Internet through optical cable. In that year, 
there were only about 10,000 Internet users in China. But the growth rate at the end of 
the 1990s was astonishing. According to the report from the China Internet Network 
Information Centre, from the end of 1997 to the end of 1999, the user population 
increased 13 times, from 670,000 to 8.9 million.3° In addition, over 15,000 websites 
have been created in China. Domain -name registrations in China rank seventh in the 
world.31 
10 See Beijing Review 41, 48 (30 November - 6 December 1998): 8 & Business Weekly, 12 March 2000: 
5. According to conservative estimates done by other foreign agencies, the user population ranged from 
3.79 million to 6.7 million by the end 1999. See Peter Weigang Lu, "Internet Development in China," 
Chinaonline, 31 March 2000 (www.chinaonline.com). 
31 Beijing Review 43, 13 (27 March 2000): 20 & "The Name of the Game is ... China Ranks No. 7 
Worldwide in Domain Registration," Chinaonline, 26 May 2000 ( www.chinaonline.com). 
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Although the on -Iine population in China is anticipated to soon become the 
largest in Asia, the penetration of the Internet into the general population will remain 
shallow. It is estimated that about 7% of the population will be on -line in 2005; the 
comparable figure in Japan is more than 60 %.32 The users in China now are 
concentrated in a handful of the largest cities: the majority of the users are in Beijing, 
Shanghai and Guangzhou.33 
In spite of the weak base of Internet users, this sector has already given rise to a 
surge of various Internet -related industries. They include the Internet Services Provider 
(ISP), the Internet Content Provider, web domain registration and web -site design, 
Electronic Commerce (e- commerce) and so on. The Internet- related industries started to 
flourish at the very end of the 1990s. For example, websites engaged in e- commerce 
soared from 100 in early 1999 to 1,100 in mid -2000.34 By the end of 1999, the e- 
commerce volume of business hit 200 million yuan.35 The private ventures constitute a 
major proportion of the risk- takers in this Internet sector. 
The development of e- commerce is now greatly constrained by two factors. The 
first is poorly developed telecommunications network- building, caused by the 
monopoly of China Telecom, a state company regulating -cum- engaging in most 
businesses related to telecommunications. Its monopoly leads to considerably higher 
Internet access fees than in the United States. The network subscription fee also 
accounts for a major proportion of the cost for companies that are engaged in various 
32 Peter Weigang Lu, op. cit. 
33 Zhongguojingying bao [China Business], 22 August 2000 (Internet edition: www.cb.comcn). 
34Zhonghua gongshang shibao [China Business Times], 10 March 2000 (Internet edition: 
www.cbt.com.cn) & China Daily, 21 June 2000 (Internet edition: www.chinadaily.com.cn). 
35 See Beijing Review 43, 13 (27 March 2000): 21. 
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Internet businesses. As a result, the ISPs, which took the lead in the Internet industry 
from the mid- 1990s, all have reported that they are not making any profits yet.36 In 
order to hasten the industry's development, the government is increasing inputs into 
network building and is introducing greater competition in the IT industry. It has 
established a second company, China United Telecommunication (China Unicorn) in 
1994, to improve the business environment.37 The cost of Internet access is also 
decreasing today, but the situation in this sector of the business context remains far from 
desirable.36 
In addition, an inadequate infrastructure for e- commerce is imposing another 
constraint. Although various on -line clearing systems are now being established by 
some well- established Internet companies in association with individual banking 
corporations, most of e- commerce transactions are still conducted through traditional 
methods. Most people who purchase goods on -line still pay through post offices or pay 
cash upon delivery. The Internet only helps to accelerate the speed of information flows. 
In fact, the method of credit card payment is far from popular in China. The reliability 
of the transactions' security needs to improve. The express delivery business, which just 
started in China a few years ago, is likewise still backward, which makes on -line 
purchasing very slow. As a result, e- commerce is largely limited to business -to- business 
transactions at present. 
36 See Beijing Review 41, 48 (30 November - 6 December 1998): 10. Besides the cost, as the China 
Telecom manipulates the infrastructure of the network, this point of vantage makes it able to offer 
relatively cheaper services to customers. The competition is very unfair to other companies. 
33 The China Unicorn has only broken the monopoly in paging and telephone services by now. It is only 
slightly engaged in the ISP service. 
38 While T was conducting the fieldwork in 1999, the Internet access fee for non -corporate users had just 
been reduced from 10 yuan to 4 yuan per hour. 
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Despite these many constraints, investors and entrepreneurs have not lost their 
interest in this virgin territory. In spite of the fierce competition in certain markets, like 
the PC market, the markets are far from saturation and prospects are very optimistic. It 
is estimated that overall, the proportion of PCs to the national population was only 1 to 
120 in 1998.39 Among urban families which possess a PC, only 12% of them were on 
the net according to a survey conducted in 1999,4° and everybody anticipates that the IT 
sector will expand considerably. Entrepreneurs in several cities are taking a pivotal role 
in this development, among which are those from the two cities in this study: Beijing 
and Guangzhou. 
The Private Economy in Two Cities: Beijing and Guangzhou 
Beijing is one of four centrally administered cities (zhixiashi) in China - equivalent to 
a province in administrative ranking - and is, of course, also the seat of the central 
government. It is located at the northern fringe of the North China Plain surrounded by 
Hebei Province and near another centrally administered city, Tianjin. Guangzhou is the 
capital of Guangdong Province - a deputy provincial level city. It is strategically 
located at the vertex of the Pearl River Delta, a pivotal point of communication in South 
China derived from its historical role as a treaty port in modern China. The human 
resources available to Guangzhou are much less than in Beijing, in that Beijing is the 
national hub of tertiary education. There are 65 tertiary education institutes in Beijing 
and 35 of them are designated as national key -point (zhongdian) tertiary institutes. This 
se Shichangbao [Market Daily], 25 September 1999: 3. 
40 Shichangbao [Market Daily], 1 April 1999: 8. 
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constitutes a quarter of all national key -point tertiary institutes.41 Guangzhou is also an 
important education hub in South China, with 26 institutions of higher learning.42 Yet 
Guangzhou is obviously put in the shade by Beijing. 
However, Guangzhou enjoys a comparative advantage due to its proximity to 
Hong Kong and the close connections of its residents with Hong Kong people and 
overseas Chinese. This facilitates the development of foreign investment and trade. The 
reform policy in the 1980s was especially favourable to Guangdong Province by 
allowing it to pioneer foreign trade and to absorb foreign investment, and by granting it 
considerable fiscal autonomy. As its capital, Guangzhou was also one step ahead of 
many other cities in initiating economic reforms. It was one of the coastal open cities in 
1984 and was allowed to have independent planning (jihua danlieshi) from 1985 to 
1993, which granted it provincial -level economic power and direct access to the central 
government in economic planning. 
Despite enjoying more advantages, Beijing has not outperformed Guangzhou in 
terms of economic output. Even though Guangzhou has a considerably smaller 
population and area, in 1998, the GDPs of Beijing and Guangzhou ranked second and 
third respectively among all cities. Since 1988 Guangzhou has overtaken Tianjin as the 
third largest urban economy in China after Shanghai and Beijing. In some aspects, 
Guangzhou outdid Beijing. In 1998, the industrial output and the utilisation of foreign 
investment of Guangzhou were slightly larger than those of Beijing. The per capita 
41 Chen Sian, Fuwu Zhongguo - pojie shoudu jingji nanti 'Serving China - Solving Economic Issues of 
Capital] (Beijing: Zhongguo jiancha chubanshe, 1998), 151. 
az Zhongguo chengshi tongji nianjian [Urban Statistical Yearbook of China] (Beijing: Zhongguo tongji 
chubanshe, 1998), 278, 296. 
104 
income of Guangzhou residents was higher than that of both Shanghai and Beijing 
residents.43 
The economic growth of both metropolises in the post -Mao era has relied upon 
the development of their suburban districts. In Beijing, the development of Haidian 
District, northwest of the city centre, became a point of departure for the high -tech 
industrial development of China. From the early 1980s, Zhongguancun, situated in 
Haidian and dubbed the Silicon Villey of China, took the lead to develop technology - 
based industries under the auspices of the major research institutes and universities that 
are densely located in Haidian. In 1988, the Beijing Experimental Zone for New 
Technology Industry was established in Haidian to promote and facilitate the 
development of the high -tech industries. This was the first high -tech industrial zone in 
China. Its establishment imitated the Stanford Industrial Park in Silicon Valley, in 
which an innovative milieu was deliberately nurtured for techno -entrepreneurs. 
Moreover, almost 80% of the enterprises registered in the Zone engage in electronics 
business.44 Entering the 1990s, four other similar industrial zones were established in 
other suburban districts and counties surrounding the city centre.45 In 1999, these 
dispersed zones were further integrated into the Zhongguancun Science Park (ZSP) (See 
Figure 4.5). 
Guangzhou's new development zone mainly stretches eastward, in Huangpu 
District, 35 kilometres from the city centre. In 1984, the Guangzhou Economic and 
43 Guangzhou tongJí nianjian [Guangzhou Statistical Yearbook] (Guangzhou: Guangzhou nianjianshe, 
1999), 535. 
44 
www.zhongguancun.com.cnizgc web /yggk/yggkjjfz_qy.htm 
45 The other four Zones are Fengtai Zone in Fengtai District, Changping Zone in Changping County, 
Yizhuang Sciences and Technology Park in southeast of Beijing and Electronic City in Chaoyang 
District. 
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Technological Development Zone in Huangpu was established mainly to attract foreign 
business, as a counterpart to the Shenzhen Special Economic Zone. In between 
Huangpu and the city centre, a suburban area of 108.3 square kilometre was 
appropriated to establish Tianhe District in 1985 as an extension of the old city centre. 
In 1991, the Tianhe Scientech Park (TSP) was established in the district, somewhat like 
a small Zhongguancun. Huangpu and Tianhe are now two significant economic 
powerhouses for Guangzhou. In my field studies, I mainly visited private enterprises in 
the Haidian District of Beijing, and the Huangpu and Tianhe Districts of Guangzhou 
(See Figure 4.6). These are not only the spearheads of municipal economic growth but 
also cradles for the revival of the private sector. 
Beijing from Laggard to Emulator vs. Guangzhou - Overshadowed Pioneer 
In spite of its favourable conditions as the political and educational centre of 
China, Beijing did not lure people into private business. As the capital of a socialist 
country, it tended to keep private entrepreneurs at a distance from Beijing in the first 
decade of the reforms. By contrast, Guangzhou is far away from the political centre, 
was one of the earliest open cities, and has proximity to "capitalist" Hong Kong. Hence, 
the ideological constraints upon private economic development were already more 
relaxed at the very beginning of the reforms. 
The government's and people's attitude towards private business in the two 
cities posed a great contrast. In the 1980s, the development of the private economy in 
Beijing was very sluggish. In 1981, the number of getihu only reached about 6,000, 
while there were 20,000 in Guangzhou. Most of these businesspeople in Beijing were 
originally retirees and unemployed persons. Youth awaiting job assignments (daiye 
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qingnian) constituted a very small proportion of the getihu. As capital residents, Beijing 
youths felt more ashamed of becoming individual businesspeople.46 By contrast, as 
early as 1974, 994,000 young people who were rusticated during the Cultural 
Revolution began to return to Guangzhou. But the government and state enterprises 
were already overstaffed, unable to absorb the new workforce. Fearing social unrest, 
allowing them to set up private businesses and collective enterprises provided a solution 
for the municipal government. Moreover, the government already connived at private 
businesses employing more than seven wage labourers.47 
By the end of 1987, Guangzhou had 1,688 "big" getihu business units, which 
employed more than seven persons.48 In Beijing, there were only 805 such "big" getihu 
business units on the eve of the legalisation of private enterprises. Right after the 
implementation of the Provisional Regulations on Private Enterprises, only 8 getihu 
business units in Beijing were re- registered as private enterprises. Further, only 694 of 
the above "big" getihu business units remained after the promulgation of the 
Regulations.49 This unusual contraction reflected the sensitivity of Beijing's 
businesspeople to the political turmoil in 1988 -89. By contrast, in Guangzhou there 
were 579 private enterprises registered by the end of 1988. Among them, 78 were 
registered limited companies. The total registered capital of all types of private 
enterprises amounted to 78 million yuan. Of these enterprises, 579 were industrial 
enterprises, accounting for 51 %.50 The slight preponderance of industrial enterprises 
A6 Xianmin Shi, `Beijing's Privately -owned Small Businesses: A Decade's Development," Social 
Sciences in China, 1st issue (Spring, 1993): 155. 
Ezra F Vogel, One Step Ahead in China: Guangdong under Reform (Cambridge: Harvard University 
Press, 1989), 99 -100. 
68 Guangzhou tongji nianjian (1988), op. cit., 118. 
69 Shoudu jingji [Capital Economy], 76 (October, 1997): 30. 
5° Guangzhou nianjian [Guangzhou Yearbook] (Guangzhou: Guangzhou wenhua chubanshe, 1989), 371. 
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boiled down to the fact that industrial plants usually employed more workers than other 
sectors and so were more often eligible to re- register their enterprises. 
In the first four years of the 1990s, the development of registered private 
enterprises in Beijing lagged behind many other cities. Despite being a provincial -level 
city, the number of its registered private enterprises was much fewer than all other cities 
that had been granted independent planning in 1990» This sluggish growth should he 
attributed to the special status of the national capital, which had just been swept by the 
political campaign against Bourgeois Liberalism. Administrative control over private 
economic development remained especially strict in Beijing. For instance, before 1993, 
the registration of all enterprises had to be approved by corresponding economic 
departments of the government, and all of the enterprises had to find a danwei to he 
"attached to" (guakao).S2 In other words, if one had no guanxi with any state economic 
sector or state agency, it was unlikely one could set up an enterprise in the capital. 
In spite of the slow development of the "formal" private sector, the quasi -private 
enterprises or spin -offs had become well developed since the 1980s. They were mainly 
composed of technology -based industry. Reportedly, these so- called minying 
technology -based enterprises had already reached 552 in 1986. Most of them were 
registered as either collective or state enterprises and were concentrated in Haidian 
District.53 In addition, there existed a great pool of well -educated would -be 
51 Zhongguo gongshang tongji ziliao (1990), op. cit., 54 -6. 
52 Zhonghua gongshang shibao [China Business Times], 3 April 2000 (Internet edition: www.cbt.com.cn) 
& Interviewee 2. 
Wang Jianhua (ed.), Minying keji qiye de fazhan [Development of People- operated Technology 
Enterprises] (Beijing: Jingji kexue chubanshe, 1996), 29. 
108 
entrepreneurs who were waiting for a favourable environment to start up their own 
business career. 
Since the implementation of the Company Law in July 1994, the private sector 
in Beijing has experienced an extraordinary growth. Most of the new private enterprises 
leaped into the category of limited companies. After 1994, the distribution of types of 
private enterprises in Beijing was extremely skewed. In 1995, the number of registered 
private enterprises surged by 159 %, leaping from 7,509 in 1994 to 19,420. Among 
them, 10,248 were limited companies registered in accordance with the Company Law, 
accounting for 53% of all types of private enterprises.54 In that year, the share of private 
limited companies only reached 37% nationally.55 This development was in extreme 
contrast to the conditions of early years. In 1989, there were only 5 private limited 
companies out of 123 private enterprises in Beijing, with a total registered capital of 
only 15.3 million yuan.56 
In 1995, this explosive growth made Beijing overtake not only Guangzhou (see 
Figure 4.4), but also many other municipalities and provinces. In 1998, the number of 
private enterprises in Beijing reached 59,690 of which 52,099 were limited companies, 
rising to 87% in share. The registered capital hit 36.3 billion yuan.57 This extraordinary 
development should be attributed first to the further liberalisation after Deng's southern 
tour and second to the promulgation of the Company Law. The rapid growth was 
apparently a direct response to the latter, because almost 90% of the newly established 
sa Zhongguo gongshang xingzheng guanli nianjian (1996), op. cit., 146. 
ss Ibid., 146, 416. 
se Zhongguo gongshang xingzheng guanli tongji sishinian [Forty Years of the Industrial and Commercial 
Administration of China] (Beijing: Zhongguo tongji chubanshe, 1992), 157 -8. 
57 Zhongguo gongshang xingzheng guanli nianjian (1999), op. cit., 148. 
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private enterprises were registered in accordance with the Company Law. The de- 
emphasis upon ownership in the new law encouraged politically sensitive Beijingers to 
open a private firm.58 As noted in the last chapter, the rapid growth of private limited 
companies after 1994 was a nationwide phenomenon, but Beijing seems to be more 
sensitive to institutional change. 
















Sources: Zhongguo gongshang xingzheng guanli nianjian (1993 -1999), op. cit.; 
Zhongguo gongshang xingzheng guanli tongji sishinian [Forty Years of the 
Industrial and Commercial Administration of China] (Beijing: Zhongguo 
tongji chubanshe, 1992); Being gongshang guanli [Beijing Industrial and 
Commercial Administration], 91 (May, 1997): 44 -5; Beijing gongshang 
guanli [Beijing Industrial and Commercial Administration], 101 (March, 
1998): 4.; Guangzhou nianjian [Guangzhou Yearbook] (Guangzhou: 
Guangdong renmin chubanshe, Guangzhou nianjianshe, 1990 -9). 
Guangzhou was quite different from Beijing. For the private economy in China, 
Wenzhou was usually taken as the hallmark. However, focusing upon the urban private 
economy, one should have a look at Guangzhou first. h7 1990, the development of 
private enterprises in Guangzhou topped all other independently planned cities and 
sx Shoudu jingji [Capital Economy], 76 (October, 1997): 33. 
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centrally administered cities in the number of enterprises and investors, registered 
capital, and turnover.59 In spite of the unfavourable political environment in 1990, the 
annual growth rate in the number of private enterprises, investors and employees 
maintained a high record - 36 %, 30% and 37% respectively.6o 
Compared with other cities, the Guangzhou government took a more lenient 
attitude towards the private sector. Its government was determined to make use of the 
private sector to boost the municipal economy from the outset. As early as 1989, the 
government promulgated regulations to promote the growth of private enterprises. The 
measures included opening more previously restricted business areas to the private 
sector, and granting tax reductions and tax holidays to newly established or 
manufacturing enterprises. The government gave preferential treatment to indigenous 
private enterprises that processed orders placed by foreign companies and those that 
formed joint operations or joint ventures with foreign companies.61 In addition, the 
government issued regulations in 1992 to allow wholly individually -owned and 
partnership enterprises with registered capital of 30,000 yuan or above to possess legal 
person status.62 
In 1993, the Municipal Party Committee and government jointly promulgated 
the "Resolution on Accelerating the Individual and Private Economy." Ahead of the 
central policy, the resolution defined the private economy as an "important component 
59 There were 14 centrally planned cities. Besides Guangzhou, they were Shenyang, Dalian, Changchun, 
Harbin, Nanjing, Ningbo, Xiamen, Qingdao, Wuhan, Shenzhen, Chengdu, Chongqing and Xi'an. See 
data about the private economy in these cities in 1990 in Zhongguo gongshang tongji ziliao (1990), op. 
cit., 54, 56 -7. 
6° Guangzhou nianjían (1991), op. cit., 418. 
61 Guangzhoushi fagui guizhang quanshu [Collection of Rules and Regulations of Guangzhou] 
(Guangzhou: Guangdong renmin chubanshe, 1996), 96 -8. 
62 Guangzhou Government Document (1992) no. 72. 
111 
of the national economy and one of the mainstays of the socialist market economy," 
while the Party centre did so only as late as 1997. In order to promote the private 
economy, more restrictions were lifted, all business areas were open to the private 
sector, and the government launched a trial of granting select manufacturing private 
enterprises permission to possess independent rights to export and import. These rights 
were nationally granted in 1999. In addition, the private sector was allowed to buy 
SOEs. The government also set up an experimental zone that promoted the individual 
and private economy in Baiyun District, a suburban district situated to the north of the 
city centre.63 
In October 1997, the municipal government issued the "Regulations for 
Protecting Rights of Private Enterprises," which were approved by the Guangdong 
People's Congress Standing Committee. This was the first set of such local regulations 
to formulate concrete principles to respect the legal property rights of non- publicly- 
owned economic organisations and to place private and public enterprises on an equal 
footing vis -à -vis administrative rules. The regulations stipulated that no danwei or 
individual could illegally intervene in the operation of private enterprises nor could 
encroach or infringe on the legal property of private enterprises, while the directors, 
supervisors, business partners and staff of private enterprises were prohibited from 
making use of their positions in the enterprises to take bribes. Elsewhere in China, the 
state authorities generally have made light of the protection of private property. For 
instance, one would only be charged with committing corruption if the misbehaviour 
concerned infringing upon public property. The concept of "corruption" (tanwu) is not 
as Geti siying jingji falli faguì wenjian xuanbian [Selected Laws and Regulations on Individual and 
Private Economy] (Beijing: Zhongguo zhihua chuhanshe, 1998), 860 -4. 
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applied to the same behaviour in private organisations. Hence, the new regulations were 
a breakthrough in terms of official attitude towards private property. 
However, the pioneering practices of Guangzhou have not spurred an upsurge of 
its private economy as in Beijing. Its top position fell to eighth in terms of the number 
of private enterprises in 1998. The loss of the leading position was reportedly attributed 
to the poor implementation of the above policies. For instance, by early 1998, there had 
been only two private enterprises possessing independent rights to export and import.64 
The burden of administrative fees remained very heavy. Red tape was still hindering 
business transactions 65 Cases of infringements of private property were common.66 
According to the official statistics, on the other hand, the performance of private 
economic growth in Guangzhou was also impressive. The annual growth rate in the 
number of private enterprises averaged 36% for the first nine years of the 1990s, while 
the share of limited companies rose to 76% in 1998.67 My interviews suggest that the 
provincial capital remains one of the most favourable places in South China for business 
investment in light of the efficiency of the state administration. The composition of 
investors attests to the validity of this impression. According to the official statistics, up 
to mid -1999, a quarter of the private enterprises in Guangzhou had been opened by 
outsiders, i.e. non -Guangzhou residents. Approximately another quarter were jointly 
opened by native residents and outsiders.68 As a major trading centre in South China, 
Guangzhou is a desirable place for investment by domestic entrepreneurs from outside 
64 Guangzhou ribao [Guangzhou Daily], 13 May 1998: 2. 
65 See China News Service (27 August, 1998) (www.chinanews.com). 
66 See Nanfang ribao [Nanfang Daily], 23 November 1998: 13; Renmin ribao [People's Daily] (South 
China News), 23 November 1998: 1. 
fi7 Guangzhou nianjian (1991 -9), op. cit. 
68 Yangcheng wanbao [ Yangcheng Evening News], 16 October 1999: 1. 
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the provincial capital. The above contradictory images of the investment environment 
there reflect the comparative advantage of Guangzhou against many places in the north, 
even though the environment of Guangzhou is not satisfactory enough. 
Guangzhou suffered from a competitive disadvantage within the economic 
landscape of Guangdong Province. First of all, three of the four Special Economic 
Zones in China are located in Guangdong Shenzhen, Zhuhai and Shantou. In 
addition, counties in the Pearl River Delta, including Dongguan, Nanhai, Zhongshan 
and Shunde, took off economically in the 1980s and have achieved a high level of 
industrialisation and urbanisation. These newly developed cities not only attracted 
foreign investment but also bolstered the development of the indigenous private sector, 
acting head -on as competitors with Guangzhou. Hence, they tapped a high proportion of 
the economic resources available in Guangdong. This is especially so with Shenzhen; 
its GDP is now catching up with Guangzhou's. The number of private enterprises in 
Shenzhen overtook Guangzhou in 1995 and reached 34,000 in 1998, while 
Guangzhou's trailed it at 31,000.69 
If Guangzhou could keep one step ahead of other cities outside Guangdong, it 
could only keep less than a step ahead of other cities within Guangdong. The 
preferential treatment offered by the Guangzhou government could be copied by 
neighbouring cities very quickly. For instance, similar regulations for protecting private 
enterprises were promulgated in Zhuhai in September 1998.70 The government policy 
towards the private sector does not count very much if the offers by adjacent places are 
b9 Zhongguo gongshang xingzheng guanli nianjian (1999), op. cit., 225, 231. 
70 Ibid., 232. 
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more or less the same. Moreover, the legacy of a bloated bureaucratic structure in the 
provincial capital put Guangzhou at a disadvantage. 
In contrast to the situation in South China, Beijing in North China faces far less 
competition than Guangzhou. Tianjin, as noted above, has been overtaken by 
Guangzhou not only in overall economic performance but also in the private economy, 
let alone in comparison with Beijing. Beijing has been playing a leading role in 
developing the private sector in this region from the mid -1990s onward. 
Interestingly, except for specific policies towards minying technology -based 
industries, the Beijing government had not actively hastened private economic 
development until 1998 after the Party centre had recognised the non -public sector as an 
"important component" of the national economy.71 In general, the economic policy of 
the Beijing government usually strictly complied with the central line, while the 
southeast coastal provinces took the lead to break that line. Although the ZSP creates a 
"greenhouse" environment for technology -based industries, in which semi -private and 
private enterprises account for the majority of such firms, the preferential treatment 
granted by Guangzhou's TSP does not lag behind Beijing's ZSP and is even better. The 
higher calibre of human resources available in Beijing is the major impetus to the 
upsurge. Better -educated people are increasingly more inclined to exploit their career 
outside danwei that offers low remuneration and no room for their own initiative. 
Setting up their own private business is one of the options. This results in a unique 
mode of development of the private sector in Beijing. The private entrepreneurs there 
71 The Beijing Municipal Planning Commission et al. promulgated in September 1998 "Opinions on 
Encouraging Beijing's Individual and Private Economic Development." See the Opinions from 
www.mystar.com.cn/p9205.html. 
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tend to be better educated, especially among the entrepreneurs in Haidian District, 
where around 80% of private entrepreneurs possess a bachelor degree or above.72 They 
concentrate upon technology related businesses. It was reported in early 2000 that in 
Beijing there were around 20,000 private enterprises engaging in computer applications, 
scientific research and technology development, accounting for a quarter of all private 
enterprises in the capita1.73 
By the same token, private enterprises in Haidian District constitute a high 
proportion of all the private enterprises in Beijing. In April 1998, they accounted for 
26% of all Beijing's private enterprises. This was 34 -odd times the number in the least 
developed district Yanqing County in northern Beijing, and eight times Xuanwu District 
at the city centre.74 The private enterprises in Haidian were proliferating at an 
astonishing speed in the past few years. From 1995 to mid -1999, the number of private 
enterprises in the district had soared 18 times.75 The outstanding performance of 
Haidian should be attributed to its special location as the hub of higher education. The 
municipal government usually takes Haidian as a point of trial implementation of 
reform measures that further reinforces the capacity of the district to absorb private 
investment. The government's industrial policies ever more leaned towards promoting 
high -tech industries that are densely located in the district. 
Last but not least, many "fake" collective technology -based or so- called minying 
enterprises began to re- register themselves as private enterprises at the end of the 1990s. 
About 50% of the collective enterprises in Beijing, including a lot of technology -based 
7z Shoudu jingjí [Capital Economy], 90 (December, 1998): 7. 
73 Beijing ribao [Beijing Daily], 2 March 2000 (Internet edition: www.jb.com.cn). 
74 Shoudu jingji [Capital Economy], 97 (July, 1999): 10. 
75 Beijing ribao [Beijing Daily], 29 July 1999 (Internet edition: www.jb.comcn). 
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firms, either transformed themselves into shareholding cooperatives or re- registered 
themselves as limited companies through mid -1999.76 It should be noted that the output 
of minying technology -based enterprises also constitutes a considerable share of the 
GDP in the capital. The technology- industry -trade revenue of the minying technology - 
based enterprises already accounted for 23% of its GDP in 1997.77 
Haidian's phenomenon is not exactly replicated in Guangzhou. The great 
contrast in the pool of technical personnel from higher education and research institutes 
is a major cause. In addition, well -paid position offered by a large number of foreign - 
funded companies in Guangzhou provide a substitute for taking business risks and 
absorb a considerable portion of the well- educated workforce. According to interviews 
with people in Guangzhou, it seems that the native residents in general prefer to secure 
employment job with foreign - funded companies rather than to take a business risk 
themselves if they have two such options. Conversely, businesspeople from elsewhere 
in China have a greater propensity to pick Guangzhou as a base for entrepreneurship. 
That may account for why a high proportion of the private enterprises in Guangzhou are 
owned by "outsiders." 
If Beijing is compared to Bangalore - India's Silicon Valley - Guangzhou can 
be compared to Hyderabad, which is attempting to catch up with Bangalore in the IT 
industry. Likewise, the Guangzhou government is bolstering the development of high - 
tech industry, especially focusing upon computer software. Based upon the TSP, the 
Tianhe Software Park was set up in August 1999 to specialise in the development of 
software. Most of the software and related enterprises in Guangzhou are non -state firms. 
Beijing jingjibao [Beijing Economic DaiIy], 1 August 1999: I. 
77 Chen Jian, op. cit., 176. 
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According to an official investigation in 1999, 90% of 957 such enterprises were 
minying enterprises.78 By the same token, Tianhe is one of the districts in which the 
private sector as a whole is thriving. In 1998, the number of private enterprises 
registered in Tianhe District ranked second in the metropolitan area, with most of the 
high -tech enterprises located in Tianhe.79 Comparatively speaking, the distribution of 
private and technology -based enterprises is relatively even, not as skewed as in Beijing. 
Comparing the paths of private economic development in the two metropolises, 
it is interesting to note that local preferential policies towards the private sector did not 
play a determining role in hastening the growth of the private sector, though macro- 
economic liberalisation did spur an overall acceleration of development, shown in the 
last chapter. The economic landscape of the two cities overrode other factors in leading 
to this contrasting performance. However, it does not follow that the local governments 
have had nothing to do with it. Increasingly significant industry- oriented policies are 
shaping the private sector from another side. This dimension will be discussed in 
Chapter Seven. By and large, Beijing as the emulator and Guangzhou as the pioneer are 
heading in the same direction of development - high -tech industries in which private 
entrepreneurs are taking advantage of the policy line to expand the niche for the private 
economy. The rest of this dissertation will focus upon how this specific group of 
entrepreneurs and their enterprises behaved in the 1990s. 
78 Guangzhou ruanjian chanye fazhan xianzhuang diaocha baogao [Investigation Report on the 
Development of Software Industry in Guangzhou], done by Guangzhoushi manjian chanye xietiao 
gongzuo xiaozu. 
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Chapter 5: The Background and Corporate Structure of Enterprises 
This chapter examines the background of the 50 enterprises in my sample and 
the experiences of the entrepreneurs who are running them. I should clarify that a few of 
these entrepreneurs invest in more than one business field, but I will mainly focus upon 
their core business. The entrepreneurs are usually the chief executives, who may be only 
one of the investors in their enterprises if these are not sole proprietorships. In two 
cases, the entrepreneurs are not investors of their own capital but only the Chief 
Executive Officers (CEOs). Furthermore, one of the 50 cases is a state -funded minying 
enterprise in Guangzhou. In another case among those interviewed in Beijing, the 
company headquarters is in Fuzhou, Fujian Province. 
The following pages will examine the personal background of these 
entrepreneurs, the background of the enterprises and their corporate structure. I will not 
disclose the names of these enterprises and entrepreneurs except for a few celebrated 
cases in which I partly rely upon documentary materials. 
Personal Particulars and Personal Resources 
Age Structure and its Backdrop 
All of the entrepreneurs are male. The average age of these entrepreneurs was 35 
in 1999. The oldest was 62, and the youngest 24. Compared with the nation -wide 
survey on private entrepreneurs conducted by the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences 
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(CASS) in 1997, whose samples' average age was 40.5,1 my sample was quite young. If 
the oldest entrepreneur, the extreme case, were expunged from the list, it would drop to 
31.5. It should be noted that 29 entrepreneurs out of these cases were born in the 1960s 
and 10 were born in the 1970s. These 39 entrepreneurs grew up in a relatively 
favourable era. As one of the entrepreneurs, Wang Wenjing, the president of one of the 
top software companies, Ufsoft Group, who was born in 1964, said with a sense of 
gratitude to a newspaper, "I haven't experienced the three -year natural disaster (1959- 
61); I only have a vague memory about the Cultural Revolution but just caught the good 
era of reforms and opening, caught the resumption of university admissions, caught the 
regaining of respect for knowledge and talents, caught [the chance of permitting] 
individuals to start their own businesses... ,2 What Wang said aptly depicted the 
politico -social background of his generation of entrepreneurs. They belonged to a lucky 
generation in the sense that the political and social factors were helpful for them to 
become specialised entrepreneurs. Different from the preceding generation, they never 
experienced the mental and psychological pressures generated by incessant political 
campaigns, especially the Cultural Revolution. They were relatively free from 
ideological constraints when they pursued their careers outside a danwei. As for the 
remaining 11 entrepreneurs, except for the oldest case, they were eyewitnesses rather 
than participants of the Cultural Revolution, because they were mostly born in the 
second half of the 1950s and were still children during the political turmoil. 
Zhang Houyi & Ming Zhili (eds.), Zhongguo siying giye _fazhan baogao (1999) [Report on the 
Development of China Private Economies (1999)] (Beijing: Shehui kexue wenxian chubanshe, 2000), 
105. 
2 Being wanbao [Beijing Evening News], 3 October 1999 (Internet edition: www.jb.com.cn). 
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Education and Career Paths 
Just as the entrepreneur Wang Wenjing pointed out that his generation had better 
access to an education, the entrepreneurs in this study had indeed received a good 
education. Forty -two entrepreneurs have obtained bachelor degrees or above (84 %), 
whereas the CASS survey showed only 20.2 %.3 None of my cases were among the 
earliest post -Mao urban getihu businesspeople who launched their own businesses in 
default of employment opportunities. Nonetheless, many of these entrepreneurs started 
their own businesses at youngish ages. Omitting one case who was a peasant without 
much education, the youngest business starter launched his own business at 20, while he 
was still studying at school. Another, who at 21 was an undergraduate, quit his studies 
at university in order to concentrate upon his business start-up. Some of the other 
entrepreneurs claimed that they had done part-time jobs during their university studies 
and accumulated seed capital through this. 
The entrepreneurs' experience of employment before launching their first 
business was usually not rich. Only those who started working during the 1980s and 
before accumulated a considerable work experience. Of the 20 entrepreneurs who 
started working during the 1990s, only 5 cases had more than 3 years of experience of 
prior employment (See Table 5.1). This short experience of the youngest entrepreneurs 
reflected the significant change in the notion of a career among the new generation, who 
no longer stuck to the job security offered by the state. This is especially true for the IT 
specialists, who want to pursue their own initiative, whereas the state sector was unable 
to provide them with sufficient room. Among my cases, 18 entrepreneurs had job 
3 Zhang Houyi & Ming Zhili, op. cit., 106. 
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experience in non -state or foreign- funded enterprises. They quit the assigned jobs or 
declined the state's job assignment to seek another job by themselves. The abandonment 
of job assignments occurred among those who started working during the 1990s. The 
others, who had worked in the SOEs or state agencies, can be divided into two groups. 
The first group was composed of those who started businesses in the second half of the 
1980s. They quit their state jobs propelled by the nation -wide enthusiasm for xiahai 
(diving into the business sea) around 1988. The second group was composed of those 
who started working in the 1990s. They quit their jobs because of the gloomy prospects 
for career development in the "traditional" job. The opportunity cost of quitting the state 
job is getting progressively lower and lower. 
A particular feature of my cases is that many of these entrepreneurs had job 
experience in higher education or research institutes. This is not peculiar given that 
most of these entrepreneurs embarked upon IT businesses. Beijing and Guangzhou 
shared the same experience in this respect with other technopolises over the world.4 
Elsewhere nowadays, well -known entrepreneurs have spun off from jobs in universities 
and research institutes. Starting from the mid- 1980s, they quit their jobs there and 
started their own firms so as to turn their research products into commodities. 
This path of development was more manifest among the cases from Beijing. 
Nine of the Beijing entrepreneurs had research and/or teaching experience in 
universities or research institutes, while there were only four such cases in Guangzhou. 
The entrepreneurs in Beijing in general were better educated than those in Guangzhou. 
13 of the Beijing enterprises had at least one investor with or earning a Master's or 
4 Manuel Castells & Peter Hall, Technopoles of the World: The Making of 21st Century Industrial 
Complexes (London: Routledge, 1994). 
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doctoral degree, while there were only 6 in Guangzhou. As noted in the last chapter, 
Beijing is the national hub of various higher education and research institutes. This 
well -educated group of entrepreneurs was more socially respected than other groups of 
businesspeople, who were sometimes disparaged as nouveaux riches and crooks. 
Table: 5.1: The Employed Experience of Entrepreneurs (N =461* 





Working before the 
1990s 
Entrepreneurs Started 
Working from the 
1990s 
Never employed 1 
Less than 1 Year 1 5 
1 to 3 Years 6 9 
4 to 5 Years 6 1 
More than 5 Years 13 4 
Total 26 20 
*The remaining four cases are irrelevant. Three of them are CEOs or employed 
managers. The remaining one has both employed and self -employed business 
experiences from the outset. 
Despite generally short experiences of prior employment, many of these 
entrepreneurs did draw relevant resources from their pre- business education and work 
experiences. There were respectively 30 and 27 entrepreneurs whose businesses were, 
with varying degrees, related to their academic training and previous work experiences. 
Combining the two factors, 36 cases (72 %) linked their businesses with to their 
previous experiences. It should be noted that a good command of computer knowledge 
and technique is often the key to launching business in the IT industry, while sensitivity 
to market demand is the primary, even the sole key for many other industries. 
Origins, Residency and Business Mobility 
While professional training, education and work experiences are often crucial to 
these entrepreneurs, the ascribed status basically played no distinctive role in nurturing 
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their career. In terms of origins, 34 out of 48 relevant enterprises (71%) involved 
entrepreneurs who were non- native to the two cities. 34 out of 47 relevant cases (72 %) 
obtained full residencies (hukou) in Beijing or Guangzhou.5 Some of them were not 
native. They obtained residency due to pursuing post -graduate degrees there or being 
assigned to work there. In other words, 13 entrepreneurs were neither native nor local 
hukou holders. This indirectly indicates that the parents, families, and other close 
relatives of these non -native entrepreneurs generally have laid no critical foundation for 
their building of businesses, even though some of them had absorbed their family 
members or close relatives into their firms. For one thing, they did not live with their 
parents, as the latter almost all kept living in their home towns. For another, no one in 
all of these entrepreneurs came from rich or senior cadre families. Indeed, not a few of 
them sprang from peasant stock. The family heritage looked to play no important 
function in their career pursuits. If anything, the fathers of two entrepreneurs were also 
managing businesses; therefore, their fathers to a certain extent shaped the forming of 
their own entrepreneurship. But these two interviewees alleged that their families 
invested nothing in their firms, and they were in unrelated businesses. This finding is in 
line with CASS's survey.8 Even for the native -city entrepreneurs in my cases, their 
Hukou, or known as the household registration is an administrative system to control rural -urban 
migration by means of mandatory allocation of urban residencies and jobs. During the era of planned 
economy, with an urban hukou, one was entitled to get access to all life necessities from their 
habitations, including housing, food rationing, school education, job, etc. For its origin and 
transformation, see Tiejun Cheng & Mark Selden, "The Origins of Social Consequences of China's 
Hukou System," The China Quarterly, 139 (September, 1994): 644 -68 & Hein Mallee, "China's 
Household Registration System under Reform," Development and Change 26, 1 (January, 1995): 1 -29. 
E For non -native undergraduates, they are not entitled to obtain the residency after the graduation. 
'Interviewees 3 and 50. 
R Zhang Houyi & Ming Zhili (eds.), Zhongguo siying give fazhan baogao (1987 -1998) [Report on the 
Development of China Private Economies (1987 -1998)] (Beijing: Shehui kexue wenxian chubanshe, 
1999), 156. 
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supposed familiarity with local resources gave them no conspicuous advantage over the 
non -native entrepreneurs. Admittedly, the IT industry is a relatively open business and 
closely linked to overseas rather than local resources, and therefore, being a native -city 
entrepreneur does not necessarily entail any advantage. 
As a usual practice, many of the entrepreneurs among my cases relied upon 
loans from kith and kin to help establish their firms, but this could not be regarded as a 
critical resource, because it was always stopgap assistance, not a real financial input, 
and they needed to pay the money back in a short time. 
It should be noted that the capitalist economy in China had vanished for almost 
30 years before its revival in the early 1980s. It was normal that most of these private 
entrepreneurs started from scratch. Although there are some young "bureaucratic 
capitalists" who were children or close relative of senior cadres, so- called princelings 
(taizidang), they are usually engaged in such "black" economic activities as state -capital 
drainage, underground and rent -seeking businesses. They should be separated from this 
study that just focuses on productive businesses. 
Three specific cases in Guangzhou are noteworthy when discussing origins and 
residency. First, two of the enterprises were not originally established in Guangzhou but 
in the places of origin of the entrepreneurs. One of these entrepreneurs was assigned to 
work in a state factory in Guangzhou after his graduation from university. But after one 
year, he quit the job to launch a small factory in his home town, Changsha in Hunan 
Province. This went bankrupt after half a year, and after that he worked in two non -state 
companies in Shenzhen and Guangzhou in tandem, and simultaneously embarked upon 
trading businesses in Hunan. In 1996, he established a new company with his friends in 
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Changsha. When I interviewed him, he had just managed to move the company's 
headquarters from Changsha to Guangzhou. He explained that this decision was based 
upon two factors. First, all of the shareholders including him held a Guangzhou hukou. 
Second, Guangzhou was an important economic hub where a higher calibre of human 
resources was available. The Changsha government had urged him to stay, but he 
ignored the request. 
The fact that he had been granted a Guangzhou hukou seemed crucial in his 
decision- making. But his choice was made rather for market considerations. In another 
case, the background was similar. An enterprise founded in Xinjiang also moved the 
company headquarters to Guangzhou. The entrepreneur only held a Xinjiang hukou. He 
explained that Guangzhou was a place where information transactions were far better 
and the government administration was flexible and pragmatic. In this case, market 
forces obviously played a leading role in his decision. 
The third case further hacks up my argument. A returned student from the 
United States initially pooled his capital in his hometown in Jiangsu. But he was 
disappointed by his townsmen. "I started a company in my hometown... But people 
there, their minds are so backward. The people are pretty conservative, not open - 
minded, very narrow," he said in English, "People here in Guangzhou are different 
because it is close to Hong Kong and Shenzhen. That makes it like a foreign country. 
That's why I come here. "9 Rational economic considerations - i.e. the "economic 
action" in the Weberian sense - obviously overrode all other considerations: political, 
sentimental and social factors - i.e. the "substantive economy" in the Polanyian sense. 
9Interviewee 44. 
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In the first case, his identity as a Guangzhou hukou holder was just compatible with his 
rational considerations. 
In addition, the geo- economic pull effect on "business migration" from rural to 
urban areas and from small towns to larger cities shares the same logic as that of 
population migration. The pull effect is more manifest in big cities like Beijing and 
Guangzhou where there are millions of members of the "floating" population. The 
control over population mobility is becoming ineffective now_ It is in part caused by the 
growth of the private enterprises. Despite holding no local hukou, the "non -resident" 
entrepreneurs were capable of obtaining sufficient daily necessities from the market 
now, including solving the education problem of their children. The private enterprises 
also employed a Iot of people who were not local hukou holders. For example, in one of 
my cases, 50% of the staff of a large education software company in Beijing, CSC, does 
not hold Beijing hukou, I° 
One thing the "non- resident" entrepreneurs grumbled about was the difficulty of 
applying for a passport. It is significant for the businesspeople now to go abroad for 
business reasons. However, to do so they needed to return to their hometowns, where 
their personal dossiers were kept, to apply for it. They also found it difficult to apply for 
passports or other warrants for their "non- resident" staff if necessary, as their 
enterprises are not danwei. On the other hand, when some entrepreneurs had a chance to 
obtain a local hukou, they declined to apply. Among my interviewees, a "non- resident" 
entrepreneur in Beijing was offered a chance to apply by virtue of his economic 
contribution. However, he did not want to go through the rigmarole of the application, 
1° See Zhonghua gongshang shibao [China Business Times], 26 April 1999: 5. 
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so he simply gave it up.' Indeed, the considerable number of "non- resident" 
entrepreneurs in this study demonstrates that the hukou system neither imposes 
constraints upon nor provides any significant benefit to the private entrepreneurs now. 
With hindsight, some local governments have relaxed controls over the entry of 
"outsiders" in order to absorb outside investment. For instance, in Guangzhou, non- 
resident private investors who have attained a certain level of tax contributions within a 
certain period of time can now apply for a transitional residency, a so- called blue seal 
hukou, for themselves and their family members and staff.'2 
"Business migration" was found not only in terms of rural -to -urban or town -to- 
city but also district -to- district within a city. It should be noted that small enterprises in 
cities are usually registered with the district's Bureau of Industry and Commerce 
Management (BICM). They are directly regulated by various departments of the 
district's government. The enterprises pay taxes and other fees to the district's 
government instead of to the municipal government. Hence, the regional economic 
competition is not only between higher -level but also between lower -level 
administrative regions. In Beijing, there is a fierce competition between Haidian District 
and Chaoyang District in luring business investment. Given the expensive office rents 
and poor traffic conditions in Haidian District, some private technology -based 
companies have now moved to Chaoyang District, where the environment is much 
better (it is the embassy district). The district also offers attractive preferential -policy 
packages aimed towards the new entrants.13 In addition, some enterprises moved their 
Interviewee 2. 
12 Nanfang ribao [Nanfang Daily], 21 September 1999: 1. 
13 See Being jingjibao [Beijing Economic Daily], 29 June 1999: 6 & 6 June 1999: 2. 
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factories out from the urban districts. One of my cases was in the midst of moving its 
factory from Beijing City to the outskirts county Changping, where it was offered 
cheaper land and other preferential treatment.74 
This regional competition can be utilised and distorted by entrepreneurs. For 
instance, the official domiciles of some enterprises among my cases were not the places 
they were actually doing their business. Various particular reasons account for this 
practice, but in so doing, they pay taxes to one district's government but earn their 
revenue in another district. In other words, it is possible that an IT entrepreneur can 
register his firm and pay his enterprise's taxes in Chaoyang District where he enjoys 
preferential policies, but carries out his business in Haidian where it still enjoys a 
locational economic advantage. Entrepreneurs can maximise their profits by exploiting 
the structural defects of the administration system. 
Political Profiles and Capital 
The political profiles of my interviewees were not, in general, auspicious. Only 
four entrepreneurs among my cases were Party members. None of the rest claimed to 
have joined any other Party- endorsed political parties. Among the four Party members, 
only one entrepreneur claimed that he still participated in Party activities and had a 
Party branch in his enterprise.k5 The rest of the three were inactive members. One of 
them even claimed that he might withdraw from the Party. 
Three entrepreneurs were the members of local People's Political Consultative 
Conferences (PPCCs). They were co -opted into the PPCC because of their membership 
14 Interviewee 24. 
i5 Interviewee 51. 
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of the Federation of Industry and Commerce. One of these was Yuan Yongmin in 
Beijing. He was famous for his pioneering attempt to produce aircraft privately. He was 
an active PPCC member and concurrently the vice -chairman of the Haidian Private 
Enterprise Association and Haidian Federation of Industry and Commerce. He treasured 
these "semi- political" positions and made use of this identity to tap various economic 
resources. However, the other two entrepreneurs who belonged to local PPCCs seemed 
indifferent to their membership. One was the entrepreneur from Xinjiang, and the other 
was one of the Party members I mentioned in the paragraph above. His indifference was 
caused by cynicism toward politics after the June 4 1989 Incident. This disappointment 
over politics was his impetus to launching a business on his own. But he also recognised 
that he gained a little advantage by being a PPCC member, that no one dared bully him 
due to this identity.16 
The most influential political position that private entrepreneurs can attain may 
well be to become a deputy to a People's Congress. The entrepreneur from Xinjiang had 
been a deputy to the People's Congress in Xinjiang. Two celebrities among my cases 
were also the deputies. One is the president of CSC Group, Song Chaodi, the other the 
president of Ufsoft Group, Wang Wenjing. Song was a deputy to Haidian People's 
Congress, and Wang had been a Standing Committee Member of Beijing's PPCC in 
1993 and was elected a deputy to the National People's Congress in 1998. Obviously, 
he was wielding a certain degree of power to represent the interests of his industry and 
to influence government's policy making. 
Another case that should be noted is Edward Zeng. He was a returned student 
from Canada, holding a passport of Canada. His company, Sparkice, formed a Sino- 
16 Interviewee 25. 
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foreign joint venture with China Unicorn to enter the e- commerce business. In this joint 
venture, the foreign partner (i.e. Sparkice) held 51 percent of the company's shares. The 
possession of majority shares by foreign investors was prohibited in the 
telecommunications sector under government regulations. Obviously, he was enjoying a 
certain degree of privilege. His linkage with the state agents who oversaw 
telecommunications was conspicuous. Before he went abroad, he had been in charge of 
a research group of the state's Information Centre under the State Planning Commission 
in 1987. After his return, he became an IT policy advisor to the government and a guest 
researcher of several commissions and ministries.17 There was no doubt that he had a 
good position to bargain for favourable conditions and in swaying the government 
policy. 
Despite this particular case, securing political capital for these private 
enterprises was usually a function of political co- optation. The bigger an enterprise, the 
more exposed the enterprise, and the more likely that the entrepreneurs of the exposed 
enterprise would be co -opted by the government by offering them positions in 
intermediary organisations and the parliament -like PPCC and the People's Congress. 
Background of the Enterprises 
As of the end of the year 1999, the average length of existence of these enterprises was 
4.6 years, and the median was 4 years (See Table 5.2). The oldest enterprise had 
operated for 13 years, founded in 1986 in Guangzhou. The youngest two enterprises 
were founded in September 1999. These two enterprises were registered at the 
'7 Business Weekly, 24 October 1999: 5. 
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Entrepreneurs Park in the Guangzhou Economic and Technological Development Zone 
(GETDZ). The Park was an enterprise incubator, mainly to absorb returned overseas 
Chinese students to bring hack foreign technologies to China. The park had just opened 
when I visited it. Despite the newly founded enterprises, the entrepreneurs were not 
fresh hands. Both had started their own businesses respectively in 1990 and 1994.18 The 
enterprises were only one of their new projects. 
Table: 5.2: Length of Existence of the Enterprises (N =50 
Years <1 1 -3 4 -6 7 -8 9 -10 >10 
No. of Enterprises 5 15 19 7 1 3 
Ownership and Ownership Transformation 
Not all of the enterprises were founded or owned by the entrepreneurs 
themselves. There were five such cases. The first case was a software company funded 
by a foreign venture capitalist. After poor performance by the first CEO, the incumbent 
CEO, who had originally been a deputy general manager of the company, replaced him. 
The second case is the state -funded minying software company mentioned above. The 
third case was originally a small SOE in charge of the greening of GETDZ. In the wake 
of poor performance, it was auctioned off in 1998, and is now owned by the former 
peasant I mentioned above. The fourth case is an Internet service company that was 
founded by an entrepreneur who is one of my interviewees but was funded by another 
private capitalist. The last case is a software company that was founded by a computer 
18 Interviewees 44 and 45. One is the returned student with his origin from Jiangsu I mentioned. 
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engineer in 1994, but in 1998 was taken over by another private businessman who is 
among my interviewees. 
Among the remaining 45 cases, 13 claimed that the enterprises were exclusively 
owned by the entrepreneurs themselves from the very beginning. Four of these have 
absorbed new shareholders. But two that originally were partnerships were now claimed 
to have been transformed into sole proprietorships. As a result, plus the two cases of 
sole proprietorship in the last paragraph, there were now 13 cases of sole proprietorship 
(26 %) (see Table 5.4). By and large, the sole proprietorships did not prevail among my 
cases, though this impression will be slightly qualified when I explain the shareholding 
components of the enterprises later. 
The above was only the de facto ownership that the entrepreneurs claimed. The 
de jure ownership reflected by the enterprises' registrations produced a different and 
more complicated story (see Table 5.3 and 5.4). First of all, among the "alleged" sole 
proprietorships eight cases were registered as collectives and five were registered as 
limited companies from the very beginning Another case was registered as a foreign - 
invested company, but was actually owned by an indigenous entrepreneur who asked an 
overseas Chinese friend to register a company for him.19 It is a so- called private 
company wearing a "foreign" hat (dai yang maozi). The four remaining foreign -funded 
companies really did possess foreign investment, but the foreign partners or investors in 
three cases were returned Chinese students. Only one case was fully funded by a foreign 
venture capitalist. 
19 His friend remained the legal -person representative of the enterprise when I interviewed him. 
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Table 5.3: The Contrast between Alleged Ownership and Registered Ownership during 



















Collective 8 2 10 
Limited Liability 5 21 2 28 
Foreign# 1 2 3 
Sino- foreign" 2 2 
Total 14 28 6 48 
* The two SOEs are expunged from this analysis. 
# Foreign and Sino- foreign Enterprises have to be limited liability companies. 
Table 5.4: The Contrast between Alleged Ownership and Registered Ownership during 


















Collective 4 1 5 
Limited Liability 8 23 5 1 37 
Foreign# 1 2 3 
Sino- foreign" 4 4 
Total 13 23 11 2 49 
* One of the SOEs was now privatised, so the total enterprise number increases to 49. 
# Foreign and Sino- foreign Enterprises have to be limited liability companies. 
Those enterprises of sole proprietorship, but falsely registered as collective, 
were, except for one, established before the adoption of the 1994 Company Law. It was 
a usual practice for businesspeople at that time to put on a "red hat" if they wanted to 
set up a "gongsi" (company) all the while de facto retaining sole proprietorship. As for 
the exceptional case, the owner formed a "collective" firm with his friends in 1989, but 
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the partnership dissolved in 1996, and then he set up a new "gongsi" alone in 1997 and 
kept registering it as "collective." When I asked him why he did not register it as a 
limited company, he replied, "there is no need to change for the time being. If it does 
need a change, it would became a limited company then.i20 
Many enterprises that have de facto sole proprietorship have registered 
themselves as limited companies. Different from the registration of collective 
enterprises, they need to invite a "symbolic" partner, usually siblings, wife or close 
friends, to jointly register the companies, because the company registration regulations 
before 1994 and the Company Law both stipulate that the minimum shareholders for 
forming a limited company are two. Yet the "symbolic" partner does not need to pool 
his/her capital. S/he also holds no executive position in the company. Of course, the 
registered shares of this partner are minimised, usually amounting to around 10 -20% in 
my cases. According to the interpretation of a jurist in China, when the establishment of 
limited companies requires at least two shareholders, it does not follow that the 
company would dissolve if one of the two shareholders withdraws his/her investment 
from the company.21 In other words, sole proprietorship in a limited company is lawful. 
However, no one in my cases had attempted to withdraw the symbolic partner. 
This distorting behaviour of forming phoney partnership enterprises should be 
attributed in part to the constraints imposed by the corporate regulations and Iaws in 
China. These regulations and laws discourage the growth of sole proprietorships in a 
number of business fields. For one thing, there were many industries in which only 
20 Interviewee 27. 
21See Wang Baoshu & Cui Qinzhi, Zhongguo gongshifa yuanli [Principles of China's Company Law] 
(Beijing: Shehui kexue wanxian chubanshe, 1998), 134. 
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legal -person enterprises were entitled to run businesses. But a wholly individually - 
owned enterprise usually holds no separate legal personality. For another, legal -person 
enterprises usually refer to the company carrying the word gongsi [i.e. company or 
corporation] in their names, and by the same token, all wholly individually -owned 
enterprises are not entitled to carry "gongsi" in their names. Now only collective and 
state -owned enterprises and limited companies (all foreign- funded enterprises must be 
limited companies) are allowed to be "gongsi." Gongsi in Chinese symbolises a higher 
status for a business concern and it sounds better for an entrepreneur to make various 
business deals with this name. Wholly individually owned enterprises and partnership 
enterprises with unlimited liability are sometimes confused with getihu in image - and 
how can another company of considerable stature be expected to negotiate a big project 
with a getihu? 
Five of the enterprises in my cases were founded as getihu or as unincorporated 
private enterprises, i.e. wholly individually -owned enterprises and partnership 
enterprises. The latter slightly differed from getihu in the sense that these two types of 
enterprises should employ more than seven persons in principle and usually needed to 
have a fixed place of production and business, and their products were not necessarily 
consumption goods, whereas getihu usually refers to such small retailers as peddlers. 
However, the difference is not so distinct in practice. As I discovered, many of the 
private enterprises (siying Tye) actually employ less than eight persons. 
Among these five cases, only two entrepreneurs clearly stated that their 
companies had developed from getihu firms. One of them was the Ufsoft Group. 
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However, its business from the outset had a fixed office.22 As for the other three cases, 
the interviewees could not clarify whether they were getihu at the beginning, but 
certainly they started from an unincorporated enterprise. Those engaged in retailing 
businesses usually carried the word jingyingbu in their concerns' title, literally meaning 
"sales department," somewhat like "outlets" in operation. Those providing technical 
services might carry the word shiwusuo or fuwushe (service or consultant agent) in their 
title. Some collective concerns among my cases had the same practice. One of my cases, 
which embarked upon the software engineering, had been named gongchengbu 
(engineering department) initially.23 
In a nutshell, these five were not "companies," and the problem of the "title" 
constrained their business. The flexibility of their business operations was highly 
limited. The I997 Partnership Enterprises Law and the newly adopted Wholly 
Individually -owned Enterprises Law have not lifted this restriction. Some entrepreneurs 
in Anhui expressed complaints to a reporter before the promulgation of the Wholly 
Individually -owned Law, saying, "the nature of enterprises should be divided according 
to different liabilities, [but the nature of an enterprise] should have nothing to do with 
the use of the concern's title. Not allowing a wholly individually -owned enterprise to 
use gongsi' in its title does not accord with the demands of current economic 
development ... State -owned enterprises, collective enterprises, and joint -stock 
enterprises and foreign -funded enterprises also have different forms of investment, but 
they all can use gongsi,' and only the wholly individually -owned enterprise can't. It is 
not understandable. ... Many foreign -funded enterprises are formed by [one] natural 
'' Beijing jingjibao [Beijing Economic Daily], 18 April 1999: 5. 
13 Interviewee 35. 
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person. Why can they bear limited liability and use "gongsi" as a title whereas the 
wholly individually -owned enterprise must bear unlimited liability and can't carry 
gongsi'. ,,24 
Nevertheless, the five cases did not all start from sole proprietorships. Once the 
enterprises enlarged to a certain scale, they should have been qualified to re- register 
themselves as statutory companies. However, two of them became sole proprietorships 
as the partnership dissolved. Yet they formed limited companies at last. The other three 
cases were also transformed into limited companies while keeping the partnership 
intact. Comparing Tables 5.3 and 5.4, it can be seen that the overall trend of corporate 
transformation in my cases was towards limited companies, including foreign and Sino - 
foreign limited companies. The enterprises that started as limited companies comprised 
only 33 cases, but after the transformation, the total number of limited companies rose 
to 44 (88 %). 
After the implementation of the Company Law in 1994, "incorporation" 
(gongsihua) becomes the sole direction of development for most enterprises. I asked 
one of the interviewed entrepreneurs, who formed a limited company with a "symbolic" 
partner in Guangzhou, why he did not form a wholly individually -owned enterprise. He 
replied, "it is not allowed to set up one -man -owned company (duzi gongsi), ... so many 
of my friends in the computer industry registered their companies like mine. "25 
Obviously the major consideration lies not in liability but whether it is a "company." 
Incorporation was sought not only by the unincorporated private enterprises but 
also by the "fake" collective enterprises. Different from the former, the "fake" 
24 Zhnnghua gnngshang shibao [China Business Times], 7 August 1999: 2. 
25 Interviewee 37. 
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collective enterprises aimed at "taking off their red hats" by incorporation. Of the 10 
cases of originally collective enterprises, five of them have been transformed into 
limited companies. Even though collective enterprises can carry the name "gongsi," 
their property rights structure does not accord with the "modern company system" 
required by the Company Law, This is not simply a problem of having a legitimate 
legally -binding status but rather a rational business consideration for them to transform 
their enterprises into limited companies. One of these cases was re- registered as a 
limited company in 1998. The reason for the transformation was mainly to absorb new 
financing. Originally, the enterprise had been owned by one person. In order to absorb 
three external investments, it had to have a clear property rights structure. The 
entrepreneur also pointed out that to enlarge the scale of a collective enterprise needed 
the approval of its leading authority (shangji bumen). However, his firm had no leading 
authority at all, albeit it had been attached to another company (guakao gongsi).26 
Two cases were transformed into Sino- foreign enterprises. The original 
collective enterprise, taking the form of a legal entity, formed a joint venture with the 
foreign partner. This method of transforming the original collective enterprise into a 
legal entity is also applied to long -established large -scale collective enterprises. Since it 
is difficult to clarify the property rights among the founders of the enterprises after a 
long period of development, they needed to keep the firms from becoming further 
complicated in terms of property rights. It would have become too difficult to settle 
disputes caused by conflicts of interest between the founders, and if this were to happen, 




example.27 In this study, there is a similar case, the Suntek Group. It is the oldest 
company among my cases, founded in 1986. It started with 12 persons who mostly had 
been faculty members of renowned Zhongshan University in Guangzhou. The enterprise 
registered itself as a collective in the name of the "Guangzhou New Technology 
Research and Design Institute." At that time, the concept of "company" had not yet 
been introduced. Rut with the expansion of its businesses and subsidiaries, it was 
transformed into the Suntek Group in 1994. But the Guangzhou New Technology 
Research and Design Institute was kept intact, becoming the holding enterprise of the 
Suntek Group. 
For small collective enterprises, if they do not absorb new finance and partners, 
to become a shareholding cooperative is a possible direction of development. Here, the 
shareholding cooperative is little varied from the official concept. The official 
shareholding cooperative (gufenhezuo) is a combination of public and private 
ownership. The pertinent cases here, though, refer to private business owners issuing a 
small amount of shares to their senior staff without any quid pro quo. Table 5.4 contains 
two shareholding cooperative enterprises. In one of the two cases, shares were issued 
but the firm did not remove its "red hat" by re- registration. The other case was 
transformed into a limited company after this arrangement. Legally speaking, this re- 
registered enterprise should be a limited company of natural -person partnership, but in 
this case, the new partners had not put any new capital into the company and the staff 
"Stone Group was a renowned private computer company in the 1980s, but it was registered as a 
collective. In 1988, it was one of pilot enterprises assigned to carry out a shareholding reform. 
However, it was implicated in the June 4 Incident and then personnel conflict among top executives 
ensued so that the property rights of the company had not been clearly defined until the end of the 
1990s. Many people took the unsettled property rights problem as an account of the slow development 
of the company in the 1990s. 
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shares had not significantly redistributed the authority between the primary owners and 
the staff. This is somewhat Iike the pattern of shareholding cooperatives that had 
originated from the rural township enterprises.28 The shares of the enterprise are just 
internally redistributed. The function of this is to give the staff greater material 
incentives. To be sure, we should not understate the significance of this practice. In 
order to retain the high calibre of the services of technicians and managers, many 
business owners in the IT industry consider giving a small portion of shares to their 
senior staff. 
Another trend of transformation that I touched upon above was the growth of 
legal- person partnerships. Comparing Tables 5.3 and 5.4, it should be noted that the 
total number of natural- person partnerships was reduced from 28 to 23, albeit the 
limited companies of natural -person partnership increased from 21 to 23. By contrast, 
the legal -person or legal -natural person partnerships increased from 6 to 11. This is the 
sole category of ownership, except for the shareholding cooperative, which shows a net 
increase. This reflects the fact that some of my cases have been experiencing a more 
advanced and complex ownership transformation. The entrepreneurs were engaging in 
various formats of investment, including amalgamation, acquisition and 
fragmentation,29 on behalf not of themselves but their legal- person entities, an investor- 
28 For studies on the rural shareholding co- operatives, see Jenny Clegg, "Multi- stakeholder Cooperation 
in China - Changing Ownership and Management of Rural Enterprises," in Flemming Christiansen 
& lunguo Zhang (eds.), Village Inc: Chinese Rural Society in the 1990s. (Richmond, UK: Curzon, 
1998); Eduard B. Vermeer, "Shareholding Cooperatives: A Property Rights Analysis," in Andrew G. 
Walder & Jean C. Oi (eds.), Property Rights and Economic Reform in China (Stanford: Stanford 
University Press, 1999); Susan H. Whiting, "The Regional Evolution of Ownership Forms: 
Shareholding Cooperatives and Rural Industry in Shanghai and Wenzhou," in Andrew G. Walder & 
Jean C. Oí (eds.), Property Rights and Economic Reform in China (Stanford: Stanford University 
Press, 1999). 
29 Fragmentation refers to splitting up various businesses of an enterprise into several independent 
entities. 
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friendly tool. The emergence of "legal- person organisations" has a special connotation 
in the context of socialist China. It helps to de- personalise the private property of 
entrepreneurs in order to make the private enterprises conform to the notion of 
socialism. Many of the entrepreneurs whom I interviewed stressed that they had not 
drawn a "dollar" from the companies, and that they pooled all profits into reinvestment. 
When I asked an entrepreneur his opinion as to whether the state sufficiently protects 
private property, he nervously insisted, "I have no private property, the property is the 
company's.' 30 This reflects a residual fear of socialist thought, but also reflects a 
positive function of the "legal person" nomenclature. 
The legal -person partnership also facilitates the development of various types of 
mixed enterprises, i.e. minying enterprises. One of my cases is a joint venture between a 
private enterprise and a SOE.31 Another interviewee in Beijing similarly claimed that he 
was negotiating a joint operation or joint venture with a large -scale state -owned steel 
group in Beijing.32 On the other hand, some state capital is also de- statised in the sense 
that the incorporated state enterprise also holds a separate legal personality. This more 
or less helps the state -owned company to absorb non -state capital and to enter into 
contracts and form joint ventures with a private enterprise." As noted in Chapter 3, the 
boundary between the state and the private enterprises is beginning to become blurred. 
The main group among my cases is the enterprises of natural- person partnership. 
These partnerships stem mainly from within peer groups such as friends, colleagues and 
3o Interviewee 24. 
31 Interviewee 25. 
32 Interviewee 2. 
33 Of course, it also facilitates corrupt state officials to siphon off state assets by forming joint ventures 
with private capitalists. See Chapter 3, fn. 68. 
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purely business -oriented impersonal relationships. Out of the 23 natural- person 
partnerships, only three cases were not of this type. One is a family- member partnership 
that is not in the IT industry. The firm is a sales agent for food and beverage companies. 
Another is a husband -wife partnership. The last is a partnership with a brother -in -law. 
The dominance of peer group partnerships is self -evident in the IT industry, because the 
industry is a synergy of knowledge rather than of manual labour. IT- related knowledge 
is usually shared by peers rather than family members of different generations. As noted 
above, the social networking of these well -educated entrepreneurs is more open than 
among other groups of people, especially compared with less -educated rural 
entrepreneurs. This has resulted in a higher probability of forming this type of 
partnership. Last but not least, in many cases only a peer -group partnership could raise 
sufficient capital to open a company, as the capital requirements for running certain 
businesses are quite high. 
Capital Registration and Business Categories 
The previous section indicated that most of these entrepreneurs inherited nothing 
from their families, and that these entrepreneurs started almost from scratch in terms of 
capital. The savings from employment and small business trading were major sources of 
capital for common would -be entrepreneurs. For would -be IT entrepreneurs who 
themselves received a training in computing, casual jobs in programming were also a 
source of raising funding. It is a "hot" job among young IT people in Haidian District. 
However, in terms of the IT industry, the key capital for setting up a business 
does not rest on money but human capital. Song Chaodi, the president of the CSC 
Group, claimed that he started the CSC with merely 600 yuan in 1991. Yet a question 
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should occur to us. If they registered their firm as companies, they needed to possess a 
considerable amount of capital. Where did they draw the money? The answer is that 
they overstate their registered capital. This so- called "overstating" refers to two 
methods of fabricating registered capital. One is to temporarily borrow money from kith 
and kin to meet the basic requirements for forming a company. No sooner is the 
company registered than the money is withdrawn from the officially designated account 
and returned to the lenders. Another practice is to employ an auditing agent to issue a 
false financial statement to the BICM. By this method, one might pay several thousand 
yuan to the agents in order to set up a company which on paper possesses capital and 
assets worth hundreds of thousands of yuan. But this practice was suppressed recently. 
In this study, 14 interviewees confessed to having overstated their registered capital by 
one of these two methods at the time of initial registration. Many of them defended this 
as a usual practice among businesspeople. An interviewee observed that in China, "if 
you register a company as having a million yuan, it is not bad if it really has a hundred 
thousand yuan. "34 
One may ask how their businesses operate without sufficient financing. The 
fabrication of registered capital possesses a similar logic to the fabrication of a 
partnership, as has been discussed above. It is more or less attributed to the 
unreasonable limitations imposed by the corporate regulations and laws. Since the 
introduction of the category of a "limited company" at the end of the 1980s, the entry 
barriers to setting up a company have been very high. Various minimum amounts of 
capital have been stipulated for different industries to establish a limited company. 
According to the enterprise registration regulations promulgated in 1988, the legal- 
34 Interviewee 19. 
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person enterprises embarking upon consultant and service business had to have at least 
100,000 yuan; those embarking upon manufacturing and retailing had to have at least 
300,000 yuan; those embarking upon wholesale of merchandise had to have at least 
500,000 yuan. Other legal -person enterprises needed at least 30,000 yuan as their 
minimum registered capita1.35 These limitations were basically transplanted into the 
provisions about the establishment of limited companies under the Company Law. But 
the minimum capital requirement for manufacturing businesses rose to 500,000 yuan 
under the Company Law. The above only notes the general capital requirements for 
establishing a company. There is a separate specific administrative rule governing the 
capital requirements for individual industries. For example, a company engaged in 
advertising services required at least one million yuan in registered capital.36 Obviously, 
it was difficult for the populace, especially in the 1980s and the early I990s, to set up 
their own companies. 
Many businesses per se actually did not need such a large amount of investment. 
Hence, the behaviour of overstating registered capital was considered justifiable by the 
entrepreneurs. And this is especially true for the IT industry, apparently for the software 
sector. As its production process involves intellectual inputs rather than massed manual 
labour and capital inputs, it is unreasonable to require hundreds of thousands of yuan of 
capital. However, being classified as a manufacturing industry, software companies are 
normally required to have 500,000 yuan in registered capital. There were seven cases 
among the software companies that started with 500,000 yuan in initial registered 
35 See Gao Qiao (ed.), Zuixin qiye jingying falli fagui shiwu zhinan [Directory of New Laws and 
Regulations on Enterprise Operation] (Beijing: Qiye guanli chubanshe, 1994), 153. 
36 Interviewee 3. 
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capital. Three of them overstated their registered capital, while the rest relied upon 
temporary loans to meet the requirement. At the same time, some of the other software 
companies could he registered with less than 500,000 yuan. These business owners 
usually registered their enterprises as consultant and service companies, for which the 
minimum requirement was 100,000 yuan. This variation reflected the strategic wisdom 
of businesspeople on one hand, and the discretion of officials of the BICM in 
classifying the companies on the other. 
Nevertheless, we should not overlook that some of my cases started as 
unincorporated enterprises or as small collective enterprises that did not require such a 
high minimum registered capital. Accumulation of capital from initial business profits 
helped them to attain the minimum requirement for forming a company later. In 
addition, a few enterprises were not the first investment projects of the owners. As they 
had completed capital accumulation already, their entry into the new project usually had 
sufficient financial backup, sometimes even more than the official requirements. Those 
initiated by legal -person investment, especially by foreign- funded firms, usually had 
better finances. 
With China's economic development plus inflation, the gap between the official 
stipulation and the real capital requirements for business operations has been narrowing. 
According to CASS's survey, the average initial capital showed conspicuous growth 
between the enterprises founded during the 1978 -1991 era and the post -1991 era. The 
former was 323,000 yuan; the latter was 508,000 yuan.37 In my research into the IT 
industry, it was also found that the de facto capital demands increased because of more 
Zhang Houyi & Ming Zhìli, (1999) op. cit., 134-5. 
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competition in the industry, Capital resources become a growing factor for an enterprise 
to compete for the edge in the market. When aggressive companies intended to seize 
more market share in a short time, a huge capital investment became a vehicle. 
In general, though, the registered capital does not genuinely reflect the assets of 
an enterprise - not necessarily always the case of exaggeration, but also sometimes of 
understating. In some cases, the first capital registration was simply aimed to meet the 
requirement procedurally, and the actual capital input might be much larger than the 
registered capital. For example, the peasant in Guangzhou spent 830,000 yuan to buy 
out the SOE, while the company was registered with only 500,000 yuan in capita1.38 
With the passage of time, many companies grew much Iarger than the amount of assets 
they claimed in their registration, but they seldom increased the registered capital right 
away, because each re- registration involved complicated procedures. 
However, when they took up bigger business projects, they had to have the 
registered capital augmented, because of concerns about the liability of the company. 
Hence, increasing the registered capital to a certain extent reflected whether an 
enterprise has gone beyond the germinal stage of development. 21 enterprises had 
increased their registered capital since their founding, while another 26 enterprises 
remained at the germinal stage of development. It should not be judged that the 
performance of these 26 enterprises was undesirable, since the length of operations of 
the enterprises needs to be considered. In Table 5.5, only 8 firms that started during the 
period from 1991 to 1995 never had their capital re- registered. The other 15 firms that 
38 Interviewee 39. 
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were established during that period had already changed their registered capital since 
their founding. 
Table 5.5: The Adjustment of Registered Capital among the Enterprises (N =47) 
Founding Year Pre -1990 1991 -2 1992 -3 1994 -5 1996 -7 1998 -9 Total 
Registered Capital 
Increased 
3 5 5 5 2 1 21 
No Registered 
Capital Increased 
1 3 4 7 11* 26 
* One of the enterprises was founded in 1994, but it was taken over by the interviewed entrepreneur in 
1998. Hence, I took it from 1998. 
The type of activities an enterprise engages in also provides a backdrop that 
sheds light on these cases. In 43 cases, the enterprises were involved in varying degrees 
of technological exploitation. I term these as technology -based enterprises. However, 
they were not all in the IT sector. Two of them were in the pharmaceutical industry. 
Another was engaged in the manufacturing of light aircraft. The last specialised in 
research and development (R &D) to produce LCD projectors. 
Out of the 42 cases from the IT industry, three of the firms were not technology - 
based enterprises but engaged in merchandising computer hardware. Even though one 
of them launched a web- based trading business, it was only the user of new technology. 
The remaining four cases embarked upon non -technology- related businesses. These 
were an advertising production company, a sales agent for food and beverage 
companies, a land property company and an agricultural technology company. 
20 cases were registered in a "special economic zone," enjoying various degrees 
of preferential policies. The zone in Beijing was the Experimental Zone for New 
Technology Industry, and in Guangzhou the Tianhe Scientech Park and the GETDZ. 
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The IT enterprises could be divided into six broad categories: PC production, 
merchandising, software development /retailing, system integration, Internet -related 
service, and telecommunications. Some of my cases overlapped more than one 
category. Some had started in hardware trading but completely or partly switched to 
software engineering. In addition, telecommunications, system integration and Internet - 
related technologies involve techniques of software engineering. In terms of their core 
business, however, I have tried to put the 42 IT enterprises into the six categories shown 
in the following table. 
Table 5.6: Categories of IT Enterprises 
Categories PC 
Production 
Merchandising Software Internet System 
Integration 
Telecom. 
Number 2 4 26 6 2 2 
The software firms constituted 62% of all the IT enterprises, and they can be 
further sub -grouped according to their major speciality. These included education 
software (4 cases), offshore services (2 cases), games (2 cases), finance software (3 
cases), management software (7 cases), computer -aided design/computer -aided 
manufacturing (CAD /CAM) (2 cases), encryption (2 cases) and Chinese character input 
(1 case). The remaining three firms had no speciality. In addition, two of the software 
companies were concurrently engaged in software retailing businesses. 
Unlike manufacturing industries, most of these IT companies, except in PC 
production, do not demand manual labour for production. Also, they usually have no 
factories but only have offices for both R &D and production. All mass production 
processes, like software copying to CD -ROM, are contracted out to specialised 
factories. For the more professional software, like the management software, the 
I51 
purchasers are usually corporate users not individuals and hence, some companies are 
not concerned with any mass production. Such cases are also found among the Internet 
service, system integration and telecommunications enterprises. The IT industry thus is 
more a service sector than an industrial sector, and especially so the Internet service 
sector. But it is different from the general service sector, which either helps in 
maintaining or repairing merchandises or provides non -merchandise service, whereas 
the IT industry usually involves the production of both merchandise and sery ices. 
Scale of the Enterprises 
Most of my cases were not large -scale enterprises. In terms of numbers of 
employees, 29 employed fewer than 50 persons, 10 had 50 -100 employees, and only 11 
had more than 100 employees. The enterprises with more than 100 employees should be 
considered a large company with regard to the IT industry. 
The largest is a Guangzhou -based telecommunications conglomerate, Suntek 
Group. it employs more than 1,700 people and has 20 -odd subsidiaries. Its annual 
turnover reached about 1 billion yuan in 1998. The second largest is the Beijing -based 
CSC Group, employing over 1,000 persons. The CSC is the largest education software 
producer in China with registered capital of 50 million yuan, possessing gross assets 
valued at 420 million yuan in 1998.39 It was ranked as the 74th largest private enterprise 
for the year 1998 by the All China Federation of Industry and Commerce.40 The third 
largest is the Beijing -based Ufsoft Group, specialising in financial and enterprise 
management software, with over 800 employees. The Ufsoft Group is one of the largest 
39 Zhongguo qiyejia [China Entrepreneur], 169 (May, 1999): 16, 20. 
40 Zhang Houyi & Ming Zhili (2000), op. cit., 113. 
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companies in this speciality. The sales volume of its software packages ranked the first 
among all domestic software products in 1999, reaching 45.6 million yuan.41 These 
three enterprises were the "super- stars" among my cases. 
Among the other 8 large enterprises, two had already formed a company group 
(jituan gongsi). One is a telecommunications company, similar to Suntek. It was the 
company, noted above, that moved its headquarters from Changsha to Guangzhou. It 
employs around 300 persons and has subsidiaries in Hunan Province and Shenzhen. The 
company's registered capital has reached 5 million yuan.42 Another is a renowned PC 
manufacturer in Guangdong Province, employing around 500 persons, with its own 
assembly line in a suburban area of Guangzhou. The company's registered capital was 
20 million yuan.43 
A dealer of computer hardware in Beijing also has a considerable scale. It 
employs 200 -odd persons and has branch companies in 12 major cities in China. Its 
core business is as a sales agent for products of the Legend Group, the top IT company 
in China. Its annual turnover reached 500 million yuan and it possessed gross assets 
valued at 20 million yuan.44 Sparkice is another company employing 200 -odd person. 
Edward Zeng, noted above, was the CEO of the joint venture. In 1996, he pioneered 
opening the first Internet café in Beijing and now has 11 Internet cafés in Beijing and 
Tianjin. The cafés were not an end in itself but a means for entering e- commerce. He 
wanted to build his cafés into a chain of e- commerce "portals." The amount of capital 
61 Beijing wanbao [Beijing Evening News], 6 March 2000 & Beijing ribao [Beijing Daily], 17 February 
2000 (Internet edition: www.jb.com.cn). 
42 Interviewee 30. 
43 Interviewee 41. 
44 Interviewee 6. 
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and assets of the company were not available to me, but it is a partner of China Unicorn, 
the second largest state -owned telecommunications company. 
Another firm in Beijing specialises in financial software, employing 200 -odd 
person and setting up 16 branches in China. Interestingly, the company's registered 
capital was only 300,000 yuan. But the general manager looked very self -confident 
when I interviewed him and claimed that his company was already a medium -sized 
enterprise and had attained an annual turnover of 20 million yuan.45 Another, in 
Guangzhou, has embarked upon CAD software development. CAD is software 
requiring a high standard of technology and the company is an officially licensed high - 
tech enterprise.46 This was the sole company, except for the state -funded one, engaged 
in such software development. Its registered capital reached one million yuan and it 
employed 100 -odd people.47 
The remaining two companies were not in the IT sector. One was a Sino- foreign 
joint venture, embarking upon pharmaceutical production in Beijing. But the so- called 
joint venture was a partnership between two brothers, one from Beijing, the other from 
Canada. As it had an assembly line in Beijing, it employed around 180 persons of 
whom 100 were factory workers.48 The last was a land property enterprise, employing 
200 persons. This was a legal- person partnership between a private company and an 
SOE. Its major project was re- development of an old urban district in Beijing. After the 
re- development, it established several subsidiaries embarking upon various businesses, 
45 Interviewee 13. 
46 The enterprises registered in the special economic zones are not necessarily the high -tech enterprises, 
even though they are enjoying preferential policies. 
47 Interviewee 49. 
ax Interviewee 24. 
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including real estate, restaurants and a hotel in the redeveloped district. Hence, the 
employees on the company's payroll were relatively numerous. 
To be sure, the strength of a company may not be in proportion to the size of its 
workforce. The agricultural technology company owned by the peasant employed over 
80 workers, but the company's finances were feeble and the entrepreneur operated it in 
debt. By contrast, an Internet service company, which employed only 20 -odd people, 
secured 3 million yuan of investment from its investor.49 Again, another Internet service 
company, with 16 personnel, obtained an injection of over one million yuan of 
investment.50 Overall, the remaining 9 companies with 50 -100 employees had already 
laid relatively sound foundations. Except for the state -funded software company, all 
were established before 1996, and except for one, the registered capital of all these 
companies reached 3 million yuan or above. The exceptional case was registered with 
500,000 yuan in capital. The owner stressed that the capital strength of his company 
was far beyond that, but it was too complicated to re- register the company's capital. 
And he claimed that the company's annual turnover reached 16 million yuan.51 
The Decline of Guakao 
It is well known that many private enterprises used to attach ( guakao) 
themselves to danwei to legitimate their status. However, this attachment usually turned 
the private enterprises into subsidiary concerns under the danwei that caused many 
disputes over the property rights. The practice of guakao more or less influenced the 
corporate structure of the private enterprises. Among my cases, the practice of guakao 
49 Interviewee 42. 
50 Interviewee 28. 
51 Interviewee 31. 
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was not very prevalent. Only eight firms reported having their enterprises attached to 
danwei (the danwei being attached to is known as the guakao danwei). We should 
dissociate the motivation behind the practice of guakao from the establishment of 
"fake" collective enterprises. While the "fake" collective was mainly to disguise the 
"private" nature of the enterprise,52 guakao did not do so but simply made it more 
convenient for the enterprises to deal with various state administrative agents, which 
still stuck to the concept that a sponsor danwei should oversee all administrative 
procedures. 
Despite this, the phenomenon of guakao usually took place among the 
companies that had started operations before the mid- 1990s. At that time, government 
control over the growth of the private economy remained very strict. This was more 
pertinent in the case of Beijing than Guangzhou. Before 1993, it was stipulated in 
Beijing that all registered enterprises had to have a guakao danwei, no matter what type 
an enterprise it was. On the other hand, the confidence of private businesspeople in the 
political legitimacy of their enterprises was low. Hence, besides registering themselves 
as collectives, these "private" enterprises tended to look for companies or state agents to 
attach to. However, not all of them did so. Those which had not were so- called 
wuzhuguan jiti [collectives without supervising units]. There were two such enterprises 
among my cases. To be sure, some collective enterprises with guakao danwei were no 
different from the collectives without supervising units, because the guakao was 
sometimes "nominal," just for meeting the rules of registration. In a case noted earlier, 
52 To register an enterprise as a collective also previously helped to secure some preferential policies. 
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the entrepreneur even forgot what guakao danwei his company was supposed to be 
attached to.53 
A limited company among my cases from Guangzhou was founded in 1993 and 
attached itself to a high -tech SOE, but the aim of the attachment was to share in the 
preferential policy of tax exemption enjoyed by the SOE.54 The privatised agricultural 
technology company also remained nominally attached to its original parent company, 
but the owner stressed that his company had become an independent entity. Another 
limited company, founded in 1997, also had a "nominal" attached danwei. The 
entrepreneur noted that he had not been confident enough to open an entirely private 
enterprise at that time.55 This was an isolated case in this study: Most of my 
interviewees had founded their companies after the mid -1990s and thought that the 
practice of guakao was obsolete. 
Among the enterprises with guakao danwei, two had detached from it by re- 
registering themselves as independent companies. The interviewee in another case 
revealed to me that the government now required all enterprises to better define their 
property rights, which implied incorporation. He said to me with confidence that his 
leading authority was very liberal, and therefore guaranteed that all of the assets his 
company had earned would be owned by him.56 Obviously, the function of guakao is 
dwindling to nothing. To enjoy preferential policies is no longer the privilege of 
collective enterprises and SOEs. Despite the decline of guakao, though, some private 
entrepreneurs feel that they need an attachment to a leading authority. The Chinese 
53 Interviewee 2. 
54 Interviewee 34. 
55 Interviewee 37. 
56 Interviewee 7. 
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danwei system is still moulding the relationship among individuals, organisations and 
the state, even though the danwei system is disintegrating.57 Unorganised individuals 
and organisations without any attachment to a sponsor have tended to be isolated from 
formal institutions. As noted earlier, as a private enterprise was not regarded as a 
danwei, this caused a certain degree of inconvenience to business operations. Of course, 
the private entrepreneurs would not like to be subjected to the traditional control of a 
danwei again. They would like to have official assistance to facilitate their business 
operations. The enterprises that are registered in the "special economic zones" seem 
better able to enjoy such services from the government. This issue will be further 
discussed in Chapter 7. 
The Macro -Structures of Enterprises 
With the decline of guakao, my cases in general become autonomous economic 
entities. But their structure is not necessarily simple. Many private enterprises have 
already developed into a complex group of entities. This has been revealed in my cases' 
ownership structure, presented in the last section. Here I will present how the shape of 
its ownership forms the macro - structure of an enterprise. Since each case has its own 
particular ownership structure, it is difficult to detail each case, especially in the cases 
of conglomerates. But here I will try to single out several distinct features of these 
enterprises and to reduce them to several major models (See Figure 5.1). 
In general, the enterprises can be placed into two broad categories with four 
branches of concrete models. The two categories are (i) unitary and (ii) amalgamated. 
$7 Ji You, China's Enterprise Reform: Changing State /Society Relations After Mao (London: Routledge, 
1998). 
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The unitary pattern refers to a company wholly owned by one investment entity. The 
investment entity may be either natural persons or one legal person. If the investment 
entity only owned one company, the enterprise belongs to a "single" model. The 
"single" model is also sub -divided into enterprises with or without legal- person status, 
i.e. either a natural -person enterprise or a legal- person enterprise. If the enterprise 
makes use of its legal -person status to open subsidiaries, which also have a separate 
legal- person status, the enterprise is of a "detachable grouping" model. The 
"detachable" denotes that the parent company and its subsidiaries are two separate 
legal -person entities, even though the parent company is the holding company. It is a 
usual practice that an enterprise tends to separate the new business from the old by 
setting up another legal -personal entity. Then in case the new business fails, it would 
not financially or legally implicate the parent company. 
The amalgamated pattern refers to the forming of a joint venture by more than 
one investment entity. This pattern has two models. One is the model of a "detached" 
joint venture. Two or over two separate legal -person entities, sometimes joined by 
natural persons, respectively pool capital to form a new independent legal -person 
company. The parent companies themselves bear no liabilities vis -á -vis the new 
company, as in the case of a "detachable grouping." Another model is the "absorbed" 
joint venture,58 One legal -person entity absorbs investment from another legal -person 
entity, transforming itself into a joint venture. In this case, only the external investment 
entity bears no liabilities for the joint venture. 
58 If it absorbs the investment from natural persons, it is not a joint venture and should fit the "single" 
model. 
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Natural- person Enterprise 
Legal- person Enterprise 
The four structures are only ideal types. In practice, some large -scale companies 
with subsidiaries tend to comprise a compound model mixing the "detachable grouping" 
and "detached" joint venture together. The CSC Group and the Suntek Group are of this 
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kind. Most of the cases fit a single model: 29 cases fit that of a single legal -person 
company and 5 cases fit that of a single natural -person company. Five cases fit the 
"detachable grouping" model; another 6 cases fit the model of a "detached" joint 
venture and the remaining 3 cases are "absorbed" joint ventures. 
Is Entrepreneurial Farnilism Significant? 
This study does not focus upon the internal business management, but it is 
noteworthy that the family firms do not prevail among my cases, while many other 
studies of Chinese enterprises stress the cultural prevalence of family enterprises in 
Chinese business communities.59 
It appears that the cultural interpretation is not applicable to the IT sector. As 
noted above, the well- educated background of these entrepreneurs plus their shared 
knowledge of the IT industry resulted in a higher probability that they form a peer group 
partnership rather than a family company. Another factor should not be left out - many 
of these entrepreneurs were not native. Even if they possess a local hukou, their 
relatives do not. Hence, a family enterprise became impossible. Moreover, these 
entrepreneurs have voluntarily preferred to take the risk of launching their businesses 
outside their mother towns. I suspect this phenomenon is also shared by other types of 
private enterprises in cities, as social ties articulated outside danweí and kinship become 
increasingly significant among new generations in urban areas.6° 
59 Gordon Redding S., The Spirit of Chinese Capitalism' (New York: W. de Gruyter, 1990); Siu -lun 
Wong, "Chinese Entrepreneurship and Economic Development," in Barett L. McCormick & Jonathan 
Unger (eds.), China after Socialism: in the Footsteps of Eastern Europe or East Asia? (Armonk: M.E. 
Sharpe, 1996); Farid Harianto, "Business Linkages and Chinese Entrepreneurs in Southeast Asia," in 
Timothy Brook & Hy V. Luong (eds.), Culture and Economy: the Shaping of Capitalism in Eastern 
Asia (Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press, 1997). 
6o See Danching Ruan et al., "On the Changing Structure of Social Networks in Urban China," Social 
Networks 19, 1 (January, 1997): 75 -89. 
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When an enterprise needs to expand and to absorb external investment, a family 
enterprise becomes an obstacle. In the case mentioned earlier of an entrepreneur whose 
firm absorbed external legal -person investment, the entrepreneur not only re- registered 
his enterprise as a limited company but also had his wife and his brother -ìn -law 
withdrawn from the enterprise. He explained to me that the company should be 
institutionalised now and he did not want it to become a family company.61 
During my fieldwork in China, I also found that the family enterprise was being 
disparaged in business circles and the media. The prevalence of family -style 
management in private enterprises was singled out as one of the factors causing a 
bottleneck to their development today. Problems were raised regarding family -style 
management included the lack of professionalisation, nepotism and indeterminate 
property rights among the family members. A nation -wide survey of 100 private 
entrepreneurs published in 1999 reported that no respondent supported family -style 
management; 44 respondents objected to it; the other 40 thought that it was inevitable 
but that entrepreneurs should try to pick only competent relations.62 The attitude against 
the family enterprise is associated with the old Communist antipathy against big 
capitalists. The bureaucratic capitalism of the Kuomintang era is usually reduced to four 
big family businesses.63 Hence, the Party has tried to set up institutions to discourage 
the revival of big family businesses, as in the adoption of the Company Law noted in 
Chapter 3. People commonly tend to subscribe to this anti- family -capitalism, as they 
identify themselves with the official account of the history of the Kuomintang era. 
Interviewee 2. 
62 Guangdong dajingmao [Guangdong Great Economy], 130 (June, 1999): 75. 
6' The four families referred to the families of Chiang, Soong, Kung and Chen. 
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The negative response towards family -style management was also prevalent 
among my interviewees. When I asked them whether they had family members and 
relatives working in their companies, some of the interviewees replied to me very 
sensitively. One said, "No., we didn't open a family company, and no relatives are 
allowed to take any position.i64 Another said, "No, we don't want to make it a family 
business. I well know the hazards of doing so. "65 In another case, an entrepreneur had 
worked in a company's department that was under the charge of his relative. He felt that 
it was very inconvenient to work under a relative, and that he would rather cope with 
people who were not kin (wairen) than with kin.66 He applied his experience to his 
opinion of the family enterprise. He said, "my company is a partnership enterprise, and 
one partner absorbs his relatives into the company; another would follow suit, and then 
it becomes very difficult to manage." Hence, he did not allow the relative of any 
shareholder to work in the company. Even though his wife was unemployed, she was 
not allowed to join the company.67 
Of course, an opposite opinion was expressed by the interviewees from family 
enterprises. The interviewee from the pharmaceutical company pinpointed that the 
management of family enterprises was more united. This was the advantage of his own 
company.68 The PC manufacturer in Guangzhou was not a family enterprise, but the 
owner employed his relatives. He stressed that he picked the competent regardless of 
whether or not they were his relatives. However, it was more demanding for his 
Interviewee 19. 
65 Interviewee 49. 
66 He meant that the kinship between the superior and the inferior would result in more embarrassing 
situations, in case conflicts happened between them for the working. It was because their relationship 
involved not only impersonal but also personal one. 
67 Interviewee 47. 
68 Interviewee 4. 
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relatives to work in his company. Their promotions would be slower lest the 
entrepreneur be subject to criticism.69 
Here T do not attempt to make any judgement as to whether the family enterprise 
is efficient. But it is sufficient to reiterate that the IT sector does not adhere to 
entrepreneurial familism; and societal doubts about the efficiency of family business 
further reinforces this entrepreneurial attitude against it. 
Concluding Remarks 
This chapter presents the backgrounds of private enterprises and entrepreneurs in my 
sample and shows that these private enterprises have developed into a more autonomous 
type of economic entity than previous accounts have depicted. Most of these private 
entrepreneurs have got rid of many of the fundamental constraints previously imposed 
upon them by state institutions. The corporate structure of such enterprises has become 
increasingly complicated. This reflects the fact that some of these enterprises have 
crossed the threshold of an initial development stage and have diversified their business. 
The state is less able to patronise the private entrepreneurs by allocating access 
to urban privileges under the outmoded hukou system.7° The same is true of the 
vanishing practice of guakao. This well -educated group of entrepreneurs instead enjoys 
a high degree of autonomy. They present a strong impression that they have been able 
to carve out their careers through their professional knowledge and sensitivity to market 
demand rather than any particular official treatment. 
59 Interviewee 41. 
ro Hein Mallee has pointed out that even though the hukou system was transformed during the reform era, 
it remained an effective instrument of control for the state by manipulating the membership of urban 
hukou to maintain a "client" urban group. See Hein Mallee, op. cit. 
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However, it does not follow that the pre -reform institutions have nothing to do 
with the path of these enterprises' development. We have observed how the hukou 
system provides a stumbling block to the forming of family businesses in the urban IT 
industry. And the Communist notions about "family capitalism" reinforce this 
consequence. The legacy of Chinese communism is shaping the processes of 
transformation. 
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Chapter 6: The Business Linkages of Enterprises 
This chapter examines the inter -organisational business linkages of enterprises in order 
to evaluate to what extent the private enterprises in my sample depended upon particular 
and exclusive linkages for survival and development. I will pay most attention to the 
linkages with official and semi -official agencies that are directly related to their 
business affairs. An evaluation will be made in terms of five aspects: business trading, 
the regulatory regime, financing, horizontal connections and corporate amalgamations, 
and political capital. I will focus mainly upon cases in IT industry supplemented by 
some typical cases not derived from my field studies. 
Business Trading 
Dyadic Trading 
The entrepreneurs in my interviews usually entered the IT business through one 
of two paths. First, their training and work background in computing engineering 
facilitated their engagement in the business. The second was the pull effect of the 
sunrise industry that lured many amateurs into the business. For example, several of the 
entrepreneurs without any computing training background but working or living around 
Zhongguancun were fascinated by the electronic "frenzy" there and thus went into the 
industry. 
Despite this, the first course accounts for the vast majority of my cases. 
Computing engineers are better able to survive in this industry because they usually 
possess their own particular niches and product -lines that tend to he in short supply or 
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cannot be substituted in a short time. The early business entrants, who started their 
businesses at the end of the 1980s and the early 1990s, faced the least competition. 
Many of them were engaged in a dyadic trading business in that the users of their 
products and/or service were usually limited to official and semi -official agencies or 
commercial firms. The producers or service providers seldom needed to take on 
marketing and other post -production processing costs. But it was not a one -touch 
service, so they needed to keep a long -term trading relationship with their clients. 
Lack of competition was usually the good fortune of early entrants among the 
professional software companies. The late entrants faced fiercer competition and needed 
to create good guanxi with their clients. For example, a small system integration service 
provider, who founded his firm in 1996, told me that his first project came from a 
friend's recommendation. He explained, "no one gives a project to a new firm... But I 
have to have an initial client, so I relied upon my friend's referral."/ Another system 
integration service provider, who founded his firm in 1999, also relied upon an old 
connection built up when he worked in a state -owned computer company.2 This 
personal connection helps to lay a foundation, but entrepreneurs have to accomplish the 
rest by themselves. As the first entrepreneur pointed out, "personal referrals gradually 
decrease now .. But once I successfully completed the first project, it could help to 
generate others, If I could secure a project from a big firm, it would have a great 
positive effect. "3 To maintain good guanxi is to create a good reputation for 
"professional ties," as Chen Chieh -hsüan suggests. The IT entrepreneurs whose clients 
Interviewee 38. 
2 Interviewee 33. 
'Interviewee 38. 
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were corporate users stressed that the weaving of their trading web depended highly 
upon customers who were content with products or services recommending their 
companies to other users. 
Although guanxi ties can help bind the trading parties, the increasingly fierce 
competition is unravelling the ties at the same time. Between the upstream and 
downstream enterprises, the former try to minimise dependence upon one firm by 
creating as many partnerships as possible so as to gauge the performance of each 
partner. In the IT industry, overseas linkages provide a specific origin for many firms. 
The core business of two software companies in my interviews was to provide an 
offshore service for Microsoft. This service mainly involved "localisation" of Microsoft 
software packages. When Microsoft entered the Chinese market in the early 1990s, it 
first had to localise its English software packages. Instead of doing the task itself, the 
Microsoft looked for small local companies to undertake the jobs. Outsourcing is a 
common practice for American IT corporations. Microsoft contracted out the jobs to 
several rather than one company. As a result, two of the companies in my sample 
undertook "localisation" jobs for different Microsoft software packages. 
This practice is not exclusive to foreign companies; the same practice is applied 
among domestic enterprises. One of my cases was a sales agent for Legend products. 
The agency was founded in 1993. The owner had been a branch manager of Legend 
before he opened his own company. It was in his advantage to take on this business. 
When Legend started producing PCs in the early 1990s, the sales agent was one of the 
first dealers of Legend products. The agent had not made any profit in the first years, 
but Legend PC secured a market edge from the mid- 1990s. Between 1995 and 1997, the 
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agent's company took off, averaging a 300% annual sales growth rate. The interviewee, 
who was a senior manager, stressed that his company's success relied upon a 
conservative development strategy, embarking upon no speculative businesses. Its 
competitive strategy relied upon a lower profit rate and better after -sales services. 
Despite a very good relationship with Legend, the interviewee pointed out that the agent 
had to fulfil many conditions, like a specific sales volume, required by Legend. 
Moreover, his company was not the sole agent for Legend. Many other agents compete 
with this agent, even though he is ranked an "A" class agent now. The above cases 
reflect that guanxi may help entry into a business, but it cannot guarantee the success of 
the business. Alternatively, guanxi becomes open, competitive and non -exclusive. Many 
enterprises among my cases tried to create a competitive environment for their 
downstream local dealers to boost the sales of their products. The non -particularistic 
treatment in the above cases may be attributed to a business- oriented relationship 
among profit- seeking organisations. But what about relations with semi -official 
agencies? 
China Telecom is the largest state -owned telecommunications corporation. It 
both regulates and embarks upon telecommunications business and monopolises the 
infrastructure of networks. Despite this monopoly, China Telecom has been diversifying 
and commodifying its services, for which it needs to absorb new technology. The 
private IT enterprises are one of its sources to upgrade technology. The Guangzhou - 
based Suntek Group, for instance, is an important partner of China Telecom. The 
Suntek Group is adept at telecommunications -related software engineering, including 
having developed an automatic payment calculation system and other tele- commercial 
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services for the state's telecommunications and post agencies. These kinds of 
technology were poorly developed before the mid- 1990s. Suntek is now a backbone 
enterprise in Guangzhou. Despite its long -term partnership with China Telecom, Suntek 
faces ever more competition from new entrants. The telecommunications company that 
moved its headquarters from Changsha to Guangzhou, for example, is a head -on 
competitor with Suntek. The entrepreneur of the company whom I interviewed had 
worked in Suntek before he set up his own company. His company also specialised in 
telecommunications -related software engineering. When I interviewed the entrepreneur, 
he told me that his company had successfully scrambled for three out of five new 
projects from China Telecom, beating out other competitors, including Suntek. I asked 
him whether he employed guanxi to secure the projects. His reply was affirmative, but 
he defended this, saying that both technology and guanxi were equally important, and 
the technology of his company was more advanced than that of others.4 No matter what 
happened behind the scene, competition becomes fiercer in general. High quality 
service, competitive prices and technology upgrading are basic strategies of competition 
among the enterprises in this study. 
Guanxi further loses its function in the burgeoning Internet industry. Business 
deals in the industry are almost always conducted with little face -to -face contact. What 
customers take into account is the service output and price. This "virtual" business 
world per se has diminished the need to cultivate personal relationships. An 
entrepreneur who opened an on -line trading websìte in Guangzhou claimed that his on- 
line business orders came from as far as Xinjiang and Gansu Provinces.5 
Interviewee 30. 
5 Interviewee 50. 
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However, the development of e- commerce remains at a germinal stage. The on- 
line business still needs a synergy of diverse business participants to gear up a 
momentum. Sparkice spared no efforts over the past few years to seek out various 
business partners to launch a variety of on -line business solutions in order to accelerate 
the maturity of its services. It is impossible to rely heavily upon guanxi to achieve the 
goal, because it needs a great deal of high -technology linkages, and e- commerce is a 
highly risky business. 
Market Trading 
While many software engineering companies provide professional software and 
untraded professional services or offshore services for other business firms in which it is 
easier to build up a relatively solid trading relationship, many other software developers 
and retail -related firms need to appeal to dispersed individual consumers. Education and 
game software developers, software retailers and PC manufacturers are examples. 
Among my cases, there were five education and game software developers, two 
software retailers and two PC manufacturers, whose businesses operated in a more 
uncertain marketplace in terms of customers. Some of them were successful, but others 
not. 
A typical successful case is CSC. The rise of CSC is tantamount to a miracle. It 
was founded in 1991 and took off in 1994 by means of a software package for 
secondary school students. The market for education software was absent at that time. 
The popularity of PCs remained very low and people had never employed computers for 
teaching purposes. Therefore, CSC needed to create rather than seize the market. In 
order to create demand, the CSC organised a demonstration in Beijing and invited 
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20,000 students of secondary schools to test the software. After the interest of students 
was aroused, it further stirred up a spending desire among parents. The CSC announced 
a promise: anyone who bought the software package but failed to enter university could 
have a refund. As a result, over 20,000 software packages, priced at 1,800 yuan - a 
very expensive commodity in China - were sold out in a month. The marketing 
strategy was the key to its success. 
Other surveyed education software developers were late entrants and less 
aggressive in their marketing strategy. They were businesses with little initial capital. At 
the same time, the costs of operating in this business were rising, including research and 
development (R &D), marketing and other post -production processing, but the pricing 
had to be kept as low as possible to sustain a competitive edge. Furthermore, the 
software industry faced a popular and intractable problem - pirated software. The 
software retailing business bore the brunt of this. The two companies in my sample that 
ran software chain shops in Guangzhou needed to directly struggle against competition 
from pirated software. 
One of the game software developers among my cases developed two popular 
game packages before 1998 but almost collapsed shortly before I visited the enterprise 
due to rampant pirated software. It has already switched to on -line business.6 Most firms 
engaged in non -professional software development face the problem of piracy, but the 
government fails to crack down on it, to the point that it has become a hindrance to the 
development of the industry. 
6 Interviewee 8. 
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Whereas software development requires high -level professional techniques, PC 
manufacturing resembles traditional assembly -line production. One of the two PC 
manufacturers had developed from a small "screwdriver assembly" workshop in 
Beijing. A Guangzhou -based enterprise developed from a hardware trading firm and 
started up PC production in 1997. Now the two manufacturers have established their 
own brand -name PCs. The former was selected as one of the ten best -known PC brands 
in Beijing in 1998. The latter was a rising brand in South China. The owners of the two 
companies were not computing engineers, but they were proficient in aspects of 
commercial strategy. Both paid attention to building up their business image. When 
there were only a few domestic brand -name PCs in China, they created their own. In 
order to give consumers confidence, both companies spared no effort to earn various 
quality certificates. The PC production of the Guangzhou -based company passed the 
ISO9002 quality standard. The Beijing -based company took the lead to provide free 
after -sales service for buyers in 1994, which has become a must today for all PC 
vendors. Entrepreneurship accounted for the take -off of these two companies. 
Although the early entrants faced greater market uncertainties, the risky 
environment appears to have led to high profitability among those entrepreneurs who 
caught a good business opportunity, the late entrants were confronted with a maturing 
market in which the marginal profits were decreasing. As a software developer who had 
been mainly engaged in computer hardware trading since 1988 told me, "in 1988, all 
people were quite stupid. You gave them a quotation; they usually believed that Hence, 
the profit rate was very high. But now, conversely, they give you a quotation, `7,000 
173 
yuan for a Pentium computer.' If you don't accept it, they find other dealers."7 Now 
many of the market sectors in China have been transformed from a seller's into a 
buyer's market. Suppliers are seldom able to secure monopolised resources or control 
information so as to manipulate the market. 
Government Trading 
Albeit the market plays an increasingly significant role in economic 
development, the state is one of the participants in the market. The official and semi- 
official non -profit agencies (shiye danwei) account for a considerable share of IT 
consumption. For example, the top financial and management software developer, 
Ufsoft, relied upon customers from the state agencies during its initial development. It 
should be noted that the market for financial software was absent at that time and state - 
owned companies had no sense of the potential of the business. Wang Wenjing, the 
president of Ufsoft, who had worked in the State Council and had participated in a 
project to computerise accounting for state organs, anticipated good prospects in the 
business and thus quit his state job to start an IT outfit in 1988. Due to lack of 
competition, Ufsoft has become the No. 1 financial software developer nation -wide 
since 1991.$ But there are now many rising, highly competitive domestic software 
developers in this speciality. In my study, four other enterprises among my cases were 
in the same business and considered Ufsoft its major opponent. Hence, Ufsoft needs to 
incessantly enhance its competitiveness so as to keep the leading edge. It now also has 
switched more to relying upon customers from business firms. Government contracts 
7 Interviewee 19. 
8 See Zhang Guohua (ed.), Zouxiang tizhiwai de guanyuanmen [Officials Who are off the State System] 
(Beijing: Zhongguo jingji chubanshe, 1999), 401 -15. 
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and orders did help his company to take off,9 but at the same time, Ufsoft significantly 
contributed to the forming of the market of financial and management software, as it 
took the lead to create the market. 
In many of my cases, users of new technology were official or semi -official non- 
profit agencies. Besides demonstrating innovations in their techniques, entrepreneurs 
needed to employ various means to lobby for the adoption of their products. For 
example, a company in my cases that developed a multi -media network teaching system 
had primary and secondary schools as its customer targets, and the company needed to 
lobby the local state's education departments to recommend the system to schools.10 It 
is difficult to assess to what extent corrupt practices behind the scenes determined the 
deals, but it was conceivable that government officials would not be as business- 
oriented as the personnel in business firms. Every entrepreneur recognised that to 
maintain good guanxi with the officials was a prerequisite to making deals with the 
government. 
On the other hand, the state is reforming the government procurement system by 
introducing a competitive tender system so as to establish a fair and transparent 
procurement system and to reduce the expenditures of the government. Three of my 
cases has participated in such a tender and succeeded in their bids to obtain some 
government contracts - the two PC manufacturers and a hardware dealer in 
Guangzhou. The dealer was the only one among them to charge that even though some 
of the tenders were fair, most were not and the officials exercised too much discretion.11 
'Interviewee 9. 
1° Interviewee 19. 
Interviewee 36. 
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Despite this, it should be noted that the private sector was not excluded from the 
government's purchases. In 1999, the Guangzhou -based PC manufacturer beat other big 
competitors, obtaining the biggest PC purchasing contract offered by the Guangzhou 
government. 
To be sure, the "pies" offered by the government are not necessarily delicious. 
The peasant entrepreneur who bought a SOE in the GETDZ had undertaken a small 
civil engineering project on behalf of a township government in north Guangdong. The 
civil engineering project was a "key point" project in the province, so the entrepreneur 
supposed that his payment to undertake it should have been very secure, but due to 
fiscal mismanagement by the township government the entrepreneur had not been paid 
after the completion of the project and needed to take the government to court.12 
In light of such incidents, enterprises, like their upstream trading parties, try to 
diversify their products and sources of businesses to minimise their dependence upon 
one business link, no matter whether the links are with state agencies or with other 
profit- seeking organisations. Despite good performance in the sales of the Legend 
products, the sales agent of Legend was searching for other directions for future 
development. It started developing its own products and entered into Internet services. 
The Beijing -based PC manufacturer invested in R &D, developing its own software for 
its PCs and exploiting other IT products such as a video -on- demand system for the hotel 
industry. 
12 interviewee 39. 
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The Regulatory Regime 
The state regulatory regime is usually regarded as a source of distortion during 
marketisation. But before the mid-I 990s, the IT industry was basically an unregulated 
sector in China. It is interesting to note that while the state is carrying out de- regulation 
in other sectors, the IT industry has just started to be regulated by the state. For 
example, financial software needs to be approved by the Ministry of Finance. The 
production of all brand -name PCs needs to be supervised by the State Bureau of 
Computer Quality Monitoring and to be approved by the Ministry of Information 
Industry as of 1996. Despite the regulations, the competition has not been basically 
distorted. Non -brand -name PC clones are still available in the market. It is not difficult 
for software products to get approvals from corresponding state authorities, unless the 
products relate to sensitive issues. Although the Ministry of Finance annually proclaims 
a list of officially approved financial software, it does not help to promote the brands on 
the list, as it is the basic requirement for every developer to get the approval.13 
Some entrepreneurs among my cases nonetheless made use of the state 
regulatory authorities to enhance the reputation of their products. In one of my cases, an 
entrepreneur developed a software package for estate management when he worked in 
the Ministry of Construction. In 1996 he quit his job to open a company in Beijing to 
sell his software. By virtue of his old connection with the Ministry of Construction, his 
software easily passed the examination of the Ministry and he made use of this to 
promote the reliability of his software, while the same products of other companies had 
f3 Interviewee 38. 
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not passed the examination yet.14 Despite this advantage, his company failed to enter the 
market profitably in Beijing because a big company that had been spun off from a 
renowned university in Beijing had started the business earlier and had already seized 
the market. As a result, he turned his target to the market in South China.15 
The consequence of another case was different. A software engineer in 
Guangzhou developed a budgeting software package for the building industry. His 
software was highly recommended by the Guangzhou Urban Construction Committee 
because of his good connections with a state -owned computer company that was 
affiliated with the Municipal Science and Technology Committee. The referrals from 
the Committee constituted 30% of the turnover and his software also accounted for a 
majority share in the Guangzhou market. But he also explained that his software was 
tailor -made for the situation in Guangzhou. It could not be applied to other areas. By the 
same token, it was difficult for the software from other areas to enter the Guangzhou's 
market. That was another point that helped to explain why his software could take 
command of the local market.16 
Actually, the government seldom restricts the development of any practical 
technology with economic value, but one of the Party's concerns is the "spiritual 
pollution" spread by the electronic media. Besides the Internet, education and game 
software in particular are potential sources of this. In order to control "spiritually 
harmful" products, the government stipulated in 1996 that all education and game 
software developers have to buy ISBNs for their software packages from book 
14 The examination only provided an official quality assurance to customers. Those who have not passed 
the examination could still sell their products. 
15 Interviewee 10. 
16 Interviewee 37. 
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publishers. All of these products are regarded as electronic publications. Book 
publishers, instead of any government agent, play the role of censor. If any problem 
occurs, the publisher will take the responsibility. As the publishers are monopolised by 
state -owned companies and the ISBNs are not evenly distributed, there is a lack of 
sufficient opportunities to secure ISBNs. The big book publishers usually hold more of 
the ISBNs. These publishers benefit by selling ISBNs to software companies without 
having to commit any of their own financial resources. 
Despite this, market forces still exert an influence. The book publishers compete 
with each other. One of the software game developers told me that he first bought an 
ISBN from a renowned university book publisher, but he found that the publisher's 
reputation had nothing to do with his success in marketing his software. Moreover, the 
book publisher was very inefficient in passing it through its censorship system, and the 
price charged him was also too high. He said he could now buy the ISBN from other 
publishers which were more efficient and cheaper.17 
Another sensitive issue is information security. The Chinese has government 
just decided to prohibit the sale of foreign encryption technology that protects electronic 
communications from eavesdropping. In Guangzhou, I visited a private company that 
had embarked upon encryption technology. The interviewee told me that it is now 
difficult to enter into the business, because the government considers the technology to 
relate to national security. Hence, private entry is strictly controlled and foreign 
investment is not allowed; otherwise, the interviewee remarked, there is no security at 
aI1.18 It was lucky that the company was an early entrant and now received significant 
'7 Interviewee 8. 
'8 Interviewee 51. 
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state support. Similar controls are also applied to ISP. The ISP is a gateway to the 
Internet. In order to control information flows, foreign companies are not allowed to 
operate in the ISP business, and it is also difficult for private businesspeople to obtain 
an ISP licence. Moreover the ISP licensee needs to pay an expensive fee to lease lines 
from China Telecom. This makes ISP a loss- making business today and thus 
discourages investment by private capital. But some interviewees believe that to boost 
the IT industry, the government will have to relax controls over the ISP sooner or later. 
To be sure, where there are grey areas or a vacuum in certain policies, 
connections with the bureaucracy remain very important. There has always been a wide 
policy gap in the IT industry, as the rapidly evolving industry is prone to create new 
vacuums that laws and state policies fail to cover. In 1997, two brothers in Fuzhou 
started providing a very cheap long- distance telephone service through a new technique 
- Internetphone (IP) without permission; and in so doing they trod heavily on the 
toes of China Telecom, which monopolised the international telephone service. Hence, 
in January 1998 the latter ordered the police to confiscate the equipment of the brothers' 
company. The brothers then took China Telecom to court in Fuzhou. The court ruled 
that the IP service was not subject to China's state telecom monopoly. Despite that, the 
Ministry of Information Industry at last banned the private IP service and only gave 
licenses to three state -owned companies to operate the service.19 
Edward Zeng, the CEO of Sparkice, well understood the linchpin of this issue. 
Hence, he sought a partnership with China Unicorn from the outset. Furthermore, as the 
i9 See China Daily, 21 January 1999; 23 January 1999; 26 March 1999 (Internet edition: 
www.chinadaily.com.cn); South China Morning Post, 22 January 1999; 25 January 1999; 1 February 
1999 (Internet edition: www.scmp.com). 
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Internet café was a new business not covered by state regulations, he had to carefully 
toe the government line and even actively took part in drafting the rules to govern the 
business. As Zeng pointed out, "if you work together with the government so that the 
government thinks that it is in control, then things will gradually become more and 
more open. "20 Zeng's strategy was essential. Some Internet cafés were disguised places 
for gambling and prostitution and if the government simply banned the operation of all 
Internet cafés, that would be a tragedy to his business. Moreover, his ultimate goal was 
not in the Internet café business but e- commerce. A close connection with the 
government could help him to get access to government information and simultaneously 
exert influence upon policy making. 
It should be noted that such a connection with the government is a common 
strategy for "survival," but could not guarantee the success of his business. First, e- 
commerce is a new, immature business with a high degree of uncertainty. Second, there 
have been many new entrants into the business in the late 1990s. Most important, the 
business ultimately needs to appeal to business circles and private customers who are 
willing to accept the new commercial concept. To be sure, e- commerce is a market - 
friendly business in the sense that it is per se enhancing the flow of information and 
helping to reduce transaction costs. In this regard, the more open and less monopolistic 
the business environment is, the more promising the business is. Hence, the interviewee 
from Sparkice criticised the monopoly of China Telecom as a negative element of the 
business. It more or less retarded the growth of Internet users in China. The growth of 
2ÓLijia Macleod, "Fight for the Right to Party," Newsweek (8 February 1999): 13. 
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competition does not cause problems now, he remarked, because the first thing the 
business should do is to create the market, not to crowd out competitors.21 
A similar case was found among the non -IT enterprises. Yuan Yongmin, the 
owner of a pioneering light aircraft manufacturing company, took a risky gambit, in that 
the aviation business is closely associated with national defence in China. But Yuan told 
me that he had been ignorant of the crux of this issue. He said that if he had known that 
in advance, he should not have taken up the business. In spring 1993, Yuan bought a 
patented blueprint of a light aircraft from Nanjing Aviation & Spacecraft University and 
sought to register a company in Haidian District in Beijing to launch production. When 
he went to the Bureau of Industry and Commerce Management to register a new 
company, no official dared approve the registration, as it would create a precedent. 
Luckily, it was right after Deng Xiaoping's southern tour in 1992, and the local 
government wanted to put forward some advanced projects and so approved his 
registration. His success in this registration more or less hinged on his long -lasting 
relationship with officials in the Haidian District Government. Since the early 1980s, 
Yuan had been assigned to help revitalise many of the ailing state -owned food shops in 
Haidian. However, he found that the returns were not commensurate with his 
contribution. Hence, in 1986, he opened his own restaurant by buying out a state -owned 
noodle restaurant. But he carefully kept up his close relationship with the government. 
As mentioned in the last chapter, he was a PPCC member and concurrently the vice - 
chairman of the Haidian Private Enterprise Association and Haidian Federation of 
Industry and Commerce. While I went to interview him, he was hosting an official from 
21 Interviewee 16. 
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the Ministry of Water Resources and Reservation in his restaurant. A new project had 
occurred to him - he wanted to produce tourist vessels. Therefore, he needed to 
"communicate" with the corresponding officials in advance so as to improve the 
feasibility of this innovative project.22 
Financing 
Difficulty for private enterprises to get access to bank credit has been plaguing the 
development of the private economy. In China, financial institutions are basically 
monopolised by the state -owned banking sector. In past years, they allocated over 70% 
of their loans to the state sector, even though a considerable share of the loans was non- 
performing. The credit officers were not held responsible for these bad debts, but the 
loans to the private sector were a different matter. As a result, while the non -state sector 
contributed heavily to China's economic growth, it was barely financed by loans. 
The reform of the banking system in recent years attempted to rectify the 
situation. Branches of the banks are now held responsible for new loans that go bad. 
Hence, more loans are going to the better performing private enterprises. It is estimated 
that 40% of new bank loans are going to non -state firms and the interest rate charged is 
the same as state enterprises pay.23 Relatively, the state -owned enterprises are now 
getting hard to have easy credit, merely by virtue of ownership identity. The state - 
owned software company in Guangzhou also found it difficult to obtain loans, even 
though it was founded by local state authorities.24 Yet, it remains difficult for most 
22 Interviewee 20. 
23 Jim Rohwer, "Where Does China Get its Money ?" Fortune, 13 (5 July 1999) 67, 
24 Interviewee 32. 
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private enterprises to get access to bank loans. Despite scrapping the bias against them, 
lending policy minimises risk- taking in the loans extended to the private sector. Banks 
tend to adopt a policy of zero risk lending and accordingly only big private enterprises 
now find it easy to get loans. The majority of the private sector - the small firms - 
remains inaccessible to bank loans. 
Among my cases, only twelve enterprises have ever obtained loans from banks, 
of which eight were from the IT enterprises (See Table 6.1). Three of these are the 
largest conglomerates - CSC, Ufsoft and Suntek. As for the remaining five cases, the 
entrepreneurs expressed the view that bank loans were not significant in their corporate 
financing. As these were short-term loans, from six months to one year, these could 
only help to solve the problem of capital turnover for a short period. They were not 
supposed to use the loan for any long -term investment. In fact, most of them now 
seldom applied for a bank loan. For one thing, the application procedure was too 
complicated and time -consuming. For another, the amount of credit was very small, 
depending upon the value of their collateral, usually several hundreds of thousands yuan 
in these cases. This amount was far from enough for investment in the IT industry. 
One of the above five cases was the Beijing -based PC manufacturer. In view of 
its good performance, the committee of the Experimental Zone for New Technology 
Industry in Haidian recommended the enterprise for a bank loan amounting to 800,000 
yuan, with the committee and an insurance company as the guarantors and no need for 
collateral. In spite of this preferential treatment, the entrepreneur was not particularly 
appreciative, commenting that it was just a "symbolic encouragement to a private 
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enterprise. "25 The 800,000 yuan did not help the development of the enterprise very 
much. 




Never asked for bank loan 
Reasons 












Not a good 
financing 
channel 
IT Enterprises 42 8 17 *# 10* 3# 3 3 
Non -IT 
Enterprises 
8 4 2 2 
*One interviewee expressed that his company did not need any loan but he also supposed that it was 
difficult for his company to borrow money from banks. 
#One interviewee expressed that his company did not need any loan and thought that bank loans were not 
a good financing channel. 
Five cases asked for loans but were not successful, while the majority of my 
cases never asked for bank loans (See Table 6.1). It did not follow that they needed no 
loans. Twelve interviewees instead anticipated that their enterprises could not get any 
loan from the banks. Some of them attributed the problem to discrimination against 
private enterprises. The paramount factor, though, was that they did not possess the 
recognisable assets as collateral. 
In Beijing, the government is currently promoting the development of high -tech 
industry and trying to help finance the small and medium -sized high -tech firms. Various 
government departments have jointly set up a venture foundation for backing up bank 
loans to this type of enterprises. The plan originally guaranteed that the enterprises 
25 Interviewee 2, 
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could borrow money from the bank without requiring collateral, as long as the 
government acted as the guarantor and paid a certain amount of funds as a deposit. 
However, ultimately the bank insisted that no special treatment applied to this plan, 
which disappointed some of the entrepreneurs, whom I interviewed, who had intended 
to apply for it.26 
Under the policy of zero risk lending, as noted, small firms were usually not 
qualified for any loan without offering collateral - and the sole collateral the bank 
accepts is real estate. For the small IT enterprises, however, the most valuable assets are 
their intellectual property. They seldom possess real estate. By contrast, other industries, 
especially the manufacturing industry, can turn to their plants as collateral. Hence, the 
non -TT cases, of which most had real property, were more successful in getting loans. 
As a result, no matter how good the performance of an IT private enterprise, banks did 
not lend money until its profitability attained a level high enough that the risk rate of 
credit was almost as low as zero. But an enterprise that reached this level might not 
need any loan. 
While many private entrepreneurs are thirsty for loans, on the other hand a few 
of them do not want to "drink." It is interesting to note that three enterprises among my 
cases claimed that the bank urged them to borrow money, but they were indifferent to 
the offer. They were well -performing companies that had just experienced a take off. 
They already possessed sufficient capital for daily operations. To be sure, if they 
launched an ambitious new big project, bank loans were still essential. But the 
conservative policy of the hank failed to meet their business demands. In one of the 
26 Interviewees 7 & 19. 
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three cases, the entrepreneur claimed that his company was planning a new project that 
needed tens of millions of yuan, but the bank only granted it credit up to several 
millions of yuan and therefore he declined the offer.27 
Another interviewee gave a different account of the phenomenon. The 
entrepreneur explained that the speed of his capacity to expand his business operations 
failed to catch up with the influx of profits.28 In the transitional economy, there are 
many opportunities for private entrepreneurs to make big profits to the extent that these 
"upstarts" could not well master. To these enterprises, bank credit is not crucial for the 
time being. 
Furthermore, in part because of the long -term conservative lending policy of the 
banks, the private enterprises are used to being self -financed and retaining a high ratio 
of their earnings to take care of most of their financing needs. For this reason, too, some 
of them avoided borrowing money from the banks. The most extreme case was a rapidly 
growing private company, the Giant Group (Juren jituan) in Zhuhai. It ambitiously 
attempted to build a 70- storey skyscraper in the early 1990s. Since the company had 
never applied for Ioans, by the same token the owner never considered borrowing 
money to finance the construction until late 1993 when the government enforced 
austerity measures. As a result, the company needed to put all of its available funds, 
which should have been allocated to other promising projects, into this project. This 
eventually threw the company into a financial crisis in 1997 and now the owner is trying 
to save his company from bankruptcy.29 
27 Interviewee 30. 
28 Interviewee 4I. 
29 Zhongguo gíyejia [China Entrepreneur], 144 (September, 1997): 7 -8; Nanfang zhoumo [Southern 
Weekend], 7 July 2000 (Internet edition :www.nanfangdaily.com.cn). 
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Seventeen entrepreneurs responded that it was not yet necessary for them to 
borrow money (See Table 6.1). Some of them were newly- founded companies and the 
others had enough cash to operate their firms or had not reached the threshold of their 
next development stage. In addition, some entrepreneurs preferred other financing 
channels - absorbing new share capital or forming joint ventures with other 
companies. For the IT industry, venture capital is now regarded as a better capital 
source. One of these enterprises was fully funded by a venture capitalist from the United 
States. 
Three entrepreneurs remarked that, in particular, bank loans are not an 
appropriate financing source for the IT industry because of the short-term nature of the 
loans, whereas the cycle of pay -offs in IT takes at least a few years due to the on -going 
development of the computer and Internet market. Moreover, as noted above, the 
amount of a bank loan to the private sector is too small to support much investment. 
Venture capital can suffice for the demands of the industry. Some of the entrepreneurs 
revealed that they had contacted venture capitalists for cooperation or vice versa. To be 
sure, the venture capitalists to which most of these entrepreneurs are eager to get access 
are foreign ones, mainly from the United States. The development of domestic venture 
funding remains at an embryonic stage and it is short of funds to support scattered small 
private firms. 
The financing channels are becoming more diversified for the private sector. To 
go public to acquire funding is a developing source. To be sure, to list a private 
company on the domestic stock market is very difficult because most of the quotas for 
initial public offerings (IPOs) are allocated to SOEs. Just a few big private companies 
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have entered the primary market up to now. However, the past few years have 
experienced a trend of relaxation, especially since the newly adopted Securities Law 
lifted many restrictions upon the individual holding of equities. Among my cases, the 
Ufsoft Group was applying for an 1PO while I visited the company in June 1999. When 
I interviewed the president, Wang Wenjing, on the phone, he felt confident that his 
application would be approved in view of the new law. Right after my fieldtrip of 
Beijing, the application was approved and in early 2000, it was re- organised into a 
shareholding company -a prerequisite to an IPO. 
However, to complete all procedures for the formal listing is very time - 
consuming, so some private enterprises prefer to opt for an indirect listing. An indirect 
listing or "rear door listing" refers to the takeover of listed companies in the secondary 
market. By this method, the new holding company can make use of a so- called "shell" 
company to achieve the aim of raising capital from the public, with no need to 
reorganise the company into a shareholding company. It is a common practice in stock 
markets around the world. To be sure, rather than taking over a listed company through 
market trading, such takeovers have been usually achieved in China through an 
agreement between the purchasers and the original holding companies. 
During the period from 1997 to 1999, several private enterprises took over state - 
owned listed companies in this manner. One was the CSC Group, which in April 1999 
took over a Harbin -based listed steel company, Yacheng Stee1.30 Yacheng transferred 
52.3% of the corporate shares to CSC in exchange for 34 million yuan, 80% of the 
shares of a CSC subsidiary and the copyright to a software package of CSC. Under this 
3° One of the reasons why Song Chaodi, the president of the CSC, chose the Harbin -based company as the 
"shell" was that Song was a Harbiner. See Beijing jingjibao [Beijing Economic Daily], 25 April 1999: 1. 
189 
agreement, CSC holds 28% of Yacheng's shares, an amount large enough for it to 
become the largest shareholder of Yacheng. Yacheng was renamed as CSC, known as 
Kelihua in Chinese.31 By the same method, the Suntek Group purchased the state and 
corporate shares of another listed company at the end of 1999, becoming the largest 
shareholder holding 35% of the shares of the company.32 
Small IT companies have no chance of going public in the domestic market. But 
the foreign stock market seems more promising, as there are some second -board 
markets specifically for high -tech startups. Sparkice was planning to go public through 
NASDAQ. An Internet service enterprise among my cases succeeded in going public by 
buying a "shell" company on the securities market, OTCBB,33 in the United States, 
raising 70 million US dollars from the market in December 1999. 
In the past, whoever controlled capital resources could patronise enterprises in 
China. Previous studies noted that personal connections were indispensable for private 
entrepreneurs to get access to bank loans, because of the political bias against the 
private sector.34 But the recent reform of the banking system has marketised the 
operations of the credit system. Yet, most private firms continue to find it difficult to 
obtain loans from the banks, even though the big private firms have become favourite 
customers of the banks. This is reflected among my cases, especially among the IT 
enterprises. As noted, the banks are now held responsible for bad debts and therefore 
have become more cautious about providing credit. This does not mean that personal 
31 See Beijing jingjibao [Beijing Economic Daily], 20 April 1999: 1. 
32 Nanfang dushibao [Southem Urban Daily], 13 January 2000: 30. 
33 OTCBB is the short form of "Over The Counter Bulletin Board." The listing requirement of OTCBB is 
less demanding than that of NASDAQ. 
34 For example, see Andrea Lynne Robert, The Political Impact of China's New Private Entrepreneurs, 
PhD Dissertation (University of California, Berkeley, 1997), 72 -93. 
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relationships become meaningless, but a personal relationship cannot override the 
institutional constraints imposed upon the bank. On the other hand, after decades of 
deterioration of state financial and fiscal institutions, the state is short of funds to 
directly finance the development of most industries - especially the IT industry, which 
tends to demand non -traditional financial services. That is one reason why stock 
markets need to be established in China. An entrepreneur who had newly founded an 
enterprise at the Entrepreneur Park in GETDZ complained to me that the government 
had promised to grant him some interest -free loans, but he never got any, and so was 
very discontented with the government.35 The state, in short, is now less able to 
financially patronise the private sector due to its weakening fiscal muscle. 
Horizontal Connections and Corporate Amalgamations 
The foregoing sections discussed inter- organisational linkages in terms of vertical 
trading, regulatory regimes and financing connections. This section focuses upon 
horizontal business relationships, such as component trading, technological 
connections, joint projects, and joint ventures. 
For the IT industry, the capability to master new and advanced technology is an 
overwhelming condition to gain a leading edge. And this type of technology usually 
originates from foreign countries; hence, the entrepreneurs need to keep abreast of 
development trends abroad, especially through the Internet and e- mails, to access global 
information. As an IT entrepreneur claimed, if one day the Chinese government decides 
35 Interviewee 44. 
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to close down the Internet, he would immediately leave for other countries.36 Foreign 
information and connections are very critical for the IT industry, because the core 
technology remains in the hands of foreign IT giants. The domestic companies have no 
choice but to rely upon them. 
For example, all PC manufacturers cannot hut buy licences from Microsoft to 
install Windows into their PCs. But the price of a licence sold to small PC 
manufacturers is double that of large companies, which saps the competitiveness of the 
former.37 Application software development is the leading edge for many local IT firms, 
but they still have to rely upon imported hardware and professional software as the 
platform for R&D. Comparatively speaking, the IT firms in China are bound to a 
handful of foreign IT corporations, which monopolise the key core technology, more so 
than they are beholden to any local state or non -state institutions. 
The technological connections with foreign IT companies are, in short, an 
essential inter -organisational linkage. Many IT enterprises among my cases claimed that 
a number of renowned companies, including Microsoft, Sun Microsystems, Oracle, 
Intel, Hewlett -Packard, Cisco and 1BM, were their crucial business partners. The 
relations included not only business trading but also technical support and technological 
upgrading. In the case of Sparkice, besides China Unicorn, it had joined hands with 
Cybercash, an American IT corporation which specialises in on -line payment systems, 
to develop e- commerce in China. To create an effective on -line transaction system is a 
prerequisite to e- commerce. This technological linkage was as important as government 
linkages for Sparkice. 
x Interviewee 27. 
37 Interviewee 1. 
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To be sure, if a domestic organisation could monopolise some particular 
resources, albeit not relating to technology, it is easier for it to tempt other companies to 
form partnerships. As mentioned above, China Telecom as well as China Unicorn 
manipulates almost the entire telecommunications infrastructure. Some companies thus 
seek to make use of the advantages of these state -owned telecommunications 
corporations to facilitate their business plans. An Internet company in Beijing among 
my cases developed an exclusive remote website building solution and formed a 
partnership with Beijing Telecom (a local subsidiary of China Telecom) to promote the 
business. Beijing Telecom provided servers and other hardware, while his company 
provided software and other technical support. Beijing Telecom, with a great number of 
business outlets, also took charge of securing customers. Both parties then divided the 
profits according to their agreement.38 
Enjoying a quasi -official status, China Telecom is also a business -oriented 
organisation. h is listed on the Hong Kong Stock Market and now actively makes use of 
its own monopolised resources to diversify its business. Strategically to form business 
partnerships with other IT firms is more efficient than to internalise new businesses. 
China Unicorn, a young company, has highly depended upon various joint operations or 
joint ventures to proliferate its businesses in the past few years. 
Under marketisation, other state -owned undertakings are also seeking alternative 
profits by making linkages on their own. As noted above, education software companies 
have to buy ISBNs from book publishers for their software packages. This is basically a 
rent -seeking business endowed by the regulatory regime. However, some publishers 
with foresight have not only simply been rent -seekers but also sought partnerships with 
38 Interviewee 26. 
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the software developers so as to enter the New Economy. In one of my cases, an 
education software company created a partnership with the book publisher from which 
it bought the ISBN. As the publisher had better connections with the state's education 
system, it could assist the promotion of the products. The publisher also wanted to enter 
this new market of education software but did not command the technology. The mutual 
benefits to the two companies facilitated the formation of a partnership.39 
Two other small software companies also negotiated with publishers for joint 
projects. One of them was still negotiating with two big university presses to publish 
books on computer applications. It was going to pick one of the two to be its partner.40 
In another case, a software company specialised in electronic English teaching, and the 
company intended to combine its own IT technology with a publisher's professional 
knowledge in English editing to promote a new software package. The interviewed 
entrepreneur complained that being attached to the state system too long, the attitude of 
the publisher remained very conservative and that the publisher also claimed too high in 
the ratio of profit- sharing.41 
The above cases suggest that profit making and marketisation provide 
significant incentives for enterprises to combine resources. This synergy is worked out 
in a business -oriented and competitive manner. Of course, the pre -reform institutions - 
e.g. the state monopoly of book publishing and telecommunications were shaping the 
process, but this was path- dependent rather than social embeddedness. 
39 Interviewee 7. 
40 Interviewee 11. 
61 Interviewee 23. 
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The last section discussed the difficulty small private firms had in becoming 
well financed. Most of them heavily rely upon profit retention to accumulate capital for 
reinvestment. This makes them liable to fall behind other better - financed companies in 
market competition. In order to speed up their development while constrained by the 
condition that they are not entitled to bank financing or raising funds from the stock 
market, some firms seek out other companies to form a joint venture. This can expand 
the scale of a company in a short time and help partners share experiences. 
Many of the IT companies in my sample revealed that they were eager to form 
such joint ventures. The favourite partners were foreign -funded IT companies, because 
it is supposed that besides capital, these foreign companies can bring foreign 
management experience and advanced technology into the joint venture. Moreover, a 
joint venture with a foreign partner can be re- registered as a Sino- foreign enterprise, 
which can help build up a better image and enjoy preferential policies. The most 
important of these is that the joint venture can automatically enjoy an independent right 
to import and export, and tax exemptions for imports. This can reduce costs when it 
needs to import foreign equipment. Moreover, the burden of income tax for foreign 
firms is half that for domestic firms on average.42 Among my cases, one of the software 
firms in Guangzhou formed a joint venture with an IT company from Hong Kong which 
wanted to exploit the mainland market.43 To be sure, to seek a foreign partner is no 
easier than to seek bank loans. The negotiations to form a joint venture in the above 
case took over two years. The domestic companies need to demonstrate qualities that 
can appeal to the foreign companies. In general, the small private IT firms lack these 
Zhongguojingying bao [China Business], 5 September 2000 (Internet edition: www.cb.com.cn). 
°i Interviewee 52. 
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resources; otherwise, they would have been able to secure venture capital. To form a 
joint venture with a foreign company is easier said than done for most small private 
firms. 
However, a long -term trading relationship may compensate for other qualities in 
prompting foreign firms to embark on a joint- venture relationship. The Guangzhou - 
based PC manufacturer was going to form a joint venture with a Taiwan-based company 
that had been being a major supplier of its PC components. Long -term business trust 
was a significant force in this merging. This arrangement would definitely strengthen 
the market competitiveness of its PCs, which could now purchase cheaper components. 
Another source of partnerships is SOEs. Many private enterprises now choose to 
form joint ventures with SOEs, while government policy encourages the diversification 
of ownership. However, the IT enterprises among my cases, especially the technology - 
intensive ones, tended to disparage the SOEs. As in the example of a joint project in 
electronic English teaching, mentioned above, the private side was critical of the 
conservative nature of the state publisher. In general, the SOEs present an image of old - 
fashioned practices, poor performance, cumbersome management, and bureaucratism - 
not a good match for the New Economy. Let alone seeking a partnership, some of the 
companies among my cases distanced themselves from the SOEs in business trading. 
The Guangzhou -based PC manufacturer claimed that his company did not conduct any 
business with SOEs, though it did with the state administrative organs. He denounced 
most SOEs as unreliable and claimed that they never kept promises (bujiang xinyong). 
Despite the above negative factors, the SOEs still hold certain valuable 
resources. The status of an SOE to a certain extent helps in corporate financing. After 
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forming a joint venture with an SOE, a company tends to find it a little bit easier to 
obtain loans from banks, as was the experience of an enterprise among non -IT cases that 
entered into a state -private joint venture." In addition, many SOEs possess idle fixed 
assets and surplus manual labour that can be otherwise engaged. These resources remain 
useful for labour- intensive production process. The Beijing -based PC manufacturer was 
negotiating a joint operation or joint venture with a renowned steel conglomerate in the 
capital. The "marriage" was initiated and mediated by the municipal Economic and 
Trade Committee. The interviewee expected that if it was successful, the company 
could install new assembly lines so that the production capacity could increase 
multifold, keeping apace with PC giants such as Legend and Founder.45 
To form a partnership between indigenous private entrepreneurs is the easiest 
route, but it usually takes the form of absorbing new share capital rather than a joint 
venture between legal persons. This method was already detailed in Chapter 5. But it 
does not produce any special synergy as in the case of Sino- foreign and state -private 
partnerships. 
A corporate amalgamation, like other horizontal connections, is dominated by 
market -driven behaviour and rational business calculations. But the above 
amalgamations led to unfair competition because of the partially reformed market, as in 
the privileges enjoyed by the foreign -funded companies. But the entrepreneurs of joint 
ventures point out that the policy gap that applied to foreign and domestic companies is 
being narrowed. After China joins the World Trade Organisation, it is believed that both 
parties should be on an equal footing. Still, the competition will not be absolutely fair. 
44 Interviewee 25. 
45 Interviewee 1. 
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Firms with creative strategies and multiple corporate structures are producing different 
consequences for market competition across the world. 
Does Political Capital Matter? 
In David Wank's account, political capital is a unique resource for Chinese 
entrepreneurs to seek to secure the assistance of commercialised bureaucratic power, 
indispensable to prosper as a private enterprise.46 "Politicised" public belief always 
associates the rise and fall of some outstanding enterprises with the fortunes of political 
leaders who are considered by the public as the patrons of so- and -so enterprises. For 
example, Zhao Ziyang was associated with Stone Group; the Capital Steel Group 
(Shougang) was supposedly the favourite of Deng Xiaoping. What does political capital 
mean exactly? How far does such capital matter to the rise of an enterprise? 
In the above sections, I touched upon the issue of political capital. For instance, I 
mentioned the case of a software company that strove to obtain the recommendation of 
a state agency as an assurance to customers. Indeed, not a few enterprises hoped their 
products would be recognised by various authorities, as an honour and resource to 
market their brands. To be sure, this is only a "catalyst" to bridge producers with 
potential end users. Ultimately, the end users only judge a brand according to the 
quality of its products. As to IT commodities, the qualitative contrast between the same 
type of products was relatively distinguishable. The "demand side" analysis counts 
much more than the "supply side" analysis if we account for the rise and fall of an IT 
46 See David L. Wank, "The Institutional Process of Market Clientelism: Guanxi and Private Business in 
a South China City," The China Quarterly, 147 (September, 1996): 820 -38. 
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business. Customers are better able to choose goods or services. The failure of the estate 
management software to enter the Beijing market is an example (pp. 177 -8). 
Of course, consumers or users sometimes are resistant to change. The oft- quoted 
example is the persistence of the organisation of letters on a typewriter keyboard. A 
"worse" system may already monopolise the market and users get used to it and have no 
incentive to switch to another one. 
A comparable example can be found among my cases. In the Chinese computer 
market, Chinese character input is a unique and essential technique for the Chinese 
computer system. The popular input methods on the mainland now are pinyin and wubi 
(i.e. five strokes). Among the two methods, the wubi is the most popular and officially 
promoted. In this method, one needs to press at most five keys to form a Chinese 
character. A computer engineer in Guangzhou developed a new input method by which 
the keystrokes for forming a Chinese character are largely reduced. More characters can 
be formed by pressing only two keystrokes, which enhances input speed. Moreover, it is 
easier to learn this new method than wubi. However, the engineer failed to popularise 
this new method. Despite this, the method appealed to a businessman who bought the 
patent of this invention as well as the engineer's company. 
Even though the businessman anticipated good prospects for the software and 
claimed that the value of this invisible asset amounted to 300 million yuan, the liquidity 
of the asset depended upon whether he could persuade users to switch to the new 
method. The businessman adopted various strategies to market the new method and 
support from the government became an essential "catalyst." The businessman 
organised a Chinese character input championship by which he wanted to demonstrate 
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his input method was faster than other popular methods. Interestingly, this 
championship was held primarily in the name of various Guangdong's government 
departments, including Guangdong's Committee of Science and Technology and the 
Committee of Education. 
The businessman gave me a promotion booklet that contained a couple of photos 
of government officials accompanied by him. But when I asked him how the 
government supported his plan of promoting the new method, his reply was not what I 
supposed it would be -- the government only "verbally" supported him. He explained 
that the government only "took a stance of support" after other people "took a stance of 
support" and everything was well prepared. The so- called "support" was a posture 
without any substantial resource input. In other words, he needed to lay a good 
foundation in advance to convince government officials that everything is okay, that 
nothing would make them embarrassed or lose "face" when they posed as a supporter. 
Moreover, the government would be given the credit by assuming the position of the 
chief host of the activity. The businessman further elaborated his plan: 
"I don't expect any government resource input into my plan. Moreover, I 
have a policy. Any state agency, school or bank buys my product can 
pay for the price by yearly instalments. They just pay one quarter of it 
each instalment. . , .. My purpose is to support the state. Now the 
government dispatches civil servants to learn wubi that wastes 2,000 
yuan per capita and needs one month to familiarise them with the 
method. Mine only requires five days." 
The core aim of the businessman was to earn big business from the state agencies rather 
than simply to find a sponsor. But in order to earn contracts from the government, what 
"capital" he primarily used was an advanced technique and an attractive package, not 
guanxi. 
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As a norm, many public functions invite a government department to be an 
"honourable" sponsor as a symbol of legitimacy. But in practice, the departments have 
no input into the activities, except for officials attending the opening ceremony. If any 
fault is exposed, though, the officer -in- charge may be implicated, which may account 
for why the officials are the last to take a stance. The above is not an isolated case. In 
China, it is not difficult to find the office of some institutions hung with inscriptions 
from political leaders as a symbol of official support. The political Ieaders, as a norm, 
pay visits to some promising enterprises from time to time in a kind of "patriarchal 
solicitude. "47 However, this does not imply that the entrepreneurs possess political 
capital, or have a "hard backstage" in advance. The very fact is that the enterprise itself 
is a "hard backstage," to the point that political leaders are confident of stepping onto 
the stage. And in exchange the enterprise gains "face" from the honourable attendance 
of officials. 
In fact, increasingly it is the government that cultivates guanxi with enterprises. 
As Victor Nee and Sijin Su have indicated, the business firms are now not only 
becoming important sources of revenue but also providing a source of investment 
capital for new business ventures.48 To re- engineer the state sector, the government 
hopes that the private sector will participate in the reform of the SOEs. As noted above, 
the state authority actively initiated and mediated the partnership of the Beijing -based 
PC manufacturer and an SOE. The government tries to co -opt some well -performing 
47 In China, government leaders always pose as parents of the populace, dubbing themselves "parent 
functionaries" (fumuguan). 
48 Victor Nee & Sijin Su, "Institutions, Social Ties, and Commitment in China's Corporatist 
Transformation," in John McMillan & Barry Naughton (eds.), Reforming Asian Socialism: The Growth 
of Market Institutions (Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press, 1996), 123. 
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enterprises by according them some honour. Actually, though, political capital 
accumulates in proportion to the scale and performance of an enterprise. Entrepreneurs 
do not necessarily put additional effort into gaining this capital. In one of my cases in 
Beijing, the entrepreneur was recently selected as one of the ten best private 
entrepreneurs in Haidian.44 However, the graced entrepreneur did not appreciate it very 
much, because it was seen as nothing more than an "honour." 
Moreover, the "patriarchal solicitude" of the government officials sometimes 
might not bring benefits. In the section on financing, I mentioned a private company, 
Giant Group. Its project of building a 70- storey skyscraper directly led to financial 
difficulties for the company. The Giant Group was a renowned private high -tech 
company before the mid- 1990s. Many top leaders visited the company, including Jiang 
Zemin, Li Peng and Zhu Rongji. In 1992, the company decided to construct its own 
building. The first plan was 18 storeys, which was changed to 38 storeys. After a visit 
by a political leader, who suggested that it should be higher, the management of the 
company was emboldened to put on 16 more storeys, to 54 and then increased this to 64 
storeys, one storey higher than the then tallest building in Guangzhou. In 1994, another 
leader went to inspect Zhuhaì and visited the Giant Group. An idea occurred to the 
management that "64" was a taboo number.50 Plans were finalised to build a 70- storey 
building in order to establish a landmark for Zhuhai.51 The irrational ambition of the 
company reinforced by irresponsible official intervention at last drove the company to 
the brink of bankruptcy, but the government offered nothing to tide it over the crisis. 
49 Interviewee 11. 
so The number "four" sounds like "death" in Chinese, so it is always considered a taboo. Furthermore, 64 
can be associated with June 4 Incident. 
51 Zhongguo qiyejia [China Entrepreneur], 149 (September, 1997): 7. 
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Is the political support a burden or capital? The Guangzhou -based PC 
manufacturer was catching the attention of the government for its good performance. 
Government officials also visited the company and showed solicitude for its 
development. However, the entrepreneur gave his own critique vis -à -vis cultivating 
guanxi with the government: 
"An entrepreneur should pay most attention to his own business and the 
corporate management. He shouldn't waste energy on `messy affairs' 
(guanxi cultivation) ... Paying taxes in accordance with the law can 
make a great contribution to the government. We don't need to strive to 
secure the government's concern or particular guanxi with government 
leaders. What we should do is to strengthen the management 
"We welcome the leaders' visit, but we don't expect any particular 
solicitude from the government ... I think a spoiled child will never 
grow up. Even though he does, he must be incapable." (i.e. an enterprise 
under the patronage of the government cannot become a competitive 
enterprise.) 
Entrepreneurs are alert to the potential crisis caused by unusual political 
intervention. They know that they are facing a competitive environment that cannot be 
swayed by the personal authority of officials. What the first priority on the company's 
agenda should be is to enhance competitiveness in terms of management, technology, 
productivity and service. Political intervention is a burden rather than political capital. 
In his case studies of the development of the Capital Steel Group, Edward Steinfeld 
substantiated that Deng Xiaoping's visit in 1992 to the Group softened the budget 
constraints of the company, undermining its originally good corporate governance, 
which at last led to a financial crisis, somewhat like the case of the Giant Group.52 
52 Edward S. Steinfeld, Forging Reform in China: The Fate of State -owned Industry (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1998), 215 -8. 
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Furthermore, the value of political capital is depreciating. In Chapter 5, I 
presented two cases of enterprises that moved their headquarters from their initial bases 
to Guangzhou. The owners of these enterprises had assumed some political or semi - 
political positions in their places of origin. But these political honours could not 
override economic factor, and the entrepreneurs did not appreciate the positions. One of 
the cases was the telecommunications company that moved from Changsha to 
Guangzhou. When I asked the owner whether he had joined any association of private 
enterprises in Changsha, he looked as though he had forgotten whether he had. After a 
second, he refreshed his memory and mentioned that he was a board member of the 
Hunan Federation of Industry and Commerce and said that it was no more than an 
honour; he had not participated in the affairs of the Federation.53 An entrepreneur from 
Xinjiang had been a deputy to the People's Congress and a member of the People's 
Political Consultative Conference in Xinjiang. He complained that the positions had no 
functions, so he was no longer interested in them.54 I do not argue that entrepreneurs are 
all indifferent to political positions. It depends upon whether the positions give them a 
real capacity to exert their influence upon the government, not just an honour. I will 
further discuss this issue in the next chapter. 
Concluding Remarks 
The above sections examined the inter -organisational business linkages of the 
enterprises from five aspects. Combining the five aspects, I find that the on -going 
transformation of the politico- economic system is so diverse and complicated that 
53 Interviewee 30. 
54 Interviewee 34. 
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different variables are differently influencing the development of private enterprises. 
Despite this, five remarkable trends can be identified: 
First, the private enterprises in my case studies vigorously participate 
competitively in the marketplace. The private entrepreneurs have to adopt various 
strategies and multiple connections to compete with each other. No specific linkages 
can guarantee the success of an enterprise, though some Iinkages are more important 
than others. The linkages with trading parties, regulatory authorities, financial 
institutions and horizontal collaborators all can account for the rise and fall of an 
enterprise. Moreover, the bonds of some of these linkages become increasingly loose 
due to increasingly fierce market competition. Further, linkages are seldom exclusively 
connected to one enterprise. Contacts are now more accessible to all business entrants. 
The failure to develop access can be attributed more to the inadequacy of relevant 
professional resources rather than to the distortions created by artificial personal 
relationships. This phenomenon has been increasingly evident in the transition from a 
seller's market to a buyer's market in recent years. 
Second, although guanxi ties do continue to function, they are not necessarily 
exchanges embedded in pre- business personal relationships. They become open, 
competitive and non -exclusive. The traditional guanxi tie, which is based upon long- 
term cultivation of "human feelings" (ganging), may help those business starters who 
have no market experience, but it becomes ever more costly as businesses develop. 
Relying upon a traditional guanxi tie to build up a business network is time -consuming 
and leads businesspeople to lose other business opportunities. In addition, the traditional 
guanxi tie becomes less reliable because "money relations" replace "human feelings" 
205 
during marketisation. When I asked the entrepreneur who took up the business of the 
Chinese character input how he promoted his products, he replied that he would ask his 
"friends" to open firms to do the marketing. I asked him what "friends" meant. He said 
that he would openly recruit somebody to launch the business, and those he recruited 
were regarded as his "friends." This type of guanxi is in no way different from the 
sociological concept of an "impersonal relationship." I do not argue that there is perfect 
information in the market that reduces transaction costs so that entrepreneurs can leave 
all informal ties behind. However, the bonds of informal business ties are ever more 
based upon the objective performance of business partners. They are so- called 
"professional ties." 
Third, to be sure, the configurations of the linkages vary with different 
industries. The hardware, software and Internet business are different from one another. 
The different sectors of the software business also vary from each other. The 
relationships between trading parties in different marketplaces are not the same. Dyadic, 
market and government trading produce different configurations of linkages. Indeed, if 
one highly depends upon dyadic and government trading, certain business linkages 
become crucial. However, better developed enterprises tend to diversify their trading 
marketplaces. A company that depends upon only one or two customers is facing a 
bottleneck in its development. The company that is proficient at budgeting software for 
the building industry, noted above, had tried to develop other types of software, but was 
not very successful. As a result, the ratio of its turnover that depended upon the 
recommendations of a government department was too high. Patron -client relationships 
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did exist in a couple of my cases, but their competitiveness was not thus enhanced if 
solely relying upon this relationship. 
Fourth, the state regulatory regime significantly shapes linkages in the 
marketplaces. The IT industry is less regulated than many other Chinese industries, yet 
the strict controls over IP service, encryption software and ISP business prevent the 
private sector from easy access to these business fields. The monopoly of China 
Telecom reinforces the dependence on it of certain private IT firms, especially the 
Internet- related businesses. As a result, customers have to bear the cost of the slow 
development of the industry caused by a lack of market competition. The Chinese 
government is aware of the problem and is taking measures to gradually break down the 
monopoly. The first step is to split up China Telecom into four independent 
companies.55 On the other hand, the Chinese government is strengthening regulations 
over the industry, and further distortions of the marketplace are possible. It is not easy 
to speculate about the consequences of interactions between marketisation and 
regulation. 
Finally, David Wank expects that clientelism will persist as the economy of 
China becomes more developed, and he hypothesises that the larger a company 
becomes, the more significant the patronage of the government becomes. But my 
finding is that the more developed an enterprise is, the more autonomous the enterprise 
becomes. Among my cases, the better performing enterprises have better access to 
various economic resources. As Wank suggests, the Iarge enterprises tend to need more 
resources monopolised by the state, but the local government sets no obstacle to their 
ss The four independent companies separately embark on the businesses of fixed telephones, mobile 
telephones, satellites and pagers. 
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access to these resources and even actively offers the resources to them. Conversely, the 
smaller enterprises find it difficult to get access to these resources. It must be noted that 
in spite of the asymmetry of resources between the state and the private sector, the 
bargaining power of the latter is increasing, especially in the IT industry, upon which 
the official and semi- official agencies (e.g. China Telecom) increasingly depend to 
improve their own administrative efficiency and profitability. If the local government 
fails to provide the private sector with good services, these enterprises are apt to move 
elsewhere. The larger these enterprises are, the more mobility they are likely to have. In 
this sense, I prefer to depict the private sector as being in an increasingly good position 
to take advantage of the "commodification" of the state to co -opt the state agencies, 
rather than vice versa. 
In addition, the weakening of state power means that it sometimes lacks the 
resources to patronise the private sector. This weakness contains two aspects: fiscal and 
bureaucratic. The weakness of the state's fiscal resources makes them depend less upon 
the state's financial institutions and encourage them to seek out other non -state sources. 
On the other hand, the state financial institutions become freer from political 
intervention, as now they need to take responsibility for their own profits and losses. 
Hence, the linkage between the private sector and banks becomes more business - 
oriented. At the same time, there has been a fragmentation of the bureaucratic system, 
the thesis put forward by Lieberthal and Lampton.56 The case of Beijing's venture 
foundation for the small and medium -sized enterprises is a good example to show that 
there is a lack of a powerful and unitary bureaucratic system to coordinate policies. Last 
'6 Kenneth G. Lieberthal & David M. Lampton (eds.), Bureaucracy, Politics, and Decision -making in 
Post -Mao China (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1992). 
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but not least, if there are any patrons of China's IT industry, the foreign IT giants are 
more entitled to that position. 
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Chapter 7: State -Business Interaction in the Growth of the IT Industry 
The foregoing chapter noted that the weakening Chinese state sapped its own strength to 
patronise the private enterprises among my cases. On the other hand, this also connotes 
that the state may be unable to energise the private IT enterprises. The failure of the 
state to finance the small and medium -sized high -tech firms, shown in the last chapter, 
provides a typical example. However, it can be queried: does state involvement matter? 
Alternatively, we should ask how far the state is involved in the growth of the sector. In 
the context of China, where the economic infrastructure is not as well -established as in 
developed countries, we should further ask whether the Chinese state is establishing a 
fundamental institution and environment to facilitate IT development. Or is the state 
itself hindering development? This chapter will try to evaluate how the Chinese state 
plays a role in steering the development of the IT industry: it first examines other 
countries' experience, then China's approach in the post -Mao era and finally the 
findings from my field sites. 
Foreign Experiences 
Let us discuss first the role of the state in the IT industry in three different cases: the 
United States, Japan and India. These three cases can be placed on a continuum 
regarding the degree of state participation. The United States lies on the lowest end, 
Japan lies at the highest end and India lies intermediate between the two countries. 
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Silicon Valley in the United States 
The United States is the cradle of the electronics industry. AIthough military 
spending during the decades around the Second World War was the impetus in spurring 
the take -off of the infant industry, the growth engine more recently has not been state - 
led. Silicon Valley, situated at the base of the peninsula south of San Francisco, is now 
the nucleus of the IT industry in the world. Its origin can be traced to an individual 
initiation in 1937, by an electrical engineering professor at Stanford University, 
Frederick Terman, who encouraged his graduate students to open companies to 
commercialise their research products. Terman also built up collaborative ties between 
Stanford and local industry to boost the synergy between scientific research and 
commercial applications. In 1951, Terman pioneered the establishment of the Stanford 
Industrial Park next to the university to intensify the cooperation between the university 
and industry. Terman leased the land in the Park to firms at very advantageous terms, on 
the basis of their excellence in electronic technology and of their close contacts with 
Stanford. The Stanford Industrial Park Iaer became the model imitated by other 
technopolises across the world.' 
Silicon Valley shared in the military bonanza to fuel the first stage of its 
development. However, compared with another electronics centre in the United States, 
Boston's Route 128 situated in the old industrial region of the East Coast, which 
enjoyed proximity to the federal political centre, Washington, Silicon Valley shared less 
in the pool of military investment than its eastern counterpart. Paradoxically, Silicon 
Valley thus better survived after the cut in government spending on military research in 
Manuel Castells & Peter Hall, Technopoles of the World: The Making of 21st Century Industrial 
Complexes (London: Routledge, 1994), 15 -6. 
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the 1970s and in the crisis of the electronics industry in the 1980s.2 Silicon Valley has 
replaced Route 128 in assuming leadership in the industry since the 1990s and in 
moulding the extraordinary rules of the game for the IT industry. 
The success of Silicon Valley is credited to its special corporate culture in the 
"Wild West." Different from the traditional vertically integrated, closed and autarkic 
large corporate structure at Route 128, the companies in Silicon Valley tend to be 
smaller and open to access from other companies, including business rivals. As a result 
of the frequent job- hopping of specialists and would -be entrepreneurs across the firms 
in Silicon Valley, entrepreneurs in the region are acquainted with each other. 
Companies tend to work together as in a community. And based upon this historical 
context, the relationships between companies are not only those of competitors but also 
of collaborators. Instead of integrating all production processes into one company and 
developing a proprietary system, Silicon Valley's firms tend to specialise in one specific 
area, and to join hands with or rely upon supplies from other firms. The cooperation 
also includes cross -licensing and second -sourcing agreements. The former entails 
liberally cross -licensing patents to competitors to quickly diffuse the latest technology. 
The second -sourcing agreements ensure the existence of alternative suppliers and also 
help to upgrade the capability of competitive groups of engineers because the 
arrangement requires that competitors share not only technical specifications but also 
details of manufacturing processes with competing producers. By the above 
arrangements, the development cycle of products can he shortened so that the firms can 
keep a leading edge in their specialised areas. 
z AnnaLee Saxeian, Regional Advantage. Culture and Competition in Silicon Valley and Route 128 
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1994), 11 -27. 
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Another special characteristic of the firms is their financing. IT start-ups are 
typically set up by young engineers who have acquired operating experience and 
technical skills from their working in other firms in the region. When they cannot 
realise their idea in their current workplace, they draw up a business plan and seek 
funding and advice from local venture capitalists to set up their own ventures. These 
venture capitalists are different from traditional bankers. They themselves are often 
former engineers and entrepreneurs and have concrete experience in the operation of the 
IT industry, so that they are in harmony with those fresh entrepreneurs. They also 
frequently participate in the day -to -day operations of the new ventures. Although this 
special type of financing originated on the East Coast, the West Coast has best exploited 
its advantages and has turned it into a popular financing channel specifically for the IT 
and other high -tech industries. 
The practices in Silicon Valley break the lines of a traditional business cycle 
model in which technology tends to be stable over time, so vertical integration and 
corporate centralisation produce scale economies and market control until another 
technological breakthrough. The Silicon Valley's model is that business rivals do not 
resort to defensive measures but compete with each other by incessant innovation on the 
latest shared technology, adding value to it rather than excluding external access and 
concentrating on cost -cutting mass production. This special approach, according to 
AnnaLee Saxenian, is based upon the network- based, informal relationships and blurred 
boundaries among the firms geared to fostering a vigorous innovative milieu.3 
3 Ibid. 
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The above unique qualities of business institutions in Silicon Valley, including 
those of cross -licensing, second- sourcing and venture capital, are based upon individual 
or corporate initiative rather than any functional action of the state. Indeed, in spite of a 
tremendous resource input into the IT- related defence industry, the US government 
maintains no industrial policy, even though the threat from Japan intensified from the 
1980s onwards. 
MITI and the "Catch -up" of Japan 
The United States has been the bellwether and standard- setter in electronic 
technology, but it has been confronted with a foreign challenge - Japan, which has 
secured the lion's share of the global semiconductor market, overtaking the United 
States since the 1980s. In contrast to the United States, the post -war economic growth 
of Japan was marked by a high degree of state involvement - a so- called 
"developmental state," in Chalmers Johnson's term. Going beyond the "regulatory" 
function as in the case of the United States, the "developmental state" is engaged in 
entrepreneurial decision -making for the sake of the national interest and puts decisions 
into effect through its monopolised power. 
In the area of international business competition, Japan's Ministry of 
International Trade and Industry (MITI) drew much scholarly attention in the 1980s for 
its pivotal role in directing and supporting the domestic private sector in the 
international market competition.4 Founded in 1949, the Ministry is a powerful state 
machine, exercising a wide range of areas of authority from controlling imports to 
° See Chalmers Johnson, MITI and the Japanese Miracle: The Growth of Industrial Policy, 1925 -1975 
(Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1982). 
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target- setting of industrial development and manipulating capital channels. In the early 
years after the War, MITI played a very heavy- handed role in nurturing infant industry 
by setting high tariffs, imposing import quotas, subsidising selected industries, limiting 
domestic competition and supporting exports. At the same time, Japan also took the 
advantage of its close ties with the United States to foster an inflow of new technology 
so as to keep up with the latest technologies. The protectionism kept foreigners out of 
its large domestic market and Japan's support of free trade abroad proved effective in 
spurring the swift economic reconstruction of post -War Japan. 
In terms of the electronics industry, MITI adopted the same strategy to 
invigorate the domestic firms. The industry began to take off in the 1960s. Domestic 
manufacturers were protected from foreign competition by high tariffs. No computer 
could be imported without an import license from MITI, and foreign investment was 
controlled as tightly as imports. But Japan did not adopt an autarkic policy to develop 
its own technology from scratch. It encouraged foreign companies to form joint 
ventures with Japanese companies so as to acquire and catch up with up -to -date 
technology quickly. In addition, the government recognised the significance of the 
demand side, using government procurement to create demand for the domestic 
products. And substantial amounts of cheap loans were granted to support R &D in the 
domestic companies.5 In the 1980s, Japan started to challenge the leading position of the 
United States. The most remarkable victory was in the semiconductor industry. Since 
the mid- 1980s, the share of Japanese companies in the world chip market has overtaken 
the United States. During the process of emulation, MITI played a specific role in 
5 Peter Evans, Embedded Autonomy: State and Industrial Transformation (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 1995), 100 -1. 
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formulating systematic strategies to target the market strongholds of Silicon Valley one 
after another.6 
However, some studies play down the contribution of the government in recent 
decades in Japan's economic development. Compared with the early success in steel, 
shipbuilding and sewing, Michael Porter points out that aggressive efforts by the 
government to develop chemicals and plastics, aerospace, aircraft, and the software 
industry has largely failed to make Japan an international competitor. In some 
industries, including computers, the government's attempt to limit competition proved 
erroneous. It was the unwillingness of firms to abide by government plans that saved 
the day.' In Castells and Hall's study, MITI's plan of setting up 26 technopolises across 
the country in order to spread industrial hubs into less developed regions has not yet 
diminished the dominant role of Tokyo and its surrounding regions.8 
To be sure, after two decades of economic reconstruction, the role of MITI had 
already shifted from that of direct control to guidance. The sphere of its influence is not 
as wide as in its early history.9 Firms occasionally ignored the plans of MITI and relied 
less upon the resources of the state.10 The dynamism of fierce domestic rivalry 
contributed much more to the competitiveness of Japanese firms in the global market. 
6 Tom Forestor, Silicon Samurai: How Japan Conquered the World's IT Industry (Cambridge: Blackwell, 
1993), 46. 
7 Michael Porter, The Competitive Advantage of Nations (New York: The Free Press, 1990), 414. 
'Manuel Castells & Peter Hall, op. cit., 112 -43. 
9 Jon Pierre & Sang -Chul Park, "The Dynamics of Abstract and Manifest Institutional Change: MITI and 
the Japanese `Economic Miracle' Reconsidered," Governance 10, 4 (October, 1997): 351 -76. 
1° Fred Warshofsky, The Chip War' The Battle for the World of Tomorrow (New York: Scribner, 1989), 
120 -1. 
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By contrast, industries in Japan that were over -protected become unproductive and 
unresponsive to change.' 
MITI now plays a role in signalling to firms rather than directly intervening in 
their decision -making. The growth of the IT industry is mainly driven by rapid self - 
initiated innovation. The degree of government participation in this respect seems 
limited.'Z In spite of the prolonged economic recession from the early 1990s onwards, 
the Japanese government realises that what it can do is limited and recognises that 
private companies acting independently is the key to improving industrial 
competitiveness. The government can be only confined to playing a supplementary role 
- modifying regulations.13 
Some authors credit other factors in their accounts of Japan's success. Tom 
Foster highlights the higher capability of Japanese firms in commercialising the output 
from research, while Europe and the United States over -emphasise basic scientific 
research. As a consequence, when many new basic technologies were invented by 
Americans, the Japanese usually showed themselves more capable of developing these 
into lucrative commercial goods. The dominance of Japan's consumer electronics in the 
global market is credited to this.14 In her account of the loss of Silicon Valley in the war 
for the semiconductor market, Saxenian de- emphasises the function of market 
protection by the Japanese government. Instead, she singles out the unique corporate 
Michael Porter, op. cit., 416 & Scott Walker, "A Tale of Two Tigers and a Giant: Comparing the 
Response of Japan, Korea, and Taiwan to the Asian Financial Crisis," Asian Perspective 24, 2 (2000): 
33. 
12 Michael Porter, op. cit., 414 -6. 
13 See a recent interview with the Minister of MITI, Kaoru Yosano, in Shige Makino and Mika Shinkai, 
"MITI Minister Kaoru Yosano on Reviving Japan's Competitive Advantage," Academy of Management 
Executive 13, 4 (November, 1999): 9 -11. 
14 Tom Forestor, op. cit. 
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structure of the Japanese firms, in which suppliers, subcontractors, customers and 
bankers are informally and closely tied, which permits lower product costs, faster 
development and more responsiveness to the market. She attributes the failure of Silicon 
Valley to its resort in manufacturing to a traditional model of mass production that 
isolated engineering and design from manufacturing.15 She highlights both Japanese and 
Silicon Valley's unique networked corporate cultures as an essential condition of 
success in the New Economy. 
No matter how one accounts for the success of the Japanese IT industry, state 
participation is noticeable. Although MITI now employs a more indirect policy leverage 
than direct control over supply and demand, it never embraces a belief in market 
absolutism and broad deregulation.16 The Ministry might not make all of its economic 
decisions correctly and it is no longer as powerful as before in policy enforcement, but 
it did empower certain fledgling industries in the early years so that the domestic firms 
could directly face foreign challenges in later years. From the viewpoint of neo- statism, 
a strong state is not equivalent to an omnipotent entity, which takes up every job by 
itself. The definition of a state's strength also changes over time: it is more important 
for the developmental state to strengthen the business sector in collaboration with itself 
on pursuing development goals. This is especially relevant for the late industrialising 
countries. 
'5 AnnaLee Saxeian, op. cit., 90-1. 
6 Shige Makino and Mika Shinkai, op. cit., 11. 
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India: a New Software Superpower 
India is in the spotlight because the booming Indian IT industry is challenging 
the conventional wisdom in which poor countries should modernise by first 
emphasising labour -intensive and low -skill industries, as was the cases of the East 
Asian countries in the wake of World War II. India's IT industry has skipped this 
middle stage between agriculture and high technology, directly entering into this 
knowledge -based industry and becoming one of the top software exporters. During the 
decade from the mid -1980s to the mid- 1990s, the annual growth rate of software 
exports averaged above 60 %.17 The IT industry boasts the second richest man after Bill 
Gates, Azim Hashim Premjì, the chair of Wipro, the IT giant in India. The outstanding 
performance in the IT industry is in very sharp contrast to India's poor performance in 
other sectors. 
Influenced by English Fabian socialism, the post -independent Indian political 
leaders adopted autarkic and semi -socialist economic policies. Despite no mandatory 
command planning and nationalisation of the private sector, the characteristics of the 
policies were likened to several that applied in Mao's China: (1) restrictions upon 
foreign direct investment (FDI); (2) emphasis on heavy industry and state ownership; 
and (3) discriminatory pricing against agricultural products. Despite the existence of the 
private sector, its proliferation was controlled by the state's industrial licensing system, 
i.e. a license -raj that resulted in patron- client relationships between state bureaucrats 
and the privileged business firms. 
" S. C. Bhatnagar and Shirin Madon, "The Indian Software Industry: Moving towards Maturity," Journal 
of Information Technology 12, 4 (1997): 279. 
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Likewise, the economic outcome was no better than in China. The poor 
performance of SOEs was evident. The growth rate of GDP averaged 3.6% from 1950 
to 1980, dubbed the "Hindu rate of growth." The growth did speed up to 5.7% in the 
1980s, but this was based upon unsustainable macroeconomic policies and led to budget 
deficits during the 1980s that culminated in the financial crisis of 1990.18 
More than 10 years after China, India resorted to reforms by opening up India to 
outside investment and de- licensing firms from 1991. The economic performance in the 
1990s seemed to have rid itself of the "Hindu rate of growth," by soaring to around a 
7% average annual growth rate over the past half decade, forecast to outstrip China's in 
2000, in which the IT sector is a spearhead of growth.19 Despite the bullishness among 
Indians, however, India is lagging far behind China in overall performance, not only 
because of the late start of the reforms but also because of its enduring weak bases in 
infrastructure, exports, absorbing FDI, the old economic sector (i.e. agriculture and 
manufacturing) as well as the larger extent of poverty among the population.20 
Endeavouring to pursue developmental goals after independence, according to 
Peter Evans, the Indian state was intermediate between the developmental and predatory 
model. This type of state performs inconsistently but occasionally generates striking 
success in promoting industrial transformation. Owing to the generalist training of 
18 Vijay Joshi and I. M. D. Little, "India -- Reform on Hold," Arian Development Review 15, 2 (1997): 1. 
19 Roger Mitton, "Giant on the Move: from High Technology to the Creative Arts, India is Rapidly 
Becoming a Global Player," Asiaweek 26, 31 (11 August 2000): 30 -3. 
20 India has 53% of its population living on less than US$1 a day, compared with 37% in China. See ibid., 
31. For comparison of economic reforms and performance between India and China, see Gilbert 
Etienne, "Economic Reforms in China and India," in Henri- Claude de Bettignies (ed.), Business 
Transformation in China (London; Boston: International Thomson Business Press, 1996); Tapen Sinha 
and Dipendra Sinha, "A Comparison of Development Prospect in India and China," Asian Economies 
26, 2 (June, 1997): 5 -31; Manmohan Agarwal and Dipankar Sengupta, "Comparing Transition 
Economies: China and India," China Report 36, 1 (Jan. -Mar., 2000): 1 -28. 
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Indian civil servants as well as the lack of networked connections with the private 
sector, the state bureaucracy was unable to coordinate industrialisation we11.21 Rampant 
corruption and patronage further exacerbated the dysfunctional role of the state in 
economic development. 
However, the state -business relationship in terms of the IT industry is an 
exception. In India, the Department of Electronics (DOE), which was formed in the 
early 1970s, has taken charge of IT policy. According to Peter Evans, the DOE is an 
industry- friendly government department, technology- oriented and more immune to 
corruption. From the early 1970s to the mid- 1980s, the state stuck to import- 
substitution, self -reliance and a state -ownership centred approach to the electronics 
industry that turned around the situation of foreign sector dominance over the industry 
in the 1960s, Although the strategy helped to nurture an indigenous sector by keeping it 
away from foreign competition, the sector was unable to keep pace with up -to -date 
technology.22 
In 1984, the new energetic Prime Minister, Rajiv Gandhi, launched the first but 
ephemeral reform. The state liberalised the entry of private capital and imports in the IT 
industry, allowed the formation of joint ventures and switched to an export orientation. 
The DOE immediately unloaded the past policy legacy and shifted energetically to the 
new line. This flexibility should be credited to the fact that the DOE did not bear the 
burden of representing a significant political constituency or of providing patronage 
21 Peter Evans, op. cit., 45 & 69. 
22 Hans -Peter Brunner, Closing the Technology Gap: Technological Change in India's Computer Industry 
(New Delhi: Sage Publications, 1995), 66 -93. 
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jobs, as in other sectors.23 The growth of the IT industry was further spurred by the full - 
fledged liberalisation from 1991 onward. 
The DOE is not as highly involved in business planning as the MITI. It is more a 
facilitator rather than a heavy -handed bureaucratic entrepreneur. It should be noted that 
the strength of IT industry in India is not in electronics manufacturing but software 
engineering and design, and teleworking. And this direction in development was not a 
premeditated and deliberate plan of the government. It just happened to match the 
global trend of an international division of labour in the IT industry. Many American 
and European companies sought cheaper offshore services since the end of the 1970s 
because of rising domestic labour costs. Because the infrastructure of India is poorly 
developed, including in transportation, power supplies and other bases for 
manufacturing industries, It has failed to imitate the East Asian countries' history of 
first taking an international position in labour- intensive industries. Even though the IT 
firms in India have engaged in hardware manufacturing, the performance of the 
software counterpart puts this in the shade. 
With the advantage of its huge pool of well- educated English- speaking scientists 
and technicians, plus the frequently remarked upon mathematical abilities of Indians, 
India has an overwhelming edge in serving the English- dominated software industry. 
Indian engineers and programmers of high quality can be hired at a fraction of the 
wages of their Western counterparts. With the Western world expecting a wide gap 
between the supply and demand of IT engineers in coming years, and with the top 
European offshore service provider, Ireland, also experiencing tight labour market, 
Indian IT companies became the greatest beneficiary. They were well set to catch the 
23Peter Evans, op. cit., 113 -5. 
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flood of offshore jobs. By contrast, Japan never obtained these intrinsic advantages and 
so it failed to take an international position in the software industry. 
It is ironic that even now the degree of penetration of computers among the 
Indian population remains low and the telephone network is poorly developed. Hence, 
the domestic market has not significantly supported the Indian IT industry, albeit it has 
been rapidly growing since the early 1990s.24 Software exports and service exports were 
the major impetus to the burgeoning IT industry.25 By the same token, both FDI and 
well- educated expatriate Indians who studied computer engineering in the United States 
and moved their careers back to their home country helped to sow the seeds of the 
development. 
Bangalore, the capital of the South Indian state of Karnataka and situated on a 
cool plateau above the hot Indian plain, is now dubbed India's Silicon Valley and 
contributed almost a third of Indian software -export sales in 1999.26 More than 1,600 
multinational and homegrown computer firms now congregate in Bangalore. The rise of 
Bangalore as the base of the Indian IT industry owes to its historical background as the 
technological metropolis of India. The central government invested lavishly in the 
building of Bangalore's civilian science and technology infrastructure as well as the 
nation's most sensitive and advanced military and space research facilities.27 
24 s. C. Bhatnagar and Shirin Madon, op. cit., 284. 
25 During the financial year 1999 -2000 (March -February), the Indian software industry grossed 5.57 
billion US dollars in which the export accounted for 4 billion. See Dewang Mehta, "Indian Software for 
the E -age," Forbes Global 3, 24 (27 November 2000): 118. 
26 Ambika Pathi, "Silicon Valley of the East: Bangalore's Boom," Harvard International Review 21, 4 
(Fall, 1999): 8. 
27 John Stremlau, "Dateline Bangalore: Third World Technopolis," Foreign Policy, 102 (Spring, 1996): 
152 -68. 
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However, US companies initially chose Bombay and New Delhi to launch their 
offshore software ventures, as they were the most convenient locations, with their 
international airports and direct data communication links. A breakthrough occurred 
when a high -ranking Indian -born scientist working for Texas Instruments championed 
the offshore facilities in Bangalore because of his association with his alma mater, the 
Indian Institute of Science in Bangalore. However, there was a lack of 
telecommunications infrastructure in Bangalore to build up an offshore software 
development centre, but the government was very responsive to this issue. The DOE 
stepped in to address the constraint by setting up a direct satellite link between Texas 
Instruments' facilities in Bangalore and those in the United States. The government's 
responsiveness gave a positive signal to other IT companies, luring them into 
Bangalore, including Digital, Hewlett -Packard and Motorola.28 Other cities followed 
suit. Alongside the flocking of multinational companies to India, new indigenous 
private firms thrived in the 1980 -90s. These start-ups were allowed to tap financial 
resources on the stock market, rapidly grew within a decade, and now already account 
for the lion's share of software exports.29 
It is very critical that the satellite link helps to bypass other constraints caused 
by the inadequate infrastructure. Given the special nature of the software industry, 
which is not dependent upon the supply of components for processing, plus the 
entrepreneurs' eased access to imported hardware under the liberalised trade policy, the 
R Vikas Deshmukh, `Bangalore: India's Hi -tech Birthplace," Economic Reform Today, 3 (1993) 
(www. cip e. org /ert/e 09 /india- 3.html). 
29 S. C. Bhatnagar and Shirin Madon, op. cit., 283 and Anthony P. D'Costa, "Capitalist Maturity and 
Corporate Response to Economic Liberalization in India: the Steel, Auto, and Software Sectors," 
Contemporary South Asia 9, 2 (July, 2000): 154 -7. 
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IT sector is largely insulated from surrounding deterrent factors. Further insulation is 
realised by the establishment of technopolises. Under the auspices of the Software 
Technology Park Scheme of 1990, many technology parks have been built up on the 
outskirts of cities that help to insulate the IT sector from the cluster of congested old 
urban areas. These parks are self -contained hi -tech communities, which have their own 
power, sewage, satellite communication systems and offer health care, schools, housing 




boost this newborn sector. 
cies, including tax exemptions and tax holidays, and cheap land 
arrangement is widely adopted in developing countries to 
The implication of this arrangement not only provides such 
an innovative milieu as in Silicon Valley, but also a high -tech haven to harbour the new 
economic powerhouse sector from red tape and corrupt institutions. This may be the 
best approach for the "intermediate" state to catapult itself to the forefront of the global 
economy because it is time -consuming for a weak state to wait for the turn around of 
the entire institution. 
To be sure, the "greenhouse" cannot be completely isolated from the outside 
world. The Indian IT sector has been plagued by an inadequate infrastructure. Constant 
power outages prevent effective communications and computer work. And it still takes 
much time to travel between software parks and downtown Bangalore due to the poor 
transportation infrastructure. The public IT agencies still enjoy preferential access to 
government projects that stifles competition and the formation of a more vigorous 
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domestic market.30 The new sector is not completely immune to the ailing old sector, 
and it is apparent that the new sector is facing bottlenecks in its development caused by 
the inefficiency of the old sector. But this very fact provides incentives for the 
government to reform the old sector and other related institutions. Alongside the 
liberalisation from 1991 onward, the government has unleashed an entrepreneurial spirit 
by pruning its socialist roots and resorting to privatisation. More importantly, many 
cities, including Hyderabad, Chennal and Pune, are trying to catch up with Bangalore in 
the IT industry. The overcrowded environment and rising business costs in Bangalore 
have apparently channelled some capital into those cities. The inter -city competition 
also creates incentives for local governments to hasten reforms in order to gain a 
cutting -edge position over rivals. 
What lesson do the three countries give us in terms of the state -business 
relationship in IT industrial development? The three cases share the common experience 
that a vigorous private business environment is indispensable for the growth of the IT 
industry. And only the private sector has the underlying substance to gear up for the 
development drive, even though this varies from one country to another. As Porter 
remarks, the private firm and not the government creates and sustains an industrial 
competitive advantage.31 But one still needs to ignite these private resources and to add 
the catalyst to drive them forward. The state can play this role. Although the role of the 
state in the US looks insignificant, there was no doubt that the American government 
already had laid a good foundation of economic institutions and entrepreneurship was 
3° S. C. Bhatnagar and Shirin Madon, op. cit., 287. 
31 Michael Porter, op. cit., 619. 
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thriving far ahead of the emergence of the industry. Moreover, the government's 
military spending in the early years gave the first momentum to the business. 
For the Iatecomers, the state's role is more significant. The latecomer countries 
tend to be weak in their economic foundations. In order to catch up with the advanced 
countries quickly, the state needs to do more than just play the role of a "custodian." 
Japan lay within this historical context. But Japan is a "strong state" model; another 
latecomer, India, is weaker than Japan, as an intermediate state. The intermediate state 
fails to penetrate effectively into every aspect of society. It can only make an effort to 
develop a partial reform in the field with less social and political resistance first and 
selectively empower a specific group within the economy. Taking advantage of the 
success of the partial reform, the state then spread the momentum into other sectors of 
the economy. China is sharing in the same strategy. 
The case of India is comparable to China in many aspects. Both countries have a 
background of a state -centred approach in development. Both have a huge population 
and share the same problems of poverty and of disparities in wealth distribution. 
Despite the time lag in adopting whole -hearted reforms, India launched its reform in 
technology industry at about the same time as China. The strength of both countries also 
lies in software technology. Nevertheless, China's performance in the IT industry falls 
behind India's. In the course of a few years, the industry in India has produced a 
number of internationally competitive private IT firms. But there is almost none in 
China today. What is the reason? 
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China's Approach 
To be sure, the contexts of the reforms in China and India are not the same. India is not 
a socialist country per se, albeit it adopted certain semi -socialist policies. The Indian 
economic reforms from the mid- 1980s onwards are only strategic adjustments 
accomplished by modulating policy leverage. But China has carried out an underlying 
structural transformation of the state and economy. And it should be noted that the 
Chinese state at the beginning of the reforms directly controlled most of the resources of 
the country. When the state adopted a gradual approach to the reforms, it took 
considerable time for the private sector to emerge and to accumulate its own capital and 
to simultaneously struggle with the legacy of the socialist system. 
By contrast, India did not start from scratch. There was an established private 
business class before the liberalisation policy. Wipro, for instance, did not grow from an 
IT start-up but was an old enterprise producing cooking oils that had already moved to 
explore the IT business area in the early 1980s. In addition, since the end of the 1960s, 
the Indian government has formulated specific industrial policies for the electronics 
industry in which it maintains a strategy of compensating through software exports for 
the cost of the import of hardware and electronics items.32 Hence, India is an old hand 
in the software industry. More importantly, there had already been a large pool of 
turnkey US- trained IT talents available to India while the state was gearing up the IT 
engine. These returnees not only financed the Indian IT sector but also transplanted 
management techniques from the United States that markedly differed from the 
32 Richard Heeks, India's Software Industry: State Policy. Liberalisation and Industrial Development 
(New Delhi: Sage Publications, 1996), 53. 
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traditional indigenous business sector.33 In the meantime, Chinese mainlanders first 
began to obtain a chance to go abroad to learn advanced Western technologies. 
Entrepreneurship, having been extinguished for three decades, budded at about that 
time. Most of the current leading IT firms were commercial businesses that provided 
non -demanding technical services in the 1980s. Under these circumstances, the social 
base for developing IT industry in China was relatively weaker than that in India in the 
1980s. 
The Chinese approach to high -tech industrial development, including the IT 
industry, differed from the three countries' exemplified above in the sense that the latter 
to a larger extent relied upon an existing private sector, while a well -defined private 
sector in China was absent in the 1980s. On the other hand, China's approach to a 
certain extent resembles the US approach in the sense that both rely upon the synergy 
between industry and universities and research institutes to bolster the industrialisation 
of high -tech research output. In this regard, in China the universities and research 
institutes (U &RIs) play a bigger role in nurturing entrepreneurship, and many currently 
well -known IT companies have spun off from U &RIs. 
The spin -offs can be reduced to two types of enterprises. The first are subsidiary 
economic entities of U &RIs. The typical examples include Legend, a spin -off from 
CAS, and Founder, a spin -off from Peking University. Another type of spin -offs is 
separately organised by scientific and technical personnel from the U &RIs. A typical 
case is Stone. The origin of the spin -offs can be traced back to as early as 1980, when 
such an entity was firstly founded in Beijing by a research fellow at the Institute of 
V.N. Balasubramanyam and Ahalya Balasubramanyam, "International Trade in Services: The Case of 
India's Computer Software," The World Economy 20, 6 (September, 1997): 836. 
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Physics of CAS, Chen Chunxian, after his tour of Silicon Valley. In 1984, the number 
of these entities reached about 40 in Zhongguancun.34 But their legitimacy had not been 
officially endorsed until 1985 where the government launched the reform of the 
management system of science and technology. 
The 1985 reform intended to re- orient the development of science and 
technology (S &T) towards economic construction. Under this new direction, the U &RIs 
were pushed to shift to commercialise and industrialise their research and to engage 
more in entrepreneurial activities. To be sure, the government at the outset was more 
oriented towards merging U &RIs into existing enterprises. However, this attempt 
yielded no satisfactory results because of a lack of incentives or an ability by the 
enterprises to absorb the U &RIs.35 By contrast, the performance of spin -offs was more 
remarkable and drew the attention of state leaders in the second half of the 1980s, 
especially the fruitful development of spin -offs congregated around Zhongguancun, 
which induced the government to explore the advantages of this spontaneous 
development. 
The Torch Programme and New & High Technology Development Zones 
China's catch -up plan in S &T was launched in 1986 by the so- called "March 
1986 Programme. "36 The aim of it was to rapidly narrow the gap between China and the 
advanced countries in S &T by strategically sponsoring the research of selected fields of 
34 Ricky Tung, "The Chungkuantsun New Technology Development Zone: Mainland China's Silicon 
Valley," Issues and Studies 24, 2 (December, 1988): 50. 
35 Shulin Gu, China's Industrial Technology: Market Reform and Organizational Change (London: 
Routledge, 1999), 29 -32. 
3' This high -tech development programme was named "March 1986," because the proposal was 
submitted and endorsed by Deng Xiaoping in March 1986. 
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S &T and to pave the way for the formation of China's high -tech industry. But the 
March Programme is only concerned with the mid- and long -term goal of S &T 
development, and it is not concerned with the industrialisation of research output. In 
order to spur the formation of high -tech industry, the government launched the "Torch 
Programme" in August 1988. Given the experience of Zhongguancun and Silicon 
Valley, the government picked the development path of sponsoring the establishment of 
separate New & High Technology Development Zones (NHTDZs), in urban 
knowledge- intensive areas like Zhongguancun to tap local resources to develop and 
disseminate high -tech applications. 
By the same token, the Torch Programme does not directly fund the 
development of high -tech industry and only provides indirect guidance plans to 
enterprises. It is different from the March Programme in which enterprises and research 
institutes are directly funded by state appropriations as a mandatory plan. The initiative 
of enterprises plays a more important role under the Torch Programme. The enterprises 
in the NHTDZs can secure some competitive small funds or have access to low- interest 
loans by applying for being project takers of the Torch Programme. The orientation of 
the Torch Programme denotes a retreat of the state from the direct management of high - 
tech industrial development. First, the input of state resources into R &D has diminished 
since the reform era. This is in line with the thrust of S &T policy, which intends to 
marketise the institution of S &T. Enterprises are encouraged to explore alternative 
channels to finance themselves. The state just requires banks to set up a loan quota 
earmarked for high -tech industries. 
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Second, the state would rather draw on preferential policies than input its own 
resources to foster the high -tech sector. In the Nl-ITDZ_s, enterprises can enjoy various 
tax holidays, tax reductions and tax exemptions, and have less restricted access to 
imports. But the special treatment is less favourable than that applied to Special 
Economic Zones (SEZs) and Economic and Technological Development Zones 
(ETDZs). The central government also provides less capital investment to the 
NHTDZs.37 
Unlike the SEZs and ETDZs, indigenous private enterprises was allowed to 
enter the NHTDZs from the outset. That was congruent with the simultaneous 
legalisation of private enterprises in 1988. However, there were few enterprises 
registered as "private" in the development zones at the beginning While the spin -offs 
formed as subsidiaries of U &RIs were registered as state -owned enterprises, the 
individually founded spin -offs tended to register themselves as collective enterprises 
and attached themselves to a supervising unit (guakao danwei). To be sure, private 
enterprises were not treated on a par with the other types of ownership in policy 
implementation. For instance, the Ufsoft Group was a registered private enterprise in 
Beijing's NHTDZs from its inception, but it could not enjoy any preferential treatment 
in its early years because of its private ownership.38 
No matter what type of ownership was registered, these spin -offs were 
encapsulated as nsinban (i.e. people- managed) technology -based enterprises in the 
1980s and are now known as minying technology -based enterprises (The meanings of 
37 Shuguang Wang, Yulin Wu & Yujiang Li, "Development of Technopoles in China," Asia Pacific 
Viewpoint 39, 3 (December, 1998): 286 -7. 
38 Zhonghua gongshang shihao [China Business Times], 15 April 1992: 8. 
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minban and minying are more or less the same in Chinese). As noted in the previous 
chapters, they are distinct from the traditional SOEs in the sense that they receive no 
funds from the state budget and have independent management. These non -state 
enterprises are sometimes confused with other generic private enterprises by foreign 
observers,39 but their property rights have been ill- defined. 
The indeterminate property rights obviously became a hindrance in the later 
stages of enterprise development. As an entrepreneur of a collective enterprise in 
Zhongguancun complained to me, "the enterprises in Zhongguancun tend to have a 
short life span, because the problems caused by being `collective' have never been well 
settled. So- called collective enterprises that have made money don't want to further 
develop, as the expanded collectives do not belong to the real owners. "40 Of course, the 
same problem was pertinent to the state -owned minying enterprises. To alleviate the 
problem, the implementation of shareholding transformation had already started from 
1992 onward. But the progress of privatisation moved slowly. In 1995, among all 
domestic high -tech enterprises in the NHTDZs, only 6% were registered as private and 
17% as shareholding enterprises.41 In 1998, the ratio rose to 17% and 36 %.42 
Despite the persistence of property rights problems, it was also evident that these 
non -state enterprises contributed markedly to the technical renovation of the industry 
and yielded a better performance in market competition. Whereas the state allocated 
scarce funds to the large and medium -sized state enterprises to renovate their 
79 For example, Ricky Tung put all these spin -offs into the category of private enterprises. See Ricky 
Tung, op. cit. 
40 Interviewee 19. 
41 Shuguang Wang, Yulin Wu & Yujíang Li, op. cit., 290. 
42 Zhonghua gongshang shibao [China Business Times], 12 August, 1999: 1. 
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technology, the performance of non -state enterprises outdid the state enterprises in 
technological advancement.43 In other words, the state wasted a good deal of financial 
resources that could have been better allocated to the more efficient non -state sector. 
Due to the absence of intervention from senior authorities, the non -state enterprises are 
better able to make decisions and react to market signals quickly. 
It does not follow, though, that the state contributes nothing to the growth of 
high -tech industry. Besides the preferential policies mentioned above, the establishment 
of the NHTDZs created a "greenhouse" for nurturing high -tech industry. In the first 
place, the NHTDZs set up Service Centres for Scientific and Technical Entrepreneurs as 
"incubators" to provide venues, facilities, related services, training and consulting 
guidance for technological innovation activities to protect the high -tech start-ups, 
especially those initiated by individuals. By 1998, the incubators had reportedly 
cultivated 3,700 new -type small enterprises, of which 1,200 were high -tech 
enterpri ses.44 
There are now 53 national level NHTDZs established across the country, in 
every province except Ningxia, Qinghai and Tibet. Each NHTDZ is managed by an 
elaborate Administrative Commission. It is like a mini -government equipped with 
almost a complete government apparatus. Its power ranges from admitting enterprises 
into the zone to planning and financing construction of infrastructure, leasing land, 
collecting taxes, and dealing with foreign trade and cooperation for its constituent 
enterprises, To a certain extent, it provides an insulated environment from the 
43 Xiaojuan Jiang, "Chinese Government Policy towards Science and Technology and its Influence on the 
Technical Development of Industrial Enterprises," in Charles Feinstein & Christopher Howe (eds.), 
Chinese Technology in 1990s (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, 1997), 145 -8. 
44 Beijing Review 42, 40 (4 October 1999): 14. 
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inefficient and corrupt old bureaucratic system, much like the Technology Park in India. 
In the special context of China, the Administrative Commission undertakes one more 
meaningful function. It can play the part of a danwei to provide private firms with a 
one -stop service, while private firms outside the NHTDZs need to deal with a variety of 
government departments for just one matter and sometimes find no channel to settle 
some issues because of the absence of a leading danwei. 
Different from most technology parks across the world, the NHTDZs - the 
Chinese technopolises - are not necessarily located in newly -developed suburban 
districts. Some of them lie in the built -up part of cities where U &RIs cluster. The zone 
in Zhongguancun is interspersed with other enterprises in a non -NHTDZ urban setting. 
Hence, the R &D milieu in Zhongguancun is not very favourable compared with the 
newly -developed zones where the planning and infrastructure are better. For example, 
the Shangdí Information Industry Base, situated to the north of Zhongguancun, is a 
newly -developed zone where high -tech enterprises are provided with more space to 
expand. 
In line with the March Programme, the Torch Programme only selects certain 
kinds of technology as focal points for development, covering 11 fields, including 
microelectronics and electronic information technology. From the mid -1990s onwards, 
it further zeroed in on the software industry and separately set up Software Technology 
Parks to bolster the industrialisation of software technology. Those enterprises engaged 
in software technology can enjoy extra preferential treatment from the state. Recently, 
the state further promulgated a new tax policy for the software sector. Firms which sell 
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self -developed computer software are qualified for a rebate of a value -added tax (VAT) 
so that the real burden can he reduced from the ordinary rate of 17% down to 3 %.45 
To he sure, the state does not put a premium on all types of software. Only those 
related to the enhancement of productivity and those types of software that are 
considered critical to the economy are covered. For example, software technologies 
ranging from finance to management, education and CAD /CAM are put at a premium, 
while software games are not covered. Likewise, not all enterprises that are engaged in 
developing "critical" types of software can win favour with the state. The state adopts a 
"pick- the -winner" approach to selectively cultivate certain enterprises with better 
performance as the base for global competition. The "pick- the -winner" approach 
apparently reinforces the effects of business competition. Other conditions being equal, 
the winners can gain greater resources so that the losers and the latecomers are put at a 
disadvantage. But it should be noted that the non -state /private sector has not lost its 
leading position to the state sector, even though they did not won the state's favour at 
the very beginning. Ever more private "winners" have been picked by the state from the 
1990s onward. Ufsoft, CSC and Suntek are now "backbone" enterprises under the 
Torch Programme. They can secure resources more easily than other firms. For 
instance, Ufsoft and CSC gained the state's help in land appropriations to build up their 
headquarters at the Shangdi Information Industry Base (See Plates 7.1 & 7.2). 
To be sure, the IT sector remains a fledgling industry. Even though there are 
some relatively Iarge companies, their strength lags far behind their multinational 
counterparts. These large companies still operate in an unstable and less 
65 See Article 5 of "Detailed Rules on Development Policies of Encouraging Software and Integrated 
Circuit Industry" issued in October 2000. 
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institutionalised market, Nevertheless, due to the retreat of the state, the resources that 
can be offered by the state have become less critical; otherwise, they should have been 
squeezed out by the privileged state sector. 
Both the Indian and Chinese states play the role of "midwifery" in fostering the 
growth of the IT industry. However, the Chinese "socialist" state works at a 
disadvantage by virtue of its own residual ideological constraints and outmoded 
economic institutions. It has to expand a much greater effort to demolish the old 
institutions and to re -build new ones. Both states do not directly input many resources 
into the IT sector, but the Indian state was better able to channel external resources into 
the sector. Apparently, a good financial service is one of the most critical factors to 
boost the sector. While the Indian IT start-ups could raise funds from the public at an 
earlier time, the Chinese counterparts still cannot find a means to enter the domestic 
securities market. To enter a foreign stock market requires that a firm either contravene 
or detour numerous bureaucratic hurdles. The second -board market is still on the way to 
being established. The lack of channels to go public also discourages the inflow of 
foreign venture capital, because the stock market is the most desirable outlet for venture 
capitalists to withdraw their capital from mature start-ups. 
In addition, while the Indian software industry can rely upon exports to spur its 
growth, the Chinese IT industry needs to lean on the domestic market as the pillar of 
growth, even though the government is spurring an export drive now.46 Hence, the 
Chinese government has to make a double effort to nurture the domestic market. 
46 During the financial year 1998 -99 (March -February) software exports from India were worth 2.69 
billion US dollars, compared with 130 million US dollars for China in 1999. See the figures from 
www.webindia .com/india /computers.htm and New China News Agency (I5 October 2000) 
(www.china.org.crifenglish/2790.htm) 
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However, this is not easy, especially since the rampant piracy problem in China not 
only hurts imported software products but also now hinders the growth of the domestic 
software industry.47 Accordingly, the sales of the software sector are now only 
equivalent to one -fifth that of the hardware sector.48 
The Interaction of Enterprises with the State 
The above section has examined the macro policy context of the IT as well as the 
overall high -tech industry in China. But what is the reality of implementation? This 
section will explore the experience of the enterprises in my case studies and the multi- 
dimensional interactions between the state and these private enterprises. These 
interactions are grouped into three broad dimensions: preferential treatment, tax and fee 
management, and state -enterprise coordination. The distinctions between my Beijing 
and Guangzhou cases will be drawn in this analysis. 
Preferential Treatment 
Less than half of the surveyed enterprises were registered in the NHTDZs: 14 
from Beijing and 4 from Guangzhou. In addition, two cases in Guangzhou were located 
at the Entrepreneur Park, an incubator in the Guangzhou Economic and Technology 
Development Zone (GETDZ), one of the ETDZs. The establishment of the Park is 
aimed to tempt overseas Chinese to start high -tech businesses in Guangzhou. And all 
start-ups can use the offices there free of charge for two years. Owing to it being a 
4' According to a survey done by the Ministry of Information Technology, 26% of respondents of 
software companies listed piracy as the top threat to their survival. See South China Morning Post, 31 
August 2000 (Internet edition: www.scmp.com). 
48 Business Weekly, 16 January 2001 (Internet edition: www.chinadaily.com.cn). 
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newly -established incubator, the entrepreneurs in the two cases observed that the 
GETDZ had thus far granted no further concrete support measures to them. 
It should be noted that more of the firms in Beijing lay within a NHTDZ. This 
was because of the contextual difference between Beijing's and Guangzhou's NHTDZ. 
Beijing's Experimental Zone for New Technology Industry (hereafter, Experimental 
Zone) was the first NHTDZ established, in May 1988, right before the promulgation of 
the Torch Programme. At the beginning, the Experimental Zone was limited to a small 
area around Zhongguancun (the Shangdi Information Industry Base not yet established), 
a built -up area where many of the electronics -related enterprises had already 
congregated before the establishment of the Experimental Zone. As a result, the 
administrative control was difficult. As the earliest NHTDZ as well as a pilot 
implementation, the benchmark for admitting an enterprise was neither very high nor 
standardised. Among the enterprises registered in the Experimental Zone, some of them 
had just embarked upon business and were merely in IT sales, not technological 
research. 
It should be clarified that to be a member of the NHTDZ is not equivalent to 
being a "high- tech" enterprise. There is a separate procedure to licence an officially 
recognised high -tech enterprise. And the licensed high -tech enterprises can enjoy extra 
preferential treatment and gain more state support. For example, they can apply to 
undertake projects for the Torch Programme. Besides the three largest private 
enterprises among my cases, a couple of the medium -sized enterprises in my sample 
were project takers of the Torch Programme. 
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By contrast, Guangzhou's NHTDZ, Tianhe Scientech Park (TSP), established in 
1991, is located in a new development district, Tianhe. It is a distinct area, separate 
from other urban settings. Enterprises of the TSP operate in an enclave completely 
under the jurisdiction of its Administrative Committee. But the Experimental Zone in 
Beijing overlaps Haidian District. The offices of technology -based enterprises share the 
same overcrowded area with other types of enterprises. The technological level of the 
enterprises among the cases in the TSP was higher than that in the Experimental Zone 
on average. This does not imply that the technological level of high -tech firms in 
Guangzhou is higher, but only that the admission criteria of the TSP are more stringent 
and elite- oriented. 
By the same token, the enterprises /TSP tie is closer than in the Experimental 
Zone. An entrepreneur who belonged to the first flock of members in the Zone 
complained that the bureaucratic structure of the Experimental Zone became 
increasingly bloated and the bureaucracy itself was too much intertwined with its own 
economic interests.49 In addition, while some of the interviewed entrepreneurs in the 
Zone were able to have access to the government's extra services,50 others found 
themselves disregarded by the Administrative Committee. But the latter were conscious 
that there were too many enterprises in the Zone, and the Administrative Committee 
was unable to take care of all of them. They anticipated that once they grew up, they 
might draw the government's attention. Indeed, there are over 4,500 enterprises 
registered in the Experimental Zone, while no more than 1,000 are in the TSP. The TSP 
49 Interviewee 19. 
50 The extra service included information supply, coordinating companies and assisting corporate 
financing. 
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apparently bears a lighter burden than the Experimental Zone and thus has a more 
favourable business -environment framework, leaving aside the extraordinary human 
resources in Haidian. 
In principle, enterprises in various NHTDZs should enjoy more or less the same 
preferential policies. This is a central policy aimed at avoiding a vicious competition 
among the NHTDZs.tt In practice, there are variations between the NHTDZs in Beijing 
and Guangzhou. As the earliest NHTDZ, the Experimental Zone has been implementing 
the preferential policies promulgated by the municipal government with the State 
Council's approval since May 1988, even after nation -wide policies were issued in 
1991. The oft -quoted policy granted in the Experimental Zone is a three -year income - 
tax holiday for newly -established firms and a tax reduction by half for another three 
years.52 This treatment is absent in the nation -wide applied policies, including those in 
the TSP. But some of the surveyed entrepreneurs considered the first three -year tax 
holiday provided no benefit to them, because they yielded no profits in the first few 
years. So, regardless, they did not need to pay income tax at all, no matter whether there 
was a tax holiday. However, some of the entrepreneurs that were concurrently engaged 
in a trading business still appreciated the tax holiday. It should be clarified that even 
though one is not a licensed high -tech enterprise, a firm can also enjoy the tax holiday 
and reduction as long as it is registered in the Experimental Zone. 
In the nation -wide policies, a two -year exemption of income tax takes effect 
once the high -tech firms have made a profit. This makes more sense for most high -tech 
51 Shuguang Wang, Yulin Wu & Yujiang Li, op. cit., 289. 
52 See Beijingshi xinjishu chanye kaifa shiyanqu zhengce wenjian huibian [Collection of Policy 
Documents concerning the Beijing's New Technology Development Zone] (January, 1999): 3. 
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start-ups. Besides the tax holiday, the high -tech firms can enjoy a variety of preferential 
treatments. They pay a lower rate of income tax of 15 %, compared with 33% for 
ordinary firms. They are exempted from a construction tax when they build a new plant 
or offices. They are also exempted from tariffs when they export their products. In 
addition, local governments formulate extra preferential policies in order to compete 
with other places. In Guangzhou, the TSP offers a tax rebate by returning 25% of the 
local share of VAT back to the high -tech firms. To clarify, this practice is in breach of 
the central policy. In January 2000, the State Council issued a notification to local 
governments to stop this practice.53 
hi parallel with other aspects of its reforms, Guangzhou also took new steps 
ahead of other places, while Beijing tends to comply with the central policy. For 
instance, in the high -tech industry, intellectual property is considered invisible capital 
for an enterprise. The Chinese government also allows scientists and technicians to 
quantify and convert their research products into the registered capital of enterprises, 
but the maximum ratio of this type of invisible capital could only constitute up to 20% 
of total registered capital of an enterprise according to the 1993 Company Law. In 
March 1999, the central government relaxed the restriction by pulling the ceiling up to 
35 %. In the wake of this, the Beijing authorities followed suit to promulgate parallel 
local regulations to boost the high -tech industry. However, the Guangdong government 
had pulled the ceiling up to 30% as early as 1994.54 In order to absorb more Chinese 
53 See "State Council's Notification concerning Correcting Arbitrarily Formulating Return- after -Tax 
Policy in Localities" (State Council's Document [2000] No. 2) (11 January 2000). 
54 See Article 7 of "Regulations on Guangdong Minying Science and Technology Enterprises" (approved 
by the Standing Committee of Guangdong People's Congress on IS January 1994), quoted from the 
appendix of Huang Renxing et al. (eds.), Guangdong feigong jingji yanjiu baogao [Research Report on 
Non -public Economy in Guangdong] (Guangzhou: jinn daxue chubanshe, 1999), 244. 
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who have gone overseas to open start-ups in Guangzhou, the municipal government has 
further opened up the ceiling for these returnee - founded start-ups, limiting no maximum 
ratio for the convertibility of research products into registered capital.ss 
In my field studies, most of the cases, especially in Guangzhou, were small 
firms that were not registered in these greenhouse -like development zones. Hence, in 
general they could not enjoy any preferential treatment. In view of the policy's lean 
towards the IT industry, some of these small entrepreneurs were toying with moving 
into the NHTDZ. However, some surmised that their enterprises probably would fail to 
fulfil the conditions for entry. It should be noted that the entrepreneurs had not obtained 
sufficient information about the government's preferential policies and so did not know 
how to obtain the benefits of preferential programmes.56 More importantly, with regard 
to the advice given by informants, a couple of entrepreneurs were convinced that it was 
difficult to obtain the benefits without resorting to g-uanxi practice, and they figured out 
that the cost of obtaining this benefit might be higher than the benefit itself. Hence, they 
would rather put more effort into improving their own management and enhance 
productivity than waste time and money in cultivating guanxi. 
Their accusation was not well substantiated. Those entrepreneurs who operated 
high -tech businesses in the NHTDZ reflected that they did not appeal to any 
particularism. The types of their technologies were supported by the state high -tech 
policy. No matter what really happened behind the scene, it is interesting to note that 
when entrepreneurs appealed to the market for business information, personal 
ss Yangcheng wanbao [Yangcheng Evening News], 30 October 1999 (Internet edition: 
www.ycwb.comcn). 
561 share this comment with Xiaojuan Jiang, op. cit., 146. 
243 
connections remained their source for government information. They did not know or 
care how the formal documents were written, they just believed what their confidants 
told them. But were they reliable sources? 
Among the firms not in the NI-ITDZ and ETDZ, only one had access to 
preferential treatment. It was a small firm in Guangzhou. The Guangzhou government is 
now encouraging the development of software industry and has provided preferential 
treatment to software companies provided that they are deemed technology -based 
companies, even if they do not register themselves in the NHTDZ and ETDZ. A 
software company in Guangzhou claimed that it now enjoyed exemption from the 
revenue tax. I asked the entrepreneur how he obtained the exemption. He told me that 
the TV news reported the Guangzhou municipal government now put a premium on the 
software industry. If a company fulfilled certain specific conditions, the company could 
actively contact the Commission of Science and Technology. Hence, he actively 
contacted the Commission. Since then, he was invited to participate in some meetings 
concerning the industry, and the Commission actively advised him to apply for 
exemption from the revenue tax.57 
Why did only one of my surveyed firms obtain this special treatment in 
Guangzhou, when other cases should have been eligible for it? When I told this 
information to another entrepreneur, his response was, "if so, the government should do 
a promotion, and let me send out thousands of e -mails to inform other people." I asked 
him why many entrepreneurs seemed to know so little about government policies or did 
not believe those policies. He replied, "the husinesspeople are too busy to care about it; 
57 interviewee 38. 
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you know, our state's policies always change. "58 His comment was pertinent. Most of 
other entrepreneurs shrugged off the government's preferential policy when they made 
decisions. On the other hand, the transparency of the government policy and policy 
implementation was not high enough to keep enterprises well informed. 
To be sure, the large enterprises tended to be better informed than the small 
ones. In Beijing, for instance, many software developers need to pay VAT. The rate was 
stipulated as 17 %, which was quite high for the software industry. Unlike other 
industries that can compute the taxable income after deducting the cost of materials, 
software production has no significant cost for production materials. The most 
expensive cost is the salary of programmers. But the tax agent only counts the salary 
cost as about 800 yuan per employee, while their salaries are over 3000 yuan. 
Furthermore, the fixed capital investment for hardware was not counted as a cost for 
deduction. In order to alleviate the burden borne by the industry, some Beijing 
newspapers revealed in May 1999 that the Beijing municipal government would cut the 
rate from 17% to 6% specifically for the software sector. Meanwhile, I was interviewing 
two entrepreneurs of medium -sized software companies. I asked them to comment on 
the news. They responded with reservation, stressing that it was impossible in practice. 
However, when I talked with interviewees of Ufsoft and CSC, they had already been 
acquainted with this issue and were certain that it was true. Indeed, the Beijing 
government formally later promulgated the policy. 
The above episodes reflect the fact that there was serious "information 
asymmetry" among the enterprises. The larger enterprises apparently have a greater 
advantage to directly gain information. At the same time I refute the sociologist notion 
58 Interviewee 42. 
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that personal ties could help to save the cost of information collection and are efficient. 
The above episodes show us that it is not necessarily true. The publicly accessible 
information is not necessarily unreliable, whereas the indirect information from 
personal ties is not necessarily more reliable. If one depends upon it too much, one may 
miss more opportunities. The personal ties have not necessarily saved the cost but 
possibly exacerbated the information asymmetry for those who rely upon the ties. 
Tax and Fee Management 
Most of the preferential policies are concerned with taxes. The tax affairs are the 
major interface of the state and private business. The specific tax policy is adopted as 
leverage by the state to sway the behaviour of the entrepreneurs. But the effect varies 
from one to another industry and varies from small to large enterprises. It is determined 
not only by the policy itself but also by how it is implemented. 
In general, large private enterprises bear less of a tax burden (including fees 
levied by various state agencies) than small private enterprises in terms of the 
percentage of their sales.59 In the first place, this is caused by the fact that the large 
firms tend to enjoy more preferential tax policies. To the contrary, the small firms not 
only pay the ordinary tax rate or even excessive taxes but also bear more extra arbitrary 
fees levied by various state agencies. Tf a firm is registered as either a wholly 
individually -owned enterprise or a partnership enterprise, the owner of the firm is taxed 
twice - a personal income tax and corporate income tax. The large firms are usually 
$9 According to the survey done by the Asia Pacific School, of Economics and Management at the 
Australian National University with the assistance of the China Centre for Economic Research, Peking 
University in 1999. See A Technical Report: China Private Enterprise Study (January, 2000), Chapter 
6: 6. 
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limited companies that do not need to pay duplicate taxes. The large firms also tend to 
be better able to avoid state predation. On the one hand, they usually have a better 
relationship with senior authorities of the state. On the other, the tax office and other 
state agencies prefer to target small firms. Why? 
Small firms, including getihu, usually do not have a well -established accounting 
system. Even when they do, the state supposes it to be unreliable. Hence, the tax agent 
usually levies a fixed tax on the small business firms. The amount is calculated by tax 
officials based on their estimated sales. In other words, no matter how much one really 
earns in each month, one pays the same amount. This practice aims to maintain stable 
revenue for the state, but it gives leeway and a pretext for the tax collector to "harass" 
the small businesspeople if necessary. Whenever the tax agents find it possible that the 
planned tax quota cannot be met or they are pushed to fulfil an extra quota, they start to 
squeeze money from the small business first in the name of a "tax examination." 
Without being required to keep a proper accounting system, the small business firms 
indeed tend to under -report their sales or keep no accurate bookkeeping records. The tax 
officials would not find it difficult to dig out any fault of the businesspeople and 
consider it tax evasion, for which cause the tax officials can levy a heavy fine. The 
small firms are the primary targets of the attack also because they are large in number 
and accessibility to them is better. The retail and food shops are the major victims of 
this state predation. As they are geographically open and more congregated, not only the 
tax bureau but also other state agencies prefer to extract money from these sectors.6° 
6o This comment was provided by an IT entrepreneur who also invested in restaurants - Interviewee 52. 
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It should be noted that while the planning system in most respects has been 
abolished or diluted in China, the clout of it in taxation has never diminished. The state 
tax agents still need to accomplish assigned tax quotas. Hence, many enterprises are not 
taxed in accordance with how much they earn. To he sure, the tax agents cannot abuse 
their power utterly without regard to laws. Limited companies with a better accounting 
system tend to avoid the "harassment" and pay taxes according to the laws. This does 
not mean that the accounts of large firms are accurate and reliable, but the opportunity 
cost for digging out the faults of these companies is higher. They therefore are not the 
first targets of attack. 
The phenomenon of excessive and illegal levies was not intensively reported 
among my interviewees, even though most of them run small firms. But it should be 
qualified that some entrepreneurs disregarded this issue because they left all matters 
concerning tax and fee collections to the accounting staff to settle and took various 
levies as an ordinary cost of business operation. But at least it reflected that it was not 
serious inasmuch as it drew their attention. The status of most of them as "companies" 
would be one reason they avoided excessive levies. Moreover, the companies in the 
NHTDZs and ETDZ were protected from state predation. All told, thus, these well - 
educated entrepreneurs were not the top priority for the tax officials to bully. However, 
confrontation remained inevitable during particular incidents. In 1998, the Asian 
financial crisis erupted. During the crisis, the government imposed more pressure upon 
the local state agencies to keep up their locality's economic performance. The premier, 
Zhu Rongji, called upon localities to try their best to achieve at least an 8% growth rate 
that year. The state tax machinery was also assigned equally heavy missions. In 
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Haidian, the Bureau of Industry and Commerce Management (BICM) was assigned to 
complete an extra -tax quota for 10 million yuan. As a result, the Bureau managed to 
accomplish the mission by selectively charging 1,000 enterprises I0,000 yuan per 
each.61 An entrepreneur who was running a promising IT company in Haidian revealed 
to me that during the crisis, the tax bureau dispatched an inspection team to examine his 
company's accounts. The team left no stone unturned in search of a "mistake" 
committed by the company, but failed. Yet, the team trumped up a charge that his 
company failed to pay VAT after providing an offshore technical service, fining his 
company hundreds of thousands of yuan. In accordance with the tax regulations, VAT 
should not be applied to this case. The entrepreneur angrily made a complaint to the 
team's higher -up. The official knew the fine was groundless, so he shifted to persuasion 
rather than repression, asking the entrepreneur to pay the fine for the sake of helping the 
local government to ride out the hard times. The official also compromised by cutting 
the fine to tens of thousands of yuan. The entrepreneur accepted the compromise 
because he did not want to take the government to court for this small amount.62 
To be sure, the official attitude towards thriving companies is less repressive. 
First of all, they are a burgeoning source of state revenue. Second, their capacity to 
move to a more favourable locale is higher. However, the state might still ask them for 
an "extra" contribution, but this is attained by pleading rather than ordering.ó3 The 
enterprises with a high profit rate among my cases did not mind paying an "extra" 
fit Interviewee 6. 
62 Interviewee I I. 
63 In a piece of newspaper coverage, a celebrated entrepreneur aired that he was very willing to contribute 
to the state. The chief of tax bureau simply phoned him to plead with him for helping fill up the gap of 
tax quota, he immediately agreed. See Zhonghua gongshang shibao [China Business News], 6 March 
1998: 8. 
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contribution to the state. For one thing, sometimes they regarded it as a donation to the 
state or society and for another, it could help cultivate a good relationship with the state, 
or at least avoid unnecessary troubles. 
Not all of the surveyed firms were making a big profit. Their response to the 
taxation thus varied from one case to another. Grumbling usually came from enterprises 
that were engaged in a trading business. With fierce market competition in recent years, 
the marginal profits for such businesses have spiralled downward. Even though the 
VAT and income tax would decrease in response, the revenue tax, which taxed the sales 
volume, was heavy enough to plague the entrepreneurs. Some entrepreneurs of software 
companies also complained of the heavy burden caused by the VAT. As noted in the 
last section, owing to not counting the fixed capital investment as a cost for deductions, 
the taxable income became too high. The VAT was introduced during the 1994 tax 
reform. The design of the tax was aimed to cool down the overheated economy after 
1992. Hence, it stipulated that the fixed capital investment was not counted as a cost for 
deduction. As an adverse side effect, it also resulted in discouraging the high -tech 
companies from investing in technological advancement. The new tax policy, noted in 
the last section, that was applied to the software industry was intended to mitigate this 
side effect. Still, some entrepreneurs insisted that the key to resolving the issue should 
not centre on the rate of the tax, but on how the cost was calculated. As a new policy, it 
takes times to see the effect of the implementation. As a matter of fact, the local tax 
agent is a determinant of the consequence. 
Interestingly, some software companies among my cases did not pay VAT or 
already paid the tax at the rate of 6% due to their status as "small taxpayers." These 
250 
cases were more prevalent among the firms in Guangzhou. A few cases claimed that 
they just paid a "service tax" in place of VAT (about 5% of sales). Some enterprises 
registered themselves or were categorised as "small taxpayers" in terms of their smaller 
volume of sales, and just paid the VAT at the rate of 6% according to the state 
regulations. However, I found that the sales of these small taxpayers were not really 
smaller than the regular taxpayers I interviewed. On the other hand, as a cost, small 
taxpayers were not eligible to provide VAT receipts. Therefore, they would find it 
difficult to do business with 'larger customers who needed the VAT receipts for their 
VAT deduction. However, a small taxpayer in Guangzhou claimed to me that the tax 
bureau would issue VAT receipts for him and the rate of the tax was only 4% instead of 
6 %. Yet, his status as a small taxpayer imposed a negative effect upon his company's 
image. While he was carrying out a joint project with a big Canadian 
telecommunications company, he sensed that this foreign partner looked down upon his 
company when the former was informed of the latter's identity as a small taxpayer.64 
Furthermore, the telecommunications company that had moved from Changsha 
to Guangzhou, though not categorised as a small taxpayer, claimed that the rate of the 
VAT for it had been cut to 6% for a couple of years. Probably some local authorities 
arbitrarily made concessions to the IT industries and others exercised their discretion to 
categorise some enterprises as small taxpayers so as to boost the IT sector. It is 
noteworthy that several small entrepreneurs pointed out that the current tax regulations 
diverge from the real economic situation. If the tax officials really strictly enforced the 
regulations, all of the small businesses would fold up immediately. Hence, the tax 
officials connive at tax evasion from time to time in order to help out during the 
64 Interviewee 37. 
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economic downturn. However, this also gives the corrupt officials a pretext to take 
bribes. In addition, the tax bureau could easily attain the goal of predation, while the 
economy turns up, by digging out "faults" from old accounts. 
State -Enterprise Coordination and Entrepreneurs' Attitudes towards the State's Role 
Although illegal levies were not prevalent among my cases, most of the 
registered private enterprises among the cases, excluding those registered as collective 
and foreign - funded enterprises, faced a charge paid for membership of the "Private 
Enterprises Association." The Private Enterprises Association (PEA) is an intermediary 
organisation that is supposed to bridge the state with private enterprises, other than the 
Federation of Industry and Commerce (FIC). The PEA is organised and led by the local 
BICM, while the FIC comes under the Party's United Front System and has a national - 
level representative - the All China Federation of Industry and Commerce.65 The 
domains of the two organisations do not overlap each other. In other words, if an 
enterprise is a member of the PEA, it is not of the FIC and vice versa. Usually, big 
businesspeople are co -opted by the FIC, while the businesspeople of small and medium - 
sized firms join the PEA. 
According to the interviews in Beijing and Guangzhou, the performance of the 
PEA was much worse than that of the FIC. Only a few of the entrepreneurs were 
members of the FIC. They assumed positions in the FIC, and the FTC had regular 
meetings whereby the entrepreneurs could transmit their opinions to the government. 
65 For studies of these two organisations, see Jonathan Unger, " `Bridges': Private Business, the Chinese 
Government and the Rise of New Associations," The China Quarterly, 147 (September, 1996): 807 -14; 
Gordon White, Jude Howell & Shang Xìaoyuan, In Search of Civil Society: Market Reform and Social 
Change in Contemporary China (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1996), 184 -207. 
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But this basic function did not exist in the PEA. Most of the private entrepreneurs in 
this study joined the PEA involuntarily. Each year the BICM conducted an examination 
of private enterprises, and at the same time the firms are required to pay the 
membership fee. If the firms do not pay, the BICM holds back their business licences so 
that the firms cannot engage in business. Hence, almost all of the private enterprises 
among my cases could not help but pay the membership fee. The amount of the 
membership fee was not standardised. According to my interviews, it could range from 
hundreds to thousands of yuan. No one knew the criterion. The BICM's officials 
seemed to exercise much discretion on this issue. 
The income from charging the membership fee seems to be only a compensation 
to the Bureau's bureaucrats for the loss of the private enterprise management fee that 
was abolished in 1996. The association seemed to be an inactive organisation. Most of 
the PEA members among my cases complained that they did not know what the 
association existed for other than to force them to pay the annual fee on time and to 
subscribe to the PEA's magazines. The PEA never held meetings or other activities for 
the members and never actively offered assistance to the members. Only one 
entrepreneur in Beijing claimed that he considered the PEA his leading authority that 
could stamp his application to go abroad.66 Another entrepreneur, who had worked in 
the PEA before, defended the PEA as helping to protect private enterprises from 
government infringements, but on the condition that the entrepreneurs had good guanxi 
with the PEA in advance or that they were big businesspeople.67 
66 Interviewee 22. 
fi7 Interviewee 15. 
253 
As the PEA was considered functionless, the entrepreneurs simply regarded the 
membership fee as a surcharge by the government. Interestingly, two entrepreneurs 
were able to withdraw from their memberships. To be sure, the PEA is statutorily an 
association that private entrepreneurs should join of their own accord. It is illegal for the 
BICM to impose compulsory membership upon private entrepreneurs. In practice, if one 
is willing to struggle for justice, one may succeed in quitting the PEA. An interviewee 
in Beijing withdrew from membership by struggling with a BICM official. When the 
official threatened to hold back his business licence, the entrepreneur fought back by 
warning that he would denounce the official to the senior authorities if he really did so 
and argued for his stance was based upon the state's own stipulation that any 
government departments should not levy illegal fees on enterprises. His endeavour was 
successful. He withdrew from membership without being sanctioned. He also criticised 
the tolerance of other entrepreneurs, which emboldened the BICM to intensify its 
mispractice.68 To be sure, some of the entrepreneurs in my sample were not aware that 
membership was not compulsory for private entrepreneurs according to high -level 
regulations. 
Obviously, the PEA failed to play a role as a bridge between the state and 
private enterprises but was only another predatory state machine. Most of the 
entrepreneurs seldom sought alternative channels to contact the state. The majority 
among my cases did not join other intermediary associations. Their full engagement in 
business was the usual excuse for their indifference to these organisations. Some 
explained that they could not actively join these organisations unless they were invited 
fi8Interviewee 18. 
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to join. A dozen small entrepreneurs among my cases joined some intermediary 
associations, including the software trade association, the accounting computerisation 
association or chamber of commerce for the computer industry. Yet, some of them also 
complained that the organisations were functionless and unable to represent their 
interests. Only the big businesspeople had a voice there and monopolised all of the 
benefits, they complained. 
However, a few of the small entrepreneurs were active participants in these 
organisations. They were even initiators of such organisations, though they still needed 
to ask for the corresponding government departments to sponsor and lead the 
establishment nominally. It should be noted that the official participation/intervention in 
these organisations, as a result, earned no confidence from the "apathetic" 
entrepreneurs. Nevertheless, this type of intermediary association has been burgeoning 
since the second half of the 1990s. What actual functions they are playing requires 
further research, but apparently they are primarily capable of helping to coordinate 
certain companies within the same industry. To a lesser extent, their opinions can be 
transmitted to the government. At bottom, according to the findings from my fieldwork, 
the IT enterprises have not organised themselves well to fight for their own interests. 
The problem of pirated software was a typical example. At the Shenzhen Hi -tech 
Fair held in October 2000, several software companies initiated an anti -piracy campaign 
and made a public appeal to their counterparts to join a meeting against piracy. 
However, to the initiators' disappointment, only five of the expected 50 guests showed 
up for the meeting.69 Beijing and Guangzhou are two major consumer centres of IT 
e9 Zhongguo jingji shibao [China Economic Times], 12 October 2000 (Internet edition: www.cet.com.cn). 
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goods. So both are paradises for pirated software. When I was conducting my fieldwork 
in these two metropolises, the sale of pirated software was quite visible, albeit it had 
already gone underground in Beijing. On the streets around Zhongguancun, many non- 
native- looking people paced up and down and from time to time actively asked 
pedestrians whether they were looking for software CD -ROMs. They did not hold any 
CD -ROM disks on hand, and customers needed to follow the peddlers to inside alleys to 
select and pick the disks. Obviously, the Beijing authorities had cracked down on the 
sale of pirated software and the activities were being conducted in guerrilla style. 
As everything is more liberal in Guangzhou, so too is the sale of pirated 
software. The software was available at shops. An entrepreneur who was running 
software chain shops in Guangzhou complained to me that the Guangzhou authorities 
connived at the sale of pirated software on the condition that the shops concurrently 
sold a certain proportion of copyrighted software. The reason behind the tolerance was 
that this was a lucrative business that contributed much to the coffers of the police and 
the BICM, so they were reluctant to lose this significant source of revenue.70 
Piracy is threatening the survival of the software industry. As mentioned in the 
last chapter, one of the interviewed enterprises almost faced collapse under the crush of 
the pirated software. And this case was only the tip of the iceberg. Many software 
developers rebuked the government for failing to crack down on the pirated software; 
on the other hand, the domestic software developers themselves had less resort to the 
private enforcement of intellectual property rights than their Western counterparts.' 
70 Interviewee 31. 
71 
But one of entrepreneurs among my cases was appealing to a lawsuit against the infringement. of 
intellectual property rights by his former employee Interviewee 19. 
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Some software developers tried their own way, joining hands to fire back by launching 
a price war against pirated software. Another owner of software chain shops was going 
to launch such a price war in collaboration with other software developers. Many 
software packages originally priced one hundred -something yuan were now all priced 
28 yuan. Of course, it was a futile attempt. The producers of pirated software do not 
need to bear the cost of R &D, but the copyright holders do. And the production cost of 
a CD -ROM disk is merely two yuan. Moreover, as a journalist commented, the 
consequence of such cutthroat competition is curtailing the software developers' ability 
to undertake long -term development, because they could not rapidly accumulate 
sufficient capital for R &D.72 
While the entrepreneurs grumbled over the government's failure to handle the 
issue of piracy, they did not anticipate that the government would offer any direct 
substantial assistance to their industry. What they commonly demanded was that the 
government should further liberalise the restrictions upon the industry, create a fair 
environment for competition and improve the infrastructure for the industry. The 
example of unfairness entrepreneurs that frequently cited was the monopoly of China 
Telecom and its spin -offs that were unfairly competing with the private sector. 
Some entrepreneurs expressed their discontent with other state policies. Despite 
being a graced entrepreneur, the PC manufacturer in Guangzhou spent much time 
during the interview condemning the new SOE reform measure, debt -to- equity swap. 
He denounced the measure as rewarding the misbehaviour of SOEs' management: "the 
government doesn't care how much the SOEs owe, they don't need to repay the debt. 
The government further lavishly gives them money without any quid pro quo. This is 
z Zhongguo jingyingbao [China Business], 18 January 2000 (Internet edition: www.cb.com.cn). 
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encouraging enterprises not to keep to promises." The enduring juxtaposition of the 
SOEs and the private sector, and the undesirable state- private business relationship 
induced a grievance among certain private entrepreneurs. While they considered 
themselves to be contributing much more to economic development, they were kept in 
an inferior status and could not have equal access to resources with the SOEs. They 
even considered themselves to be subsidising the inefficient state sector. They also 
sensed that the bloated bureaucratic structure was milking the private sector of its 
economic surplus. While government officials often pleaded with them for computing 
technical assistance, they had to be subject to the leadership of these "incompetent" 
officials. A cynical attitude towards the state was prevalent among these well- educated 
IT entrepreneurs. 
Even though entrepreneurs did not require government support on the supply 
side, a few of them suggested that the government should bolster their development 
through the demand side. This opinion all came from entrepreneurs in Guangzhou. It is 
interesting to note that based in the national capital, most of Beijing's entrepreneurs 
among my cases embraced a broader vision. They just regarded Beijing as a core to 
disseminate their market into every corner of the country. They tended to take an 
offensive strategy to penetrate into various local markets. By contrast, the marketplace 
of Guangzhou's firms tended to be confined to Guangdong or South China at most. 
They took a defensive strategy to protect their own market. Hence, some of the 
Guangzhou entrepreneurs suggested the local government should spur more demand 
through government procurements and more computerisation of government 
departments. This finding is interesting in the sense that the Guangzhou entrepreneurs, 
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who commonly agreed that Guangzhou was one of the most liberal and marketised 
economic regions and had the most institutionalised and reliable commercial 
environment, urged more state intervention in the IT market. 
It was not remarkable, though, that Guangzhou and not the Beijing interviewees 
put forward this idea. Beijing has been the most computerised city in China. The 
government has been the top consumer of IT goods there as well. Despite this, the 
constellation of subsidiaries of the U &RIs in Beijing filled up the top of the selection 
list for government procurements. The small individually owned IT firms never take 
account of the possibility of their sharing in government contracts. But this is not the 
case in Guangzhou, where there are not such a large number of spin -offs. The small IT 
firms seem to have more opportunities to share in the pool of government contracts. 
It should be noted that the government already had formulated a policy line 
regarding government procurements in which the purchasing order should be placed 
with local firms if the conditions offered by other firms are not better. In the last 
chapter, I mentioned that the PC manufacturer in Guangzhou obtained the biggest PC 
purchasing contract from the Guangzhou government. It should be noted that its rivals 
included two top domestic PC manufacturers - Legend and Founder. This result was 
probably credited to the above policy. In the new development policy for the software 
industry, the central government also stipulates that all state agencies should adopt the 
domestic computer software provided that the domestic one does not carry fewer 
functions and a higher price.73 The newly -founded Tianhe Software Technology Park 
73 See Article 25 of "Detailed Rules on Development Policies of Encouraging Software and Integrated 
Circuit Industry" issued in October 2000. 
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under the TSP also promises to offer support to help the software firms at the Park to 
obtain government purchasing contracts.74 
Concluding Remarks 
The Chinese state now deploys various industrial policies to steer a path of IT 
development instead of the direct control employed during the era of a planned 
economy. Yet, the pace of development looks relatively slow vis-à-vis India, albeit its 
take -off in China was also achieved in a decade. Even though we take the relative 
deficiency of IT resources and advantage, especially human resources, into account, the 
Chinese IT industry would probably have made greater strides if there were no 
institutional constraints left in place by the old politico- economic institutions. And these 
constraints have included discrimination against private ownership compared to public 
enterprises. 
The "dysfunctional development" accounts for the considerable part of the 
growth. The spontaneous development of spin -offs and one -step -ahead local policies 
were indispensable for the industry's rapid growth. To be sure, the positive function of 
preferential policies should not be exaggerated. Even though Beijing offered less 
preferential treatment than Guangzhou, Beijing has been the spearhead of high -tech 
industrial growth. In 1999, the performance of Beijing's NHTDZ was top among all 
NHTDZs. The three main economic indices of Beijing's NHTDZ accounted for 10% of 
74 See Article 6 of "Provisional Methods concerning Supporting the Software Enterprises in the Tianhe 
Software Technology Park" issued in August 1999. 
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the total achieved by all 53 national -level NHTDZs.75 The geo- economic advantage of 
Beijing contributed much to the vigorous development. 
In sum, the state is more a hindrance than a help to the healthy development of 
the IT sector, and perhaps to the entire sphere of industrial development. The 
unreasonable taxation system, the outdated and ideology -ridden corporate regime, 
inadequate financial institutions, the predatory state machine, the protégé SOEs, the 
lack of transparency of the state and feeble law enforcement all account for the state's 
distorted or negative contributions to development. The entrepreneurs' alienation from 
the state ensues. Although the achievement of socialist marketisation should be credited 
to the withdrawal of the state from the direct management of economic operations, the 
state thereafter failed to rearticulate a mechanism to create a "negotiated relationship" 
with private business. As a result, the state is not yet able to strengthen the entire 
business sector in collaboration with the state's pursuit of developmental goals. 
Nonetheless, its collaboration with selected business groups /sectors is burgeoning now. 
The "intermediate state" approach to industrial development tends to implement 
a partial reform to influence economic transformation. The pick- the -winner strategy 
embodies this type of approach. The big private businesses are now picked by the state 
to be the backbone of industrial development and to participate in the more influential 
intermediary associations (e.g. the FIC) and lawmaking (i.e. People's Congress).76 They 
79 The three main indices are technology -industry-trade revenue, gross industrial output and state revenue 
contribution. See from Zhonghua gongshang shibao [China Business Times], 19 February 2000 
(Internet edition: wwwcbtcom.cn). 
76 At the 9th National People's Congress (1998 -2002), 80 deputies are private entrepreneurs, including 
those from the spin -off enterprises. See Zhonghua gongshang shibao [China Business Times], 6 March 
1998: 5. 
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become a privileged group, distinct from underprivileged small businesses. They enjoy 
better access to state resources. 
Despite the distinction, the privileged business groups to a certain extent 
represent all business strata, because they also share some common interests with their 
smaller counterparts. They have started to initiate their own agenda at the legislative 
level to fight for the interests of the private sector. The recent National People's 
Congress's redefinition of the non -public economy as an "important component of the 
socialist economy" is an outstanding case. The motion to pass this "redefinition" was 
tabled by a dozen deputies from the private business sector in 1998, and it was then 
voted on at the session in early 1999.77 To be sure, the political initiative of the private 
entrepreneurs as a whole is very limited and so should not he exaggerated, but the 
state's responsiveness to requests from the business circle has apparently been 
enhanced. 
The enhancement of state responsiveness is also reflected by an array of recent 
measures to nurture high -tech industrial growth. For instance, in order to facilitate the 
prosperity of the New Economy, the government is drafting an amendment to the 
Company Law by relaxing restrictions on the forming of limited companies and 
corporate finance so that private entry into incorporated enterprises becomes easier.78 It 
is noteworthy that the growth of IT/high tech industry in China also hastens the reform 
of the overall economic institutions, similar to what has been occurring in India. A 
partial industrial reform, in short, helps to trigger the momentum of an enlarged 
" Zhongguo qiye bao [Chinese Enterprise News], 4 June 1999: 5. 
7$ See Zhongguo jingying bao [China Business], 29 August & 10 October 2000 (Internet edition: 
www.cb.com.cn). 
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economic reform. The formulation of industrial policies and the growth of industry are 
mutually reinforced. 
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Plate 7.1: The Headquarters of the Ufsoft Group at the Shangdi 
Information Industry Base. 
Plate 7.2: The Construction Site of the New Headquarters of the 
CSC Group at the Shangdi Information Industry Base. 
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Chapter 8: Conclusion 
Private Ownership Matters 
The development of a de novo private sector as a prescription for economic 
reconstruction of the countries of the former Soviet bloc has recently drawn scholarly 
attention.' The most remarkable case is Poland, whose de novo private sector has played 
an indispensable role in re- engineering the national economy, which experienced a fast 
recovery as early as 1995. The private sector has accounted for the lion's share of the 
Polish GDP and labour force since the mid- 1990s.2 It is paradoxical to note that 
pessimism was dominant among the discussions of Poland's economic prospects 
throughout the 1980s and early 1990s. Its privatisation process was the slowest among 
these former communist countries, as the Polish government did not implement the 
privatisation programme in earnest from the outset, even though privatisation was 
upheld as the highest commandment for restructuring state- ownership- dominated 
economies. Probably it was a blessing in disguise. Without a deliberate plan, Poland's 
private sector has been prospering and has now become one of the largest in the region. 
At the same time, Poland still possesses a relatively large state sector.3 
See Krzysztof J. Ners, "Privatisation (from Above, Below, or Mass Privatisation) versus Generic Private 
Enterprise Building," Communist Economies & Economic Transformation 7, 1 (March, 1995): 105 -116; 
Grzegorz W. Kolodko, "Transition to a Market and Entrepreneurship: the Systemic Factors and Policy 
Options," Communist and Post -Communist Studies 33, 2 (June, 2000): 271 -293; Jan Winiecki, "Crucial 
Relationship between the Privatized Sector and the Generic Private Sector in Post -communist 
Privatization: Determinants of Economic Performance," Communist and Post -Communist Studies 33, 4 
(December, 2000): 505 -515. 
2 Krzysztof J. Ners, op. cit., 106. 
Ben Slay, "The Polish Economic Transition: Outcome and Lessons," Communist and Post -Communist 
Studies 33, 1 (March, 2000): 60 -1. 
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The awkward predicament of privatisation programmes among the former 
Soviet and East European countries is always taken as counter -evidence against the 
conventional faith in private ownership, especially compared with the "no- outright- 
privatisation" policy of China.4 However, the at times miserable experience of 
privatisation only means that the task of the transition can be arduous and time - 
consuming. There is no easy method, for instance, to clarify the ownership structure of 
SOEs, especially the large ones, which are deeply entrenched in the pre -reform system. 
As Jan Winiecki points out, cultivation of private ownership outside the old 
system is more feasible and easier for the state to rapidly hasten economic recovery and 
growth. It is more feasible to create institutional conditions for the de novo private 
sector than to re- organise the old state sector, as the latter entails more state input into 
the restructuring.5 By contrast, with its flexibility and better responsiveness to market 
signals, the small- and medium -sized private enterprises tend to perform far better than 
the state sector and privatised SOEs and are better able to absorb the surplus labour 
released by the old sector. At the same time, the growth of a de novo private sector also 
helps create a healthy and competitive environment to spur the reform of the state 
sector.6 
4 For example see Thomas G. Rawski, "Progress without Privatization: The Reform of China's State 
Industries," in Vedat Milor (ed.), Changing Political Economies: Privatization in Post- Communist and 
Reforming Communist States (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 1994); Cui Zhiyuan, "Zhongguo shijian dui 
xingudianzhuyi zhengzhi jingjixue de tiaozhan" [The Challenge of Chinese Practice to the Neo- classical 
Political Economy], Xianggang shehui kexue xuebao [Hong Kong Journal of Social Sciences], Special 
Issue (July, 1995): 1 -33; Edward S. Steinfeld, Forging Reform in China: The Fate of State -owned 
Industry (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998); Wu Yu -shan, "Huigu Zhongguodalu 
chanquan geige" [A Review of Property Rights Reform in Mainland], Xianggang shehui kexue xuebao 
[Hong Kong Journal of Social Sciences], 14 (Summer, 1999): 175 -199. 
5Jan Winiecki, op. cit., 508 -9. 
a Ibid; Grzegorz W. Kolodko, op. cit.; Krzysztof J. Ners, op. cit. 
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The liberal Chinese economist, Fan Gang, mentioned in Chapter 4, puts forward 
a similar argument in terms of "incrementalism" to account for the "success" story of 
the Chinese reform: the non -state sector, which refers to the new economic sector 
established outside the state planning system, has contributed the most to the post -Mao 
economic reforms. It is fortuitous that both Poland and China took a similar path of 
development. But it is absolutely not fortuitous that both countries have been 
successful. 
In China, the domestic non -state sector - the privately -owned, township -village 
and minying technology -based enterprises - is the counterpart of the de novo private 
sector in Eastern Europe. These non -state enterprises are now considered the same as 
"private" enterprises popularly on the mainland. However, a number of scholars are 
convinced that in China many of these enterprises, especially among the township - 
village and minying technology -based enterprises, are neither private nor semi -private 
due to their collective and state ownership in registration, and their association with 
local state authorities. But some of them also agree that these enterprises share most 
features of generic private enterprises.8 They are independent of state planning and have 
not received state budgetary investments. These enterprises are headed by entrepreneurs 
who have a high degree of autonomy in enterprise management and in disposal of the 
enterprises' property. The entrepreneurs enjoy the majority of the residual claims to the 
enterprises. Although many of these enterprises are claimed to have been initially 
See Wang Xiaogiang, Mozhe shitou guohe: Zhongguo geige zhilu [Crossing the River by Groping for 
Stones: The Path of China's Reform] (Hong Kong: Oxford University Press, 1996); and Qiwen Lu, 
China's Leap into the Information Age: Innovation and Organization in the Computer Industry (New 
York: Oxford University Press, 2000). 
For example, see the case studies of non -state computer enterprises in Lu's work, ibid. 
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funded by state institutions, the state or their parent institutes have not genuinely put 
considerable material or capital resources into the business. The enterprises utilise some 
state facilities and resources, but they pay for that, not without any quid pro quo.9 They 
are really the personal property of the co- founders of these enterprises. They registered 
their firms as "public" enterprises in part because the state did not allow the operation of 
private enterprises until 1988. Even after that date, the infant private enterprises were 
discriminated against by various state agencies until the end of the 1990s. Now these 
enterprises are trying to clarify their property rights either by incorporation or 
shareholding transformation. 
To be sure, as foreshadowed in Chapter One, private enterprises should not be 
confined to the enterprises funded by private capitalists and run by investors. In some 
cases, the state funds the development of private enterprises. Some remarkable 
examples are the enterprises set up at state -sponsored "enterprise incubator" zone by 
domestic and overseas university graduates. Many other foreign governments similarly 
sponsor young entrepreneurs to establish start-ups in the IT industry. The emergence of 
mínyíng technology -based enterprises does not lead to a conclusion that private 
ownership does not matter, but it demonstrates an alternative path for nurturing private 
enterprises. 
Networking of the IT Private Enterprises 
Despite special features of the industry, the IT sector shares a lot of common 
institutional issues with other private enterprises. According to my findings, most IT 
entrepreneurs among my cases have by formally registered their firms as private 
9 See such cases from Lu's work. Ibid. 
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companies in accordance with the Company Law and rid themselves of the institutional 
control of a guakao. The entrepreneurs in my sample are no longer confronted by the 
common constraints previously faced by all private enterprises and no longer survive 
through official patronage. They are enjoying a high degree of autonomy and some have 
even been highly mobile, disregarding the enduring constraints imposed by the 
household registration system. 
However, the TT entrepreneurs also face specific problems with respect to the 
special features of the TT industry. Alongside the state imposing a regulatory regime 
over the industry, some of these entrepreneurs need to go through more administrative 
and supervisory procedures and even face the problem of their businesses' legitimacy, 
as some policy areas are either still ambiguous or are pending state regulations. In this 
regard, it is advantageous for the entrepreneurs to keep close and good relations with the 
officialdom -in- charge. On the one hand, it helps them to keep abreast of government 
information. On the other, the entrepreneurs may try to lobby for a policy in line with 
their interests. In light of the government setting great store by the IT industry, IT 
entrepreneurs tend to bet their stakes on a marketisation policy line of the Party that is 
supposed to further liberalise control and open more areas to the private sector in the 
future. 
Marketisation counts for much with regard to the developmental autonomy of 
the private enterprises. Marketisation is dampening the magnitude of individual 
linkages. Exclusive linkages are reduced and becoming less influential. Marketisation in 
the sense of network analysis implies expansion and opening of webs of personal 
interchange. It opens opportunities for more and varied market participants, including 
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investors, entrepreneurs and consumers, with the scale of business enlarged. And the 
opportunity of manipulation by a few business participants decreases accordingly. 
This process of marketisation of the Chinese IT sector can be outlined in terms 
of a transition from a government -demand -driven market to a business- and populace - 
demand -driven market. The process witnesses a decline of exclusive official linkages. 
The enterprises are relentlessly exploiting new markets for their products, and sales to 
government cannot satisfy this demand. The emergence of a business- and populace - 
demand -driven market obviously lessens the dependence of IT enterprises upon state 
institutions. It can be argued that during this transition, the state sector and all of the 
spin -offs from various state institutions do not miss the chance to compete for benefits 
so the smaller private enterprises gain no edge in their access to resources. Despite this, 
the private sector has not lost the cutting edge in competition in this very marketised 
sector. In fact, the state sector also seeks partnerships with private firms in light of their 
better intellectual resources. In this study, the collaboration between software 
compan ies and state -owned book publishers provides an example. Despite the greater 
resources held by the state -sector partner, the autonomy of the private partner does not 
dwindle, because both sides come to terms of their own accord. Above all, the key to 
autonomy is the diversity of market participants, giving the private entrepreneurs more 
choices and bargaining power. 
This is not to deny the existence of exclusive linkages and even of patron- client 
relationships in some sectors of the IT business, such as in the areas where state policy 
is vague or immature, and those areas where there is a lack of marketisation, like the 
core business in the telecommunications industry, which is monopolised by a couple of 
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the state -owned companies. Derivative businesses need to depend upon them, for 
example ISP and Intemetphone. However, those enterprises that depend too much upon 
exclusive and clientelist ties are weak enterprises. Moreover, fierce business 
competition is not absent among the dependants. In this regard, I want to reiterate a 
hypothesis - that entrepreneurs tend to want to both reduce dependence and exploit the 
advantage of retaining important personal ties. 
Successful enterprises tend to be able to diversify their business linkages so as to 
minimise the risk of depending too much upon specific linkages. It should be noted that 
those business areas that are dependent on a state monopoly firm tend to be less 
developed and to be unable to expand their scale in the marketplace rapidly. Among the 
IT private entrepreneurs, they usually agree that the more market participants, the more 
development in the IT industry. They compare the current development stage of the 
industry to "making a pie" what the IT enterprises should do is to make a bigger pie, 
not to cut and divide the pie. Hence, it is desirable to involve more participants in the 
business. To pursue a monopoly profit does not benefit the enterprises and the industry 
in the long run. Hence, most of the private entrepreneurs do not strive for exclusive 
linkages so as to seek "rent." 
The bigger private enterprises are better able to diversify their linkages and 
minimise the risk- taking. David Wank suggests that the bigger a private enterprise 
became, the more important bureaucratic support became to it and that clientelist ties 
become more salient between big entrepreneurs and government officials. My findings 
do not attest to his hypothesis. In the first place, my cases suggest that small IT 
entrepreneurs also rely upon official ties to promote their businesses. Moreover, the 
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degree of dependence is not lower than their bigger counterparts, because the infant 
enterprise usually lacks diversified linkages so that the key official ties become 
relatively more significant. On the contrary, the bigger private firms tend to have 
cultivated diversified linkages and seldom rely upon one specific linkage. Probably the 
big business ventures demand more bureaucrat -controlled resources; but, owing to their 
rising social status credited to their economic contribution, the bigger entrepreneurs 
tend to have better bargaining power to secure bureaucrat -controlled resources, like land 
and bank loans. The small IT entrepreneurs also need these resources, but their 
accessibility to them is very low. The so- called bureaucrat- controlled resources are not 
so scarce as to be invaluable, however. Notably, too, local officials also want to release 
these resources to the better performing private enterprises to boost the local economic 
growth. Furthermore, inter -regional competition de- monopolises the access to them. 
Wank's hypothesis is devoid of a broader networking analysis, not 
encompassing a cross -sectoral, macro and "demand side" analysis. First of all, Wank's 
study only focuses upon one sector - the trading industry, and so it provides no 
comparative analysis. AIthough mine is on the IT industry, it contains several sectors 
that have different circumstances that can be compared. In addition, Wank's analysis 
does not weigh the comparative advantages and consequences of different networking 
strategies, even though this would be significant for us to judge the magnitude of 
exclusive and clientelist ties. Wank also disregards the impact of resource re- allocation 
after economic development upon the state -business relationship. 
Furthermore, Wank's hypothesis only lies in a "supply side" analysis in which it 
is implicitly assumed that the growth of an enterprise is only determined by the 
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production inputs that are provided by limited suppliers. He did not take into account 
the role of consumers, downstream buyers and producers, and even the local 
governments that compete with each other for developing local economies. His 
argument was tenable in the 1980s when a seller's market was dominant. However, with 
the advent of a buyer's market in the 1990s, it becomes questionable. It is noteworthy 
that Wank ignored the emergence of a buyer's market inasmuch as he did not agree that 
the post -Mao reform has created China real marketisation. On all these counts, this 
study of the IT industry shows that Wank's hypotheses are untenable. 
I do not argue that all marketplaces have become buyer's markets. Some areas, 
like real estate and financial and investment businesses, entail rent -seeking behaviour. 
To be sure, these are not areas of business where the generic private sector can operate. 
They are usually sources of profit- seeking of bureaucratic capitalists. 
Embeddedness vs. Disembeddedness and Path Dependence 
The foregoing discussion of networking leads us to the issue of embeddedness and 
disembeddedness. In terms of economic transformation, embeddedness is usually 
understood as a changing economic institution embedded in enduring social and cultural 
institutions, plus political institutions in the case of China. By contrast, 
disembeddedness refers to separating the economic institution from the social, cultural 
and political institutions. It should be recognised that both embeddedness and 
disembeddedness usually occur concurrently during economic transformation. 
Sometimes, whether we define a process as embeddedness or disembeddedness depends 
upon our perception of it. For example, AnnaLee Saxenian argues that the success of 
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the IT industry in Silicon Valley should be attributed to special informal social 
networks among IT enthusiasts who circulate IT information via after -working -hours 
social life. She accedes to the thesis of a "social embeddedness of economic life. "10 But 
I can alternatively define it as an "economic embeddedness of social life." In fact, these 
IT enthusiasts extend their working hours informally into their leisure time. Economic 
Iife invades social life. 
After all, there is no pure process of embeddedness and disembeddedness in the 
economic transformation. What we should focus upon is to see which one is prevailing 
in the tug of war. Espousers of the school of "embeddedness" usually substantiate their 
argument by demonstrating the persistence of social and cultural institutions in shaping 
economic life, or demonstrating the gap between real life and the ideal -typical model. I 
suggest this is a "static" approach, as against a "dynamic" approach, which focuses 
upon the development direction of the changing process. What I am concerned about is 
the relative shift of the institution. I do not cling to the ideal -typical model that may 
never be attained in the future. In this sense, for instance, Wank seems to regard the 
emergence of minying enterprises as "embeddedness," because he judges that this 
category of enterprises cannot be distinguished as public or private if gauged in terms of 
the ideal- typical model." But in the view of the "dynamic" approach, this category of 
enterprises is a stepping stone to achieve a greater clarity of property rights in the 
special context of socialist China. In short, only the "dynamic" approach can help 
1° AnnaLee Saxeian, Regional Advantage: Culture and Competition in Silicon Valley and Route 128 
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1994), 29 -57. 
" The growth of minying enterprises is a complicated phenomenon, for which I have given an account in 
this dissertation. Wank's account is too thin to make an appropriate judgement. See David L Wank, 
Commodìfying Communism: Business, Trust, and Politics in a Chinese City (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1999), 207. 
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account for the substance of the economic transformation. Arguments of the "static" 
approach are sometimes self -evident, but seldom show the dynamics of change. 
To find which process, embeddedness or disembeddedness, is prevailing, I tried 
to trace the development trend of my sample of private entrepreneurs and their 
enterprises chronologically. My findings, as discussed in Chapters Five and Six and 
foreshadowed in the last section, substantiate that disembeddedness is prevailing, albeit 
embeddedness has not disappeared. The economic rationale increasingly dominates the 
business behaviour of these private entrepreneurs, even though they are embedded in 
various rhetorical justifications which are aimed at conforming to the notion of 
socialism, such as justifying the depersonalised status of legal person, the socialist 
nature of the shareholding transformation and minying against siying in enterprise 
labelling. 
With the liberalisation and marketisation policy of the post -Mao Chinese state, 
these entrepreneurs are disembedded from various old institutional controls. The 
business linkages between the private and the state sector become ever more business - 
oriented. Informal ties persist, but it is ever more based upon "professional trust." To 
pursue long -term development, the private enterprises are also rationally disemhedded 
from entrepreneurial familism, which has been considered a long -lasting cultural feature 
of Chinese enterprises. Even though the state is imposing a regulatory regime upon the 
IT industry, no one expects that it would take the industry back to the planning era. 
"Embedded liberalism" in Western society has not really come into being, 
Hannes Lacher argues, because the foundation of the logic of the market has not been 
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rooted out.'2 This argumentation could be transplanted to China: when the logic of the 
market is introduced into China, disembeddedness must be the trend of development. 
To be sure, this development must vary from the Western or the ideal -typical model. 
There is a misconception that the disembeddedness is a process of perfect convergence 
with other market- oriented societies. 
The variation should be attributed to the problem of path dependence. The 
theory of "path dependence" is sometimes confused with that of "embeddedness," 
because the former is often mistaken as entailing an institutional inertia.13 In fact, the 
notion of "path dependence" only denotes that the past decision -making/institutions 
significantly limit the choices of subsequent decision -making/institution building. For 
example, the household registration system impedes non -native urban entrepreneurs 
from forming family firms. State -owned book publishers with traditionally good 
connections with the state's education system become the most desirable partners of 
education software companies. But it does not follow that the institution is not evolving 
based upon a rational profit- seeking motivation. 
In addition, it is not necessarily the case that different paths must point in 
different directions. In other words, someone can choose several different paths but still 
walk in the same direction. Of course, the paths are not uniform. Some of them are 
difficult; others are easy, probably short cuts. For example, the development of the 
private economy in China, as discussed in Chapter 3, is determined by the historical 
path of the Party policy towards the private sector. This path of development led to a 
12 Hannes Lacher, "Embedded Liberalism, Disembedded Markets: Reconceptualising the Pax 
Americana," New Political Economy 4, 3 (November, 1999): 345. 
13 For example, see Hongying Wang, "Informal Institution and Foreign Investment in China," The Pacific 
Review 13, 4 (2000): 548. 
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non -straightforward revival of the private sector and produced a "variant" version of 
private firms, minying enterprises. The Party policy also stifles a swifter development of 
a private IT sector compared with India, as I argued in Chapter 7. However, above all, 
the trends of IT development that rely upon the private sector remain similar in both 
countries. On the other hand, the relatively successful revival of the private sector in 
China and Poland compared with other former communist states underlines the 
historical paths of these different countries, among which both China and Poland had a 
less developed state sector and planning system in the pre -reform era.14 Even so, it does 
not follow that other former communist countries should repudiate a strategy of 
spurring the growth of the private sector, nor does it follow that China and Poland 
should forfeit the privatisation of the state sector. Gradual and small -scale privatisation 
has in fact been proceeding in China. 
Impact of the Growth of the Private IT Sector upon Transformation 
This study of the private IT sector does not represent the experience of all types of 
private enterprises. IT is one of the most marketised of China's sectors, to the largest 
extent ridding itself of the planning system and being influenced by global IT 
production and markets. But it nonetheless demonstrates the degree of impact of the 
market upon industrial transformation and upon political and social relationships - 
which is one of the purposes of this study. Market forces do not penetrate into every 
aspect of social life. But once they enter, their impact is profound. Under the pressure of 
marketisation, the IT entrepreneurs require that China's economic institutions and 
14 I share this argument with Jan Winieckì, op. cit., 514. 
276 
practices increasingly live up to international standards. By the same token, this group 
of entrepreneurs belongs among the enthusiasts who anticipate an early accession of 
China to the World Trade Organisation, which is supposed to prompt the country to 
adhere to the international market system. 
The IT industry is largely managed by young entrepreneurs. This new 
generation of entrepreneurs disengages from any stereotyped business tradition and 
culture. Facing fierce competition, they have to be innovative and dare to change the 
established institutions. By the same token, these young entrepreneurs are better able to 
learn and absorb new and foreign modes of management and technology. The sector is a 
testing ground for various new ideas and methods such as utilisation of venture capital 
to finance an enterprise. As a result, the sector per se is a vanguard in circumventing the 
institutions that for a long time stifled the development of the private economy. 
In a different sense, too, the introduction of information technology is 
profoundly changing socio- economic relationships. For instance, the development of the 
Internet and e- commerce weakens the magnitude of guanxi ties, but create webs of 
impersonal networks among people from distant regions. In this respect, the new 
information technology is beginning to significantly change the mode of business 
transactions, just as is beginning to occur in the West. 
The IT sector accounts for the majority of high -tech enterprises, which as a 
whole have been standing at the forefront of Chinese industrial advancement. Through 
this high -tech industry, the Party started to show respect for private property rights, 
because it is comprehensible to Party leaders that the property rights structure is closely 
correlated with the performance of the IT/high -tech enterprises. Hence, the industry has 
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always been a pilot site of property rights reforms. The Party policy towards the high - 
tech industry is driving the overall liberalisation of the private sector. Several 
deregulation measures, such as the amendment to the Company Law noted in Chapter 7, 
are aimed primarily at bolstering the high -tech industry, and other private enterprises 
share in the benefit. Hence, the IT/high -tech industry has become an engine to hasten 
the development of all private enterprises. 
Obstacles to Being a Developmental State 
Peter Evans categorises India as an intermediate state, in which it is hard to describe its 
features in unambiguous terms, because it lacks a consistent performance within the 
entire state structure. This is also true for China, and there exist numerous inconsistent 
and contradictory scholarly descriptions of different parts of the Chinese state. The 
Chinese state shares most of the features of the intermediate state. 
This dissertation has attempted to give an account of the state -business 
relationship through the lens of IT industrial development. In Chapter 7, I concluded 
that India enjoys a marginal advantage in that its politico- economic institutions are 
better able to facilitate the growth of the private IT industry. Despite this marginal 
advantage, the two countries are similarly operated overall by bloated, inefficient and 
corrupt bureaucratic machinery. As an intermediate state, though, the above image may 
not be applicable to every aspect of the state. In the area of the IT industrial 
development, the image and performance of the concerned government departments are 
relatively better. The administrations of the New & High Technology Development 
Zones (NHTDZs) and of the Commission of Science and Technology present a better 
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impression to my interviewees, even though they are not helpful to every firm. 
OccasionaIIy, these administrations actively nurture certain potentially good companies. 
At the level of policymaking, despite involving bottom -up spontaneity, the state 
has adopted an appropriate strategy to unleash the rich resources of universities and 
research institutes (U &RIs) in high -tech industrial development. The state aptly allows 
the spin -offs from the U &Rs to establish semi -private science and technology 
enterprises that have demonstrated a better performance than the traditional SOEs. The 
state also set up separate NHTDZs to nurture the infant industry so that it can develop in 
an environment that is relatively insulated from the old state institutions. Supportive 
policies are also adopted via taxation and demand -side measures. Apart from the 
protection, the government tries to create a competitive tender system for government 
procurements to ensure domestic rivalry, which is important to upgrade the technology 
of the domestic sector.15 
Unfortunately, though, owing to a weakening capacity, different parts of the 
state bureaucratic machinery fail to coordinate well with each other at the level of 
implementation. The state gives no sufficient support to financing IT, or to law 
enforcement of intellectual property rights or to the establishment of infrastructure. 
Considerable state resources have been siphoned off to salvage numerous moribund 
SOEs in past years. To exacerbate the situation, the good performance in one part of the 
state machine is offset by bad business operations in other parts. The predatory aspects 
of the state machine still persist in an intermediate state. It is especially the case in 
China, because its gigantic bureaucratic structure has never been downsized, not as the 
15 See this viewpoint from Michael Porter, The Competitive Advantage of Nations (New York: The Free 
Press, 1990), 662. 
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Party reformist leaders planned, and, indeed in some sectors the size of the 
bureaucracies is snowballing.'6 The problem is exacerbated as the growing layoffs from 
the SOEs are in part absorbed by the state administration. Currently, the IT sector is not 
facing onerous problems vis -à -vis predatory government organs, and is in fact enjoying 
preferential treatment and a higher marginal profit. The degree of the state's 
responsiveness to the sector's demands is apparently higher. However, these factors 
may not persist evenly in the future. 
To settle the above diverse issues - e.g. on intellectual property rights and 
piracy - creation of a "negotiated relationship" between the state and the business 
sector is imperative. However, the state still clings to its obsolete role of leadership over 
enterprises, when it now needs to re- define the relationship after the disintegration of 
the danwei system. As a result, deficiency of communication between the state and IT 
entrepreneurs is evident. 
Despite the political apathy among the entrepreneurs, they sense that the 
sustainability of their business's development highly depends upon an efficient, stable, 
reasonable, predictable and unambiguous politico- economic system. Today, the 
entrepreneurs from time to time need to rely upon informal ties (probably corrupt ones) 
to tackle the problems caused by defect -ridden institutions. Even though the 
entrepreneurs can either enjoy benefits or avoid unreasonable treatment through tax 
evasion and fabrication of registered capital and partnerships, they understand this 
involves a potential danger that their "misbehaviour" will be disclosed. The owners of 
fast -growing private enterprises, which are the focus of media attention, especially try 
IS See Hu Jiayong, "Woguo zhengfu guimo weishenme jixu pengzhang ?" [Why does the Scale of Our 
Government Continue to Expand ?], Gaíge [Reform], 90 (March, 1998): 87 -92, 103. 
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to avoid being "the lead bird that is shot down once it takes off.îi7 They prefer to run 
their business in full compliance with a formal institution so that they can pay full 
attention to their normal business operations. However, sometimes they have no option 
but to act illegally because some state agencies did not act in compliance with overt 
laws and regulations, or some policies or measures are per se unreasonable and 
unfeasible. Although this study is not concerned with the political implications of the 
growth of the private economy, I suggest that greater political participation by 
entrepreneurs is essential to tackle this issue. Only in a coordinated and negotiated 
relationship between the state and the business sector will the Chinese state even begin 
to come close to being a developmental state. 
Last but not least, this dissertation has juxtaposed two arguments that at first 
blush seem opposite to each other: arguing for the overwhelming impact of market 
forces upon economic transformation on the one hand, but recognising the substantiality 
and magnitude of informal ties and state participation on the other. Arguing for both 
sides of an issue is mutually excluded in usual academic argumentation, I do not 
subscribe to this tradition. The existence of business -oriented informal ties does not 
counteract the tremendous impact of marketisation, nor does the state's participation in 
economic transformation. In a neo- statist perspective, the state matters not because of 
its high capacity to intervene in the economy. The role of the state needs incessantly to 
17 It is often commented upon that most private entrepreneurs dare not make their firms too large and 
striking, because the firms easily become the target of attacks for various reasons. This is compared to 
shooting down birds that attempt to take off (paoda chutouniao). 
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change over the process of the transformation. A developmental state is a state that can 
flexibly and appropriately adjust itself to different stages of economic development. 
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Appendix I: List of Interviews 
Beijing 
Date of Interview Position Enterprise 




Interviewee 2* 14 May 1999 General Manager PC Manufacturer 
Interviewee 3 2 June 1999 Legal Advertising Co. 
Representative 
Interviewee 4 3 June 1999 Sales Manager Pharmaceutical Co. 
Interviewee 5 5 June 1999 Manager Drug Shop 
Interviewee 6 8 June 1999 Executive Computer Hardware 
Manager Dealer 
Interviewee 7 8 June 1999 General Manager Software Co. 
Interviewee 8 9 June 1999 CEO Software Co. 
Interviewee 9 14 June 1999 Assistant to Ufsoft Group 
President 




Interviewee 11 16 June 1999 Vice General Software Co. 
Manager 
Interviewee 12 18 June 1999 Assistant to CSC Group 
President 
Interviewee 13 22 June 1999 General Manager Software Co. 
Interviewee 14 23 June 1999 General Manager Software Co. 
Interviewee 15 24 June 1999 Manager Food and Beverage Dealer 
Interviewee 16 28 June 1999 Chief Editor Sparkice 
Interviewee 17 29 June 1999 Manager Software Co. 
Interviewee 18 30 June 1999 General Manager Software Co. 
Interviewee 19 5 July 1999 General Manager Software Co. 
Interviewee 20 5 July 1999 General Manager Light Aircraft 
Manufacturer 
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Interviewee 21 8 July 1999 General Manager Software Co. 
Interviewee 22 14 July 1999 General Manager Internet Co. 
Interviewee 23 15 July 1999 General Manager Software Co. 
Interviewee 24 20 July 1999 Managing Pharmaceutical Co. 
Director cum 
General Manager 
Interviewee 25 21 July 1999 General Manager Land Property Co. 
Interviewee 26 21 July 1999 General Manager Internet Co. 
Interviewee 27 27 July 1999 Manager Software Co. 
Interviewee 28 28 July 1999 General Manager Internet Co. 
Interviewee 29 4 August 1999 Manager Software Co. 
* Interviewees 1 & 2 are from the same enterprise. 
Guangzhou 
Date of Interview Position Enterprise 
Interviewee 30 7 October 1999 General Manager Telecommunications Co. 
Interviewee 31 11 October 1999 General Manager Software Co. 
Interviewee 32 14 October 1999 Vice General Software Co. 
Manager 
Interviewee 33 20 October 1999 Manager Network System Co. 
Interviewee 34 21 October 1999 General Manager Software Co. 
Interviewee 35 22 October 1999 General Manager Software Co. 
Interviewee 36 27 October 1999 General Manager Computer Hardware Dealer 
Interviewee 37 28 October 1999 Manager Software Co. 
Interviewee 38 2 November 1999 Executive Computer Engineering Co. 
General Manager 
Interviewee 39 3 November 1999 Managing Agricultural Technology 
Director Co. 
Interviewee 40 4 November 1999 General Manager Software Co. 
Interviewee 41 6 November 1999 General Manager PC Manufacturer 
Interviewee 42 8 November 1999 General Manager Internet Co. 
Interviewee 43 11 November 1999 General Manager Software Co. 
Interviewee 44 17 November 1999 President Technology Research Co. 
Interviewee 45 17 November 1999 General Manager Software Co. 
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Interviewee 46 19 November 1999 General Manager Internet Co. 
Interviewee 47 21 November 1999 Executive Computer Hardware Dealer 
Manager 
Interviewee 48 29 November 1999 General Manager Software Co. 
Interviewee 49 2 December 1999 General Manager Software Co. 
Interviewee 50 4 December 1999 General Manager Internet Co. 
Interviewee 51 9 December 1999 Executive Vice Software Co. 
General Manager 
Interviewee 52 10 December 1999 General Manager Software Co. 
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Appendix II: Questionnaire* 
Personal Particulars 
1. What is your business? 
2. Sex 
3. Age 
4. Education level 
5.1. What is the job of your father now? 
If he is retired or passed away, what was his job and position? 
5.2. What is the job of your mother now? 
If she is retired or passed away, what was her job and position? 
6. What is your household registration (hukou)? 
If you were not born here, where is your place of birth? 
If you have got the local residency, when did you get it? 
7.1. Did you do any other businesses before you started this one? 
7.2. Were you hired by any work unit (danwei) before you started this business? 
Enterprise's Background 
1. When did you start the current business? 
2. Why did you choose this business? 
3. Is your business attached (guakao) to any unit? 
4.1. As what type of enterprise did your business register at the beginning? 
a. Individual (getihu) 
h. Private enterprise 
c. State -owned 
d. Limited 
e. Shareholding limited 
f. Shareholding cooperative 
* This questionnaire is translated from the original Chinese version. Most of hypothesised answers listed 
in the Chinese one are expunged here. 
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g. Others: 
4.2. Have you changed the registration? 
If yes, what is it now? And when did it change? 
What are the reasons for the change? 
5. How much was the start-up registered capital? 
How much is it now? 
6.1. How many partners were there at the beginning? 
What were their relations with you? 
If there were more than one partner (except you), what was /were the relation 
between you and the most important one /s? 
6.2. How many partners are there now? 
What are their relations with you? 
If there are more than one partner (except you), what is /are the relation between 
you and the most important one /s? 
6.3. Is /are this /these most important partner /s local person/people? 
If yes, does /do he /she /they embark on any other businesses or work in other units? 
If yes, what does /do he /she /they do? 
If no, where do /does he /she /they come from? 
Does /do he /she /they embark on any other businesses or work in other units? 
If yes, what does /do he /she /they do? 
7. How many staff do you hire? 
How did you hire them? 
8. What are the sources of your capital? 
Business Operations, Competition and Linkages 
1.1 Do you think your firm has any edge over other average firms in the same industry 
(except state firms)? If yes, what are they? 
1.2. Do you think your firm has any edge over state firms in the same industry? If yes, 
what are they? 
1.3. Are there any disadvantages in the competition with the state firms? If yes, what are 
they? 
2.1. Which type of enterprise is your greatest competitor? 
a. Private firm 
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b. State -owned firm 
c. Foreign- invested firm. 
d. Township- village collective firm 
e. Others: 
2.2. Compared with this competitor, what disadvantages does your firm have? 
3.1. What strategies have you adopted to compete? 
Was /were it /they effective? 
3.2. If you have adopted more than one strategy, which one was more effective? 
3.3. What strategy do you think is the most effective in your industry? 
4.1. What is /are the most significant business companions of your firm? 
4.2. How did you make connections with this /these companion /s? 
4.3. Why is /are ìt/they the most significant companion/s? 
4.4. Does /do the companion/s connect customers for you? 
If yes, how significant are these connections? 
5.1. What are the sources of your customers? 
5.2 Among the sources, what proportion of turnover does the most important one 
constitute? 
6. What were the start-up difficulties of your firm? 
7.1. Do you plan to expand/develop your business? 
If yes, how do you expand /develop? 
If no, why? 
7.2. No matter whether you now intend to expand/develop, what obstacles do you 
expect to come across if you do so? 
8.1. What are the difficulties of your firms' daily operation? 
8.2. How do you tackle them? 
9.1. Did your firm get loans from any banks or financial firms? 
If yes, what is the type of the financial unit? 
Did you need any guarantor? 
Tf yes, what unit/who was the guarantor? 
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Did the loan need any collateral? 
Relationship with Government 
1.1. What government departments does your firm contact? 
1.2. Which one does your firm contact the most frequently? 
Why do you contact it so frequently? 
1.3. Is there any government department that is concerned with the development of your 
business? 
If yes, what is it? How is it concerned with your business? 
2.1. How many types of taxes and fees does your firm need to pay? 
2.2. Do they increase or decrease compared with before? 
If increase, why? If decrease, why? 
2.3. Does the tax /fee expense of your firm increase or decrease? 
If increase, why? If decrease, why? 
3.1. Does the government offer any assistance or preferential measures to your firms? 
If yes, how did you get it/them? 
To what extent could it/they help your firm? 
Does the government give it /them to any other firms? 
3.2. Have you requested any assistance from the government? 
If yes, which department and through which channel to request? 
What is the response of the department? 
If no, why? 
3.3. Is /Are there any government policy /policies that can help the development of 
private economy? 
If yes, what is /are it /they? 
4.1. Among the departments you have contacted, which ones give you good 
impression? Reasons? 
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4.2. Among the departments you have contacted, which ones give you bad impression? 
Reasons? 
Miscellaneous Questions 
1.1. Are you a member of the Chinese Communist Party? 
1.2. Are you a member of any Democratic Parties? 
1.3. Are you a People's Representative or a member of Political Consultative 
Conference? 
If yes, have you ever proposed any anything about the private economy to it? 
If yes, what is it? What is the effect? 
2.1. Do you think the private property is legally protected now? 
If yes, how? 
If no, explain? 
2.2. In practice, is the private property protected effectively? 
If no, reasons? 
3.3. Are you a member of Federation of Industry and Commerce or /and Private 
Enterprises Association? 
If yes, does /do it /they provide you with any assistance? 
3.2. How do you describe the functions of these two organizations? 
4.1. Have you participated in other social activities? 
If yes, do these activities help promote your business development? 
If yes, in what aspects? 
5.1. Do you have any overseas investment /properties? 
5.2. Do you have any overseas family member? 
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